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ABSTRACT

This report (the fourth volume of the auxiliary series, "Schools for the 70's and Beyond") contains a 25-page synopsis of the conference, the texts of papers presented at the conference, and lists of participants. The papers, which take up the major portion of the document, are subsumed under three headings: 1) "Behaving and Believing," a paper by William F. O'Neill and the replies to it; 2) "Values and the Curriculum," a group of general session addresses; 3) "The Choices Before Us," speeches presented at a panel on curriculum reform. The speeches attempted to identify the values implicit in the educational systems of the three participating countries--England, Canada, and the United States, the process by which a human being acquires values, and the ways in which the school curriculum can be modified to include both implicit and explicit education in values. (Related documents in this series are ED 031 452, ED 037 405, ED 038 332, and SP 004 198.) (RT)

VALUES AND THE CURRICULUM

A Report of the Fourth International Curriculum Conference

Edited by William G. Carr
Secretary-General
World Confederation of
Organizations of the Teaching Profession

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Values and the Curriculum

A Report of
the Fourth International
Curriculum Conference

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FOREWORD

Values and the Curriculum—A Report of the Fourth International Curriculum Conference is the fourth volume of the auxiliary series of SCHOOLS FOR THE 70'S AND BEYOND, a major publication and action program of the National Education Association's Center for the Study of Instruction (CSI). The program has three parts. The first is a single-volume, multimedia report addressed to all members of the profession and the public. The second is a preliminary series addressed mainly to the teaching profession. The third, the auxiliary series, is addressed principally to curriculum specialists and to university and school researchers.

The Fourth International Curriculum Conference was held at Mohonk Mountain House, New Paltz, New York, October 13-18, 1969. The NEA Center for the Study of Instruction was host for the Conference which also included delegations from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and the Schools Council of England and Wales. These agencies also were represented on the Planning Committee and sponsored the three previous conferences which had been held in Toronto (1964 and 1966) and in Oxford (1967).

The Conference program included plenary sessions, panels, small group discussions, films, and visits to schools. Greetings to the Conference were sent by President Nixon through the U.S. Commissioner of Education, James Allen. The Conference Chairman was Dr. Stephen Wright, Consultant for the College Entrance Examination Board and former Chairman of the Educational Policies Com-

mission. Conference Coordinator was William G. Carr, Secretary-General of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

The International Curriculum Conferences have been an important but deliberately informal clearinghouse of ideas and results of experimentation and innovation. Unlike most other international conferences, they have neither developed formal resolutions nor created a permanent staff or any other continuing machinery. The sponsoring organizations agreed that 100 participants would be named from the host country with 50 each from Canada and England.

The Fourth Conference differed from its predecessors in the considerable number of practicing classroom teachers in the delegations. Another innovation was the presence of a representative group of 29 high school students as part of the U.S. delegation. The students attended all meetings, participated in the discussion groups, accompanied the other participants on the school visits, and were represented on the summarizing panel.

In order to promote personal interchange, discussion groups were kept small (about ten persons) and over half of the Conference schedule was reserved for these small groups in unstructured meetings.

A major part of the costs to plan and administer the Conference was supplied by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Ole Sand, *Chairman*, Planning Committee
Director, Center for the Study of Instruction
National Education Association

Synopsis of the Conference

William G. Carr

To endeavor to compress what has already been tersely spoken on highly complex topics, involving three national cultures (and who knows how many subcultures?) is a task which can only be undertaken lightly. Anyone who would try to write a summary in any other mood would probably develop an anxiety neurosis within a few hours. Let me therefore announce cheerfully that the interpretive summary of the Conference that follows is mine alone. No doubt I have reduced complex ideas to statements altogether too simple to be true. I plead guilty in advance to whatever crime is involved in being, as the new pejorative word says, "simplistic."

Fortunately I can also include here the major part of the texts of the prepared papers. I beg the reader who can spare the time—and all who spare the time will be well rewarded—to read the documents for himself. To those bold and busy souls who prefer a shorter version, even though it is to a degree incomplete and inexact, this editor's synopis is very cautiously dedicated.

SELECTION OF THE CONFERENCE THEME

In their opening remarks, the Conference Chairman, Dr. Stephen Wright, and the Chairman of the Planning Committee, Dr. Ole Sand, made it clear that the planners of the Conference had selected the theme "Values and the Curriculum" knowing well that they had chosen one of the most difficult and elusive of all possible topics. The selection was made, however, in the earnest belief that values have a central place in the schools of the three participating countries and in the lives of the English, the American, and the Canadian peoples. It is not too much to say that the social, economic, and political systems of these countries rest on certain basic values. The relation between these values and the program of education is therefore of fundamental importance.

"Values and the Curriculum" is an important theme not merely because of its long-range considerations, but also because, at this

particular point in history, the growth of science and technology, the declining influence of organized religion, the increased emphasis upon material goods, and the alienation of many young people are among the factors which combine to make this theme not only significant but urgent.

Thus, the selection of the theme was a challenge to the quality of the participants, and its very difficulty was the highest of compliments to those who came to the Conference.

It would be unrealistic, Dr. Wright warned the Conference, to expect that it would end triumphantly with neat solutions to the complex problems implicit in the theme. Nevertheless, he held out the hope that serious and thoughtful examination of the problems and issues involved would deepen thoughts, increase understanding, kindle interest, and lay firm foundations for further study and exploration in the improvement of schools in a most urgent and critical area.

PERSPECTIVES

The three previous conferences, said Wilfred Wees in the keynote address, faced two basic questions: (a) how to get education to adapt to changing times and (b) how to make education more directly responsive to human needs. The two problems, it would seem, are not entirely separable. The speaker, in fact, regarded the Fourth Conference as an effort to make the two problems coalesce in such a way as to permit a simultaneous solution to both of them.

Systematic effort to predict and plan the future, a process which Dr. Wees entitled "futuristics," was identified as a significant current trend. Human efforts to build the future out of the present have been based on forward projections of the values of the past. The revolution of today, however, seeks values for the future and aims to create these values in anticipation of change. To liberate the future from the prison of the past will not be easily accomplished. Social institutions are firmly embedded in their historical origins. Yet the mood of the day is to question the values of the past not as a serene, impartial academic exercise but as "a roaring search for betterment."

The Economic Council of Canada (and, one might add, many other prestigious national and international bodies, as well as multitudes of ordinary citizens) is counting on education to make the breakthrough—to change values so that social institutions will use science and technology in a better and more humane manner. This, of course, is easier said than done. Paradoxically, greatly extended

educational opportunity has been accompanied by increased rates of juvenile delinquency. Could this circumstance, Dr. Wees wondered, be due to a program of education which in practice, if not always explicitly acknowledged, gives its primary emphasis to *economic* values?

The failure of education to stress humane values has two main causes, said Dr. Wees.

First, psychology has paid systematic attention to values only within the past hundred years or so, and education began its own self-scrutiny much less than a century ago. So today we wonder whether man creates values that are higher than his instincts and, if so, how he manages to do it. (In terms of Dr. O'Neill's paper, which will be reported a little later, the answer to the preceding questions would seem to be that, fortunately or otherwise, such an act of creation is precisely what the human organism is unable to perform.)

The second reason for the historic failure of education to deal adequately with values is that the dominant method of instruction—exposition—is not suited to the development of deeply held and rationally applied values. As long as education is designed for the acquisition of knowledge, the development of values will remain accidental and fragmentary. How many preachers, after a hard day in the pulpit, have gone home to wonder whether many souls have been saved by their expositions?

The strategy for dealing with this difficulty, according to Dr. Wees, is a new effort to make children the center of educational change, giving them priority over the English preoccupation with the trade of the teacher, over the American debates about curriculum theories, and over the Canadian entanglement in the claws of administration.

The significant aspects of child growth toward a self-directing manhood are the following:

1. Self-respect, rational self-esteem; *therefore*, instead of demeaning the child because he is "small and ignorant and bad" we should respect him for what he is and what he may become.

2. Companionship, the ability to work with others; *therefore*, instead of caging each child in his own cell to listen in silence, teachers should encourage education as "the pursuit of truth in the company of friends."

3. Independence, the ability to think things through in one's own judgment; *therefore*, instead of smothering a child's mind in "the haycock of answers that we call the course of study," we should alert that mind to inquiry, to discovery, and to independent thought.

4. Self-appraisal, the child's review of the products of his own mind; *therefore*, instead of evaluation by the teacher alone we should encourage the child's own evaluation which may be more severe and more useful than appraisal by anyone else.

BEHAVING AND BELIEVING

Presenting a working paper on "Behaving and Believing," Dr. William O'Neill disavowed any special insight with regard to curriculum problems. The primary purpose of his paper was to discuss philosophical problems which are related to the theory of values and which underlie the processes of learning and knowing.

Perhaps anticipating the controversy which his paper might (and indeed did) arouse, Dr. O'Neill said that he would raise some problems and suggest some answers but could not attempt to resolve major dilemmas of moral philosophy.

Value, he said, may be best defined after making two basic distinctions:

1. The distinction between a value-experience (such as pleasure), a value-object (such as chocolates), and a value-principle (such as the Golden Rule).

2. The distinction between questions of subjective value in relation to the individual, of morality in terms of relations among individuals, and of ethics in terms of deliberate or unreflective behavior.

As to the second set of distinctions, Dr. O'Neill's paper was addressed primarily to personal values and only secondarily to moral and ethical questions.

Learning, he reminded us, is rooted in behavior. We can only know our own personal experience and that experience is an outgrowth of physical behavior.

For the newborn infant, all behavior is exploratory. By the process of direct or indirect selective reinforcement (pleasure and pain), certain types of behavior are strengthened and other types are discarded. In the long run, this reinforcement leads to the generalizations which we call human nature. This is why learning is so important in early childhood. It gives rise to the basic values that become the foundation of human character.

Thus *behavior* gives rise to *experience* which produces *learning* which makes possible *knowledge* which (we all earnestly hope) modifies *behavior* which, in turn, reinstates the cycle.

Words, said Dr. O'Neill, are merely one aspect of behavior, and they are seldom as eloquent as overt action. There is often a marked disparity between values professed in speech and values reflected in behavior. Dr. O'Neill emphasized this last point with great vigor, calling for help from philosopher John Hospers, in probably the longest and certainly the most stinging quotation in the entire essay.

Most Americans, Hospers writes, in substance profess to be Christians, yet few practice the Christian way of life. They pay lip service to the moral demands of the Gospel but would not dream of putting their precepts into practice, and would consider anyone who did so a fool. They do not turn the other cheek; they retaliate savagely and repeatedly even for small injuries. Their tongues assent to the proposition that they should forgive others not merely once but 70 times 7 times, yet they rarely forgive anything and even when they do forgive they boast about it. Their chief goal is to amass all the wealth they can—not merely enough wealth for their own comfort, but especially enough wealth to excite the envy of others.

Dr. O'Neill's paper concluded with a series of 10 comments on curriculum theory, based on his philosophical and psychological analysis of behaving and believing.

1. The distinction between "truth" and "value" cannot be justified. All truths are ultimately values. Knowing is a by-product of feeling. All education is, at root, moral education. It is fruitless to talk about intellectual training as if it were realistically separable from moral training.

2. We learn as a means of solving our problems and satisfying our needs.

3. Values and goals can be determined objectively by studying *what is* and what is capable of becoming. Educational objectives are relative to the nature of the physical world and of the human organism.

4. The sole purpose of knowing is to modify subsequent behavior. Most of what we know is nonverbal and words are always subordinate to deeds.

5. The "structure of knowledge" is related more closely to the structure of inquiry than it is to the structure of reality.

6. All education is ultimately self-education. All knowledge is personal knowledge. Under most circumstances, knowledge and belief are self-reinforcing and self-confirming. Knowledge changes, but the change usually occurs within an established context of inquiry. Even the desire to change is ultimately a personal value. Learning is based on prerational assumptions and commitments.

7. Belief is a function of behavior. Therefore, successful attempts to change belief must center not on belief as such, but on behavior.

8. Because human beings are naturally active they are naturally educable.

9. In early childhood, uncontrolled learning experience results in productive knowledge.

10. Education occurs primarily during the preschool years. It is a function mainly of the culture and not of the school. Most of what we call education is actually reeducation. The significant learnings of early childhood provide the basis for the child's future educability and determine the relevance and probable effectiveness of virtually all formal instruction in later years.

In the brief discussion period that followed Dr. O'Neill's paper, Robert Brackenbury outlined a few ideas arising from the paper which the Conference might wish to discuss:

1. If knowledge and values are not separable aspects of learning, teaching which deals exclusively with information is as questionable as teaching which deals exclusively with values.

2. Student-centered teaching which ignores the demands of the social order is as unacceptable as subject-centered teaching which ignores the human element.

3. If knowledge and belief are self-reinforcing, formal schooling might well provide students with experiences in life-styles and frames of reference quite different from those into which they were born.

THREE GENERAL SESSION ADDRESSES

The participants at the afternoon and evening sessions on October 14 and the morning session of October 15 heard a speaker from Canada, England, and the United States discuss some aspect of the Conference theme.

In opening the session on October 15, the Conference Chairman, Dr. Wright, noted that this was Moratorium Day in the United States, an effort by many American citizens to demonstrate their desire that the war in Vietnam be ended by unilateral American troop withdrawal. Speaking on behalf of the Planning Committee, Dr. Wright said that the Conference theme, "Values and the Curriculum," implies that the curriculum should provide experiences which enable young people to make judgments of value. This Conference is concerned with issues involving the priority of values. Many such

issues exist—racism, exploitation, pollution, and war. We must not avoid them.

The Conference discussion groups may, if they wish, discuss the implications for values of the moratorium or of the American situation in Vietnam. Alternatively, they may consider that these topics are not suitable for international discussion in a conference convened as this one has been. If individual U.S. delegates wish to participate in the demonstration, each should follow his own conscience.

As nearly as can be determined from the reports of the 20 discussion groups, four of the groups discussed Vietnam generally, as an example of the application of value judgments in a political decision.

WILLIAM JONES

On October 14 the first of three short general session speeches was delivered at the afternoon meeting.

William Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, began with a sturdy declaration that while the times offer challenges to many old assumptions, some values remain undiminished. He named three such enduring values. "Tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for human rights," he said, "are actually growing in strength in the current period of change and challenge." Mr. Jones considered these three values in an international framework.

Teaching tolerance as a moral principle is an honored tradition. Given the "twin miracles" of modern communication and transportation, tolerance is a practical necessity as well as an ethical ideal. The spread of education in recent decades gives ground for optimism that the lessons of tolerance can be learned. Furthermore, public opinion polls in general suggest that these lessons have in fact been learned.

Three elements form part of such an education at the international level:

1. Knowledge about other countries and peoples
2. Understanding of the character and "life-style" of other countries
3. Empathy—an awareness of our common humanity within the world's diversity.

Mr. Jones then discussed briefly the present and potential contributions of national school systems and of international agencies, such as UNESCO, to the goals of modern education.

The history of many important groups of people is still absent from school instruction and too much that is included in such instruction suffers from national bias.

For the United States, Mr. Jones recommended the increased use of foreign visitors as "resource people" in U.S. classrooms.

He reported that via exchange programs the United States has exchanged about 18,000 teachers, 20,000 professors, and 43,000 graduate students in the last 20 years. He estimated that during this period over 5 million children in U.S. schools and over 8 million abroad have been taught by an exchange teacher from another country or by one of their own teachers who spent an exchange period abroad. For college students, the total amounts to at least 1 million.

With all the efforts to overcbme misunderstanding, the peace of the world remains fragile. One evil genius has often destroyed the constructive results of years of effort.

WILLIAM DAVIS

William G. Davis, Ontario's Minister of Education, said that the curriculum should be aimed not at imparting a set body of facts or at preparing for a specific job, but at developing the unique potentials of each student. The basic value implicit in such a definition is respect for the individual.

In Canada, as elsewhere, such traditional values as honesty and sobriety are being questioned by many people, especially the young. The world is being transformed from minute to minute by modern technology. Men have walked on the moon, diseases once incurable are all but eliminated, the life span is increased, routine tasks are computerized, and the revolution of communications has made the earth into "a global village."

This technology, which adults regard with awe or sometimes with resentment, is normal for youth. Their culture is heavily influenced, often dominated, by the "third parent"—television. Subjected to this immense outpouring of mingled information, opinion, and amusement, the youth of today is in many respects more sensitive to value questions than his elders.

Mr. Davis had some other kind words for today's youth. Men have been stating their values for centuries, he pointed out, yet the young look at the realities of life and, of course, they accuse adults of hypocrisy and compromise. They are told that individuality and cooperation are highly important values and yet they feel with some justice that the school is processing them for a competitive society. They are "particularly vulnerable to the cold winds of conformity."

If the school is to exemplify the values approved by society, we must ask whether society *really* wants individuality or conformity. And if society wants some of both, one might add, what is the basis for deciding to what areas of activity each of these conflicting values is to be applied? If we are to pay more than lip service to individualism, we should develop a curriculum which encourages students to work on topics in a manner that blurs the lines between school disciplines. The speaker even went so far as to say that the common practice of organizing the curriculum around discrete subjects actually inhibits the development of coherent values by students.

Mr. Davis came out strongly for more attention to the arts in school. If it is true, as is often said, that 90 percent of all scientists who ever lived are now alive, it is likely that 90 percent of all artists who ever lived are dead. Viewing this contrast, Mr. Davis found greater attention to esthetics not only desirable but essential.

Summarizing, Mr. Davis listed four values that should permeate the schools:

1. Respect for the individual
2. Time for reflection
3. Love of the arts
4. Respect for the evidence.

Mr. Davis related with approval the anecdote about a 14-year-old who, having questioned the accuracy of a statement made by the teacher, was exhorted to have faith in the teacher's wider experience. "Sir," said the student, "conviction is a fine thing, but it's no substitute for the facts."

In view of the many practical and theoretical difficulties involved, it has been suggested that schools stay clear of value questions. The speaker, gently but very firmly, rejected this proposal as both impractical and undesirable.

LAWRENCE STENHOUSE

The series of three plenary speakers was concluded by Dr. Stenhouse, midway through the Conference. He chose not to attempt what he rightly called "the broad canvas" of the Conference theme. Instead he selected a specific but crucial problem—"The Discussion of Controversial Value Issues in the Classroom."

Although he deprecatingly referred to his paper as a "microscopic" view of one part of the theme, there were many who felt that if his gaze was (to use his word again) "blinkered," it was nevertheless a very piercing glance at an intensely practical and important issue.

If the purpose of dealing with controversial issues in classrooms is understanding, the schools may use three different approaches:

1. Transmit an agreed position adopted as a matter of policy. This method is not recommended because (a) it is impossible to attain general agreement on the vast range of issues involved and (b) teachers will disagree among themselves on many issues. This approach would therefore produce an organized and systematic hypocrisy. One cannot further the understanding of an issue by pretending that no disagreement exists.

2. Leave each teacher free to give his own views. This approach lays the teacher open to the charge of using the classroom as a platform. The profession would permit neither the dismissal of teachers with unorthodox views nor the appointment of only those with conforming views. Furthermore, the authority position of the teacher in the classroom is such that he can scarcely put forward his own views without implying that controversy can be settled on the basis of authority.

3. Ensure that the teacher does all he can to protect pupils from his own bias while advancing their understanding.

The curriculum project under Dr. Stenhouse's direction is based on the third approach. It is not, he stressed, a value-free project. First, the decision to include controversial issues in the curriculum is itself a value judgment. So is the selection of issues to be considered. Even asking the teacher to accept a role of professional neutrality on the issues is an assertion of certain values.

Classroom behavior is often disciplined by the acceptance of certain terminal objectives, but in the experimental project behavior is disciplined by the acceptance not of objectives but rather of certain principles of procedure. Hence the project has developed and tried a plan which attempts to meet certain criteria:

1. The procedures in the classroom must reflect such values as rationality, imagination, and sensitivity.

2. The teacher must aspire to be neutral and renounce authority as an "expert" capable of resolving controversial issues.

3. The authority of the teacher in determining classroom procedure remains but is justified by the need for disciplined rigor in attaining understanding.

4. Parents and public must be satisfied that every possible effort is made to avoid indoctrination.

5. The procedure must involve group discussion and group activity so as to protect minority opinions against ridicule or social pressure.

6. In such sensitive issues as family relations the privacy of students must be preserved.

7. The aim is always understanding, avoiding both premature commitments which harden into prejudice and the assignment of superior value to those who change their opinions.

The basic classroom pattern in the project is discussion rather than instruction which makes teacher neutrality always difficult and usually impossible. This classroom discussion cannot be merely an exchange of views. It must be reflective inquiry based on evidence gathered by the pupils. The project therefore produces and supplies rich, diverse, and balanced collections of evidence. These collections are now being tested in about forty schools.

The project also collects and studies tapes of classroom discussions as the basis for a self-training program for teachers.

Some personal reflections at the end of the first two years of a five-year program were offered in conclusion.

1. Many teachers, misinterpreting John Dewey, try to make classroom discussion serve a social rather than an educational function. The purpose of the project is to develop understanding rather than to modify opinions.

2. The extreme subtlety and strength of the teacher's authority position in the classroom is not generally recognized.

3. When a teacher assumes a neutral nonauthoritarian position, he tends at the same time to lessen his capacity (and tendency) to transmit to pupils his low expectation of their performance. Since recent research strongly suggests that great expectations increase the achievement of pupils of average ability, this side effect of the experimental method may be of great importance.

4. The project has enhanced the understanding of the nature and interpretation of evidence. Since almost all evidence is ambiguous, understanding may well depend on the acceptance of divergence rather than on the effort to establish consensus.

Closing a paper marked by great restraint in making generalizations and drawing conclusions, Dr. Stenhouse disclamed the discovery of an easy technique for overcoming intractable problems of mutual understanding. "We cannot create goodwill," he said, "we can only help it to work."

SCHOOL VISITS AND FILMS

On October 16, the conferees visited schools. Careful advance plans had been made by the schools to receive visitors and to relate

the observations in the schools to the theme of the Conference. The visits to the schools were made by teams of not more than 10, and in many cases fewer, participants in order to have direct personal communication with members of the school staff and with the students.

Films relating to the Conference theme were exhibited in the evening after the school visits and on Friday evening, October 17.

See Appendix D for list of schools and films.

PANEL ON THE CHOICES BEFORE US

Neil Paterson
Mario Fantini
George Flower

The morning program on October 17 began with a panel from three countries discussing the various choices in curriculum reform as far as the emphasis on values is concerned. This was followed by discussion from the floor.

Mr. Paterson's remarks in the panel began with a description of a fairly typical English program to involve 14- to 15-year-olds in making an active contribution to their community.

He warned, however, that announced objectives do not automatically flow from school-community service programs. If community service is chiefly a way of removing potential troublemakers from the school premises, or if it is available only to those who have academic difficulties, the whole enterprise is called into question.

The school-community service program, if well planned and conducted, requires of teachers great effort in preparation and evaluation.

Furthermore, we are asking for trouble if the community service program of the school is arranged solely by the school staff without student participation.

Finally, it should be recognized that a school-community service program is potentially radical. Extremes may be avoided, but if the school concerns itself with community needs which cry out for action, the relation of pupils to teachers and of community to school will undergo profound changes.

While technological change accelerates in a geometric progression, said Mr. Fantini, social institutions, such as the schools, are changing in only an arithmetic progression. The result is a broken connection between the schools and the society they serve.

It appears likely that we are now at the outset of the Second Progressive Movement in education. Student unrest, the urban crisis, the discontent of parents, all proclaim that the school is obsolescent. The people who suffer from disconnected schools can find no means to change the schools. This frustration leads to rebellion. Hitherto, the school has responded to new circumstances by adding new fields of activity; for example, vocational training, adult education, education for young children, compensatory education, decentralized administration, integration, and so on. This process of addition has probably reached its limit. The need now is for radical change in the basic model of the school. This new model should augment the number of choices open to people instead of trying to make everyone adjust to a single, relatively static institution.

In the schools of the future the community will become the classroom. The idea of the credentialed teacher will be abandoned. The current bureaucracy which is now essentially autocratic will be bypassed. The concept of education as a form of action will be substituted for the concept of education as passive reception. The largely cognitive emphasis of education will become more affective and emotional.

One school model cannot serve a diversity of needs. Society will recognize that most groups have many objectives in common but that the choices of ways to reach these common objectives can be diversified.

About 75 percent of the public is now reasonably well satisfied with its schools. This majority has a right to feel satisfied if it will allow the other 25 percent, including those who attend religious and other private schools, options for variant programs.

Mr. Flower, speaking last on the panel, noted a difference between problem defining and problem solving. We correctly avoid saying that "whatever is, is right." In doing so, however, we must avoid the equally false conclusion that "whatever is, is wrong" which leads to another false conclusion: "Any change is for the better." When we are asked to describe the nature of the proposed change, we sometimes seem to be saying "Do not ask us for systematic proposals for change." This abandonment of the rational for the emotional concerns me deeply.

These are some conclusions from this Conference:

1. The academic is attracted by ideas and concepts. So, as academics, we must be more alert to the affective and emotional factors in education. Reason is not the only component of value. It is

not anti-intellectual to admit that other than intellectual forces exist and must be reckoned with.

2. Change need not wait for all-inclusive reforms and final reports.

3. We need not go about curriculum building in an all-or-nothing spirit. A man may say, as Dr. Wees suggested, "I am a man, my own man." It remains true also, as another thinker has said, that "No man is an island." We live in a social order. One cannot be his own man, or any kind of man at all, without recognizing the social order.

4. The development of a capacity to deal with uncertainty is a major contribution of the thinking of this Conference.

5. It is traditional in education to constantly question what we are doing. It would be unfortunate if teachers were so overcome by their shortcomings that they gave up the whole enterprise.

Question: "Would you comment on the tendency in the United States to organize schools restricted to blacks?"

Mr. Fantini: "Enforced integration has resulted in resegregation. People must be given choices as to how they will deal with problems and objectives."

Question: "When does your child know better than you do?"

Mr. Fantini: "At any stage in life children are capable of participating in decisions which concern them."

Question: "How much should we water down the curriculum for the disadvantaged child?"

Mr. Fantini: "Not at all. A variety of opportunity is not watering down the curriculum."

Question: "Teaching children to perform community service is now being stigmatized as 'Lady Bountiful.' "

Mr. Fantini: "This criticism is essentially valid. We should involve students in service to the community in which they live."

Question: "You said that different groups develop common objectives. Where do these common objectives or purposes come from? By whose authority?"

Mr. Fantini: "They come from a variety of sources. Differences are a source of strength, but rules which require everybody to drive on the same side of the road are sometimes necessary."

DISCUSSION OF "BEHAVING AND BELIEVING"

Dr. O'Neill's hope that his paper would stir vigorous controversy was fulfilled. It took a little time for the conferees to think through the complex questions to which his paper was a guide, but toward

the end of the Conference there was a strong demand, welcomed by the Planning Committee and by Dr. O'Neill himself, that there be a special plenary session to discuss the implications of the paper. This was arranged for the afternoon of October 17.

Since it happened that the principal discussion paper, as well as most of the other questions and comments, arose from among the participants from England, this special session became affectionately known as the "British onslaught." The opening gun was fired by Denis Lawton. After several readings of Dr. O'Neill's paper, he concluded that it was dangerous and misleading. The paper, he said, fails to stress that the distinctive feature of the human environment (as opposed to that of rats or pigeons) is other people. Dr. O'Neill's narrowly behavioristic analysis explained everything about human beings except social interaction and the use of language. In other words, it covered everything except the most interesting and worthwhile human activities. Mr. Lawton insisted that the "pleasure-pain" view of the development of values does not explain why a man might risk his own life to save someone else or go hungry to give food to children.

Mr. Lawton also objected to what he considered the conclusion of Dr. O'Neill's paper—since values are simply the result of individual experience, any set of values is as good as any other set. He said that it could be demonstrated that some values are rationally superior to others; that values are not simply a matter of taste or accident; that just because some secondary values do change from time to time and place to place, it does not follow that all values are subject to change. Fundamental and unchangeable principles ought to be distinguished from trivial local rules.

Truth, honesty, and respect for other people are essential requirements for worthwhile social life, too important to be left to individual choice or to haphazard learning. It is particularly dangerous in a period of rapid social change, such as the present, for the educational systems to ignore the necessity for society to pass on its system of values together with a rational basis for them.

Belonging to any social group, said Mr. Lawton, is a constraint on individual freedom, but if a human being belongs to no group he is less than human and even less free. One purpose of education must be to encourage children for good reasons to postpone or forego some gratification. Just because some schools may have been too authoritarian in the past, it does not follow that what pupils learn is not important. The proposition that they be offered any curriculum, provided only that they do not like it, is, of course, nonsense

as is the opposite view that anything is educational if it gives pleasure. We nearly all agree that rationality is better than irrationality and that rationality does not come about just by growing up, but by systematic encouragement within the framework of the curriculum. Somewhere in the curriculum, said he, we must make it clear that there are values which our society must have in order to survive. Mr. Lawton agreed with Dr. O'Neill that if we separate the cognitive and affective aspects of learning, we may lose more than we gain, but he also felt that the separation of the development of individual values from social values brings about just as great a loss and, in effect, would render teachers unnecessary in the value learning process. Many schools need to reconsider the essential principles of values rather than the petty rules of conduct, but it is a refocusing that is required and not an abdication. There is as much need, he concluded, for teachers to provide opportunities for children to acquire values as to acquire knowledge.

Dr. O'Neill responded that men learn by reward and punishment. This fact is supported by overwhelming and abundant evidence. Pleasure is dynamic. It occurs when tension is reduced but not destroyed. Pleasure is a product of the solution of problems. A society which denies the natural proclivity of the human being to seek pleasure is a society that is in fundamental error. From the evidence at hand, he had proceeded by logic to the conclusions in the paper. If anyone wants to attack his conclusions he must either show that the facts are in error or that the reasoning is faulty.

Dr. Stenhouse thought that the O'Neill paper relies too much on one formula.

John Elliott said the O'Neill paper was more psychological than philosophical. There is a vast difference between reaching conclusions about how values are developed and reaching conclusions about which values have merit. Rationalism in itself is a value, but there are circumstances in which rationalism alone is not educationally sufficient.

Mr. Skillbeck said that he could see no difference between Dr. O'Neill's analysis and the 40-year-old philosophy of John Dewey, except that Dr. O'Neill minimizes social values because he omits cultural influences. The paper is a naturalistic interpretation of values. There may be no logical refutation of behaviorism but, as in other sciences, change will occur through a reformulation of the basic problem.

Dr. O'Neill replied again that he did not consider himself a pragmatist. He admitted that the paper is and was meant to be con-

troversial. He had not sought easy euphemisms for "pleasure" and "pain" and other terms which provoke controversy. The idea that value is rooted in pleasure, he stoutly maintained, is supported by extended scientific evidence and reasoning. However, Dr. O'Neill said he was gratified by the attention given to his paper and by the many important questions asked about it.

CLOSING SESSION

The Summarizing Panel

Dr. Berman said that the chief significance of the Conference would be new inspiration and new resolution to attack basic curriculum problems. The sources of values are better suited to a conference on philosophy or religion. Dilemmas which troubled the Conference included:

1. The distinction between affective and cognitive processes is no longer as clear and valid as it used to be.
2. Should the school teach the *process* of establishing values?
3. How to enable the young to deal with the *process* of forming values? In the process of establishing values the school must never tolerate shoddiness.

Professor Eggleston asked that his remarks be considered as "personal, partial, and premature." The Conference needed a structure to cope with the vast areas assigned to it. The paper by Dr. O'Neill removed some comfortable crutches from our routines of thinking. He assured the group that Dr. O'Neill is really quite human. There were too many "ministerial" speeches; too many people who began by saying "you know more about this than I do" and then proceeded to prove it, *at length*.

It was nice to be in the United States at the time the Mets won the World Series. Thus we were provided with an example of an underdeveloped, severely deprived client who nevertheless achieved success without necessitating a remedial program for the Orioles.

However, the prescriptive side was in short supply. What are the new values? Can they be taught? If so, how and when?

Michael Connolly, the Canadian member of the Summarizing Panel, said that teachers generally were on the defensive at the Conference, while the experts were condescending. Very little research was cited, although some research exists on the subject. Curriculum developers too often flee from both theory and practice

and rush into action. There is a general feeling that values are not subject to reason but only to a kind of emotional response.

Suzanne Goddard, the student member of the Summarizing Panel, said that the students had obtained many "beautiful" ideas from their presence at the Conference. She was concerned, however, whether the other participants derived much help from it. There were so many unanswered questions and so few conclusions. Perhaps, she concluded, this reflects the very nature of education—a constant reformulation of old questions without any provably "right" answers.

Concluding Address

Dame Muriel Stewart made the following points in her address:

The teachers in the schools have to face the tensions in the schools.

Values are based on the interdependence of humanity. The self-esteem of the young should not be undermined.

Have we a right to question the values of others, including children? Yes, we have, if we can show that their behavior is harmful to other people.

It is possible to provide pupils with material that arouses curiosity, but how do you get them to think? Being curious is not the same as being thoughtful.

In education if you present the challenge with faith in the response, the challenge will usually be met and answered.

The mark of maturity is the ability to make a self-evaluation as well as to deal with external criticism.

Let us use the new hardware to teach information and to give us more time to teach students how to use information.

Values are best taught by examples, for children are extremely sensitive to insincerity. Therefore teachers should review their own personal values and the values which undergird the organization of the school.

Is this the kind of conference which should be self-perpetuating? Are there alternative patterns; e.g., smaller groups to consider specific, commonly recognized problems? The greatest result undoubtedly is the personal contact, plus the visits to schools and the

correspondence that ensues. If possible, this aspect of the Conference should be increased.

We must test our results by the degree to which they are useful to the teacher, "the worker at the coal-face."

This Conference was not meant to reach group conclusions; rather it was intended to help the individual reach his own conclusions.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The Planning Committee, having in mind especially the experience of the 1967 conference at Oxford, arranged the schedule in such a way as to minimize plenary sessions and to maximize the time spent in small group discussions. Each of these small discussion groups had about ten members, a chairman, and a rapporteur who filed a summary of the group conclusions or differences. In addition, each participant was invited to write a letter containing his personal observations. Many of them did so. From these materials, plus some of my own observations, the following concluding comments have been prepared.

The Structure and Conduct of the Conference

Although some aspects of the Conference were considered by some respondents to be of limited usefulness, the overall evaluation was highly favorable. The Conference was described as "interesting," "stimulating," "enjoyable," "most successful," "productive."

The choice of the meeting place was commended by many groups and individuals.

It was agreed that personal contacts and small group discussions were the greatest source of satisfaction. On the other hand, the comments indicate an almost universal feeling that it was a mistake in a conference of this type to involve speakers from outside the educational community.

There was some criticism of the behavior of the Conference participants. Some delegates were annoyed by the fact that their colleagues had not "done their homework" and therefore arrived without having read the Conference documents or really given much thought to how to contribute to the discussion.

The involvement of students appears to have been a considerable success, from the viewpoints of both the students themselves and the other participants. A report, received about three months after the Conference from the principal of Onteora High School, indicated

that his students were genuinely astonished by the friendly reception they received from adult participants because many had expected to be ignored or snubbed. They were therefore all the more pleased that many participants appeared to be sincerely interested in securing student opinions.

The school visits were regarded as helpful and enlightening by both the student and the adult participants. It is reported that conference-related activity at Onteora High School continued for months, especially as the result of their visits to other schools. The material and ideas they gained in this process appeared in the school newspaper, in the discussions of the Student Council, and in the classroom.

The school visits, however, did not entirely escape adverse criticism. One U.S. participant wrote that he could visit schools at any time and saw no need for school visits to occupy one-fifth of the Conference time. Another participant felt that the visits to the schools involved too much travel. In general, however, the great care used in the selection of the schools and in planning the visits was recognized and greatly appreciated.

Some recommendations for future conferences suggested more short papers with direct classroom application. Others proposed that only participants who are committed to new approaches and are willing to read the documents, make proper preparations, and remain for the duration of the conference be included in any future meeting. Even in the group sessions, some said, papers should have been prepared and circulated in advance of the discussion and the research on learning problems should be analyzed. While a few participants were somewhat frustrated by the lack of Conference resolutions, most agreed that the Conference would not have benefitted from the debating process involved.

The flexibility of the Conference arrangements drew favorable comments, especially the policy of a flexible agenda to permit consideration of unforeseen issues.

General Outcomes of the Conference

In some groups the participants apparently concluded that schools should go beyond teaching understanding of issues to urging pupils to attempt a conscious clarification of their personal ethics and commitments. It was agreed that there is too much emphasis on factual knowledge, often essentially unrelated to social issues. The proposed "neutrality" of the teacher also came under attack. Some said that if basic values exist, it is the duty of the teacher to transmit them

and this cannot be done by a policy of studied neutrality. However, it is possible to avoid blatant indoctrination without accepting a neutral role. Education, they concluded, should impart values. A child who is being introduced to the world about him should be offered a compass rather than a map. What values should be thus imparted? One discussion group suggested respect for other people, the use of reason in approaching personal and social problems, and sensitivity to the environment.

The language groups considered a special aspect of the question of the teacher's "neutrality." One group concluded that teachers should not be neutral in guiding their students toward quality in literature. The great literature of the past, they said, is a repository of human experience that cannot properly be ignored while the child is immersed in second-rate literature, or worse. Another language group made a similar point by suggesting that literary excellence, not sociological grounds alone, be the basis for selection of materials.

One of the groups concluded that the stigma which some teachers attach to dialects is a value judgment which impairs the educational process. A teacher working with children from the central city should not react negatively to their dialect, even though it is incorrect or almost unintelligible according to other standards. Unfortunately, the report goes no further; what the teacher should do besides avoiding a negative reaction is not explained. Should the underprivileged child be left to use and become habituated to the dialect indigenous to his own culture? Or should teachers furnish models which are consistent with standard speech? The implication of the report, whether intended or not, is that teachers confronted by a dialect should make no effort to modify it.

More attention was recommended to speech as a means of communication, as contrasted with the present stress on writing. Again, some questions remain. Should teachers be content with minimal standards in the ability to write? And if writing is made less important in schools, what will be the effect in terms of future employment and status in a society where writing is widely used and is a necessity for practically all of the "better" kinds of employment? Whatever answers the groups may have made to these questions, it seemed to be generally agreed that teachers speak too much and listen too little.

Many groups agreed that teaching should stress observation of data and weighing of evidence. The hope was that the scientific approach could be transferred to other areas of inquiry so that socio-economic issues, for instance, might avoid the now all-too-prevalent

reliance on superstitution, prejudice, or passive acceptance of authority. Other groups, however, drew attention to the limitations of the scientific method.

Concern over the central importance of the method of science led one group to suggest that science should not be divided into separate disciplines but should be taught in a unified way.

A basic concern of teachers is to develop an attitude of investigation and curiosity. Therefore, some groups argued, any examination or examination system that encourages "mere factual learning" is irrelevant. Some indeed went so far as to favor the abolition of all external examinations, although most believed that the existing system could be reformed. In English experience at least, few teachers seemed to be willing to assess pupil development by their own personal judgment if an external examination is readily available.

Several groups considered Mr. Fantini's remarks in the tri-national panel and there seemed to be general agreement that while there is need for change, the satisfied majority should not require the unsatisfied minority to continue to adapt to the present program.

Several groups called for a variety of esthetic experiences for children, aided by resources and tools for creative expression. Instruction in the arts should be related to the lives of the learners. The interrelationships among the arts should be noted and fostered.

The discussion group on curriculum theory, true to form, came out with more questions than answers. As far as one could tell by the group reports submitted, it was agreed that students should be involved in the formulation of the curriculum itself. The school has been an institution for transmitting the social heritage; this role is changing to transmitting experience relative to present problems.

The nursery school-kindergarten group considered the ways to deal with aggression in the school setting. Some said that aggression should be met by concession; some said that it should be sublimated or redirected to other targets; still others said that aggression should be firmly met "head-on." The group did not reach a conclusion or synthesis of these alternative responses to aggression. It did suggest that the response should differ according to the circumstances; however, no basis was formulated for the selection of one rather than another response to aggression.

The same group questioned the validity or usefulness of the well worn expression that we are living in a time of changing values. Is it really true, they asked, that values are changing or is it nearer the mark to say that affluence and technology offer more options for behavior than were available in previous eras?

Another group considered the limitations on the use of technology in pedagogy. The remark of Alec Clegg at the 1967 conference was appreciatively recalled: He would not be strongly motivated by being patted on the back by a computer. The greatest danger, the group concluded, does not come from the use of machines to teach but arises rather from the living teacher who insists on (or perhaps even enjoys) acting like a machine.

In many groups a problem arose in connection with the issue of whether the schools should help children discover and develop their own individual system of values. There was no dissent from this general proposition, but many said that the schools also have a responsibility to the community to foster community values; in other words, to lead youth to become adjusted to the values accepted by the society within which the schools operate. Apparently everyone felt that socially acceptable value systems *could* be developed by self-discovery by the young. But the degree to which teachers should intervene in this process remained in doubt. Unresolved, too, was the inescapable question as to what the school should do if the process of self-direction in the discovery of values should go awry and produce socially unacceptable behavior.

It is an oversimplification, but yet generally true that the groups concerned with younger children tended to favor value development by the young. On the other hand, the groups on secondary education tended to insist on the responsibility of the schools to the society in general and to the values which that society approves. The secondary education groups also tended to resist both the idea that values are rather finally formed in early childhood and the conclusion that priority should be given to affective learning over cognitive learning. They tended instead to emphasize the need for informed and rational judgment in the value-building process.

On two points all groups would probably agree: first, the great power of the example provided by the teacher; and second, the necessity for close cooperation between school and community in the development of values.

The Conference had a difficult theme. Many groups frankly reported their frustration in dealing with it. One inevitable result of such frustration, when combined with deep interest, is evasive action. Thus, revolutionary changes or minor reforms in existing school practices were earnestly discussed, perhaps because such discussion seemed easier and more productive than continued probing of the nature of values, their origins, their sanctions, and the ways they may be taught.

Yet no one proposed that "Values and the Curriculum" was a matter of minor importance. On the contrary, everyone was ready to affirm its basic importance and its urgency in the present unsettled state of education.

The difficulty of the theme produced other effects. One of these was pessimism on the part of some participants, a pessimism which appeared to be most pronounced among the Americans. One participant from Canada observed that this bleak outlook, even though it was limited to a few participants, came as a great surprise. Some participants were so appalled by recent difficulties in the center-city schools that they seemed to be preparing to surrender the cause of education itself.

This attitude was noticed especially by veteran conference-goers who had become accustomed on previous occasions to seeing American self-confidence displayed. Thus to hear even a few American educators proclaiming the desperate sickness of their society and their schools was, for many visitors, a novel and shocking experience.

A more general and, we may hope, a more durable effect on the Conference was a feeling that intellectual and moral resources could be mobilized to deal with values and curriculum. One study group summarized well the conclusions which emerged from many of them. The first impression, this report said, was that nothing of great significance could or would happen. This initial feeling was modified as the Conference continued. Upon further reflection the participants found themselves more sensitive to the importance of value systems. By the end of the Conference, changes were already occurring in the thinking and behavior of participants. Such change, of course, was the main motivation for holding the Conference.

This Conference and Its Forebears

W. R. Wees

I should start by telling you that I am not the person I am supposed to be. The Planning Committee had decided that it would be a good thing to have someone set this Fourth International Curriculum Conference into the context of the previous conferences and had picked their man—Stuart Maclure. He was the author of *Curriculum Innovation in Practice*, the report of the Third International Conference, convened in Oxford, September 1967. Mr. Maclure is now editor of the (London) *Times Educational Supplement*.

For those of us who were at that conference, the Maclure report gave freshness, meaning, and form to the varied outpourings of many voices. For your sake and for the sake of the Conference too, at this moment I only wish that I could switch us over to the inventive, synthesizing mind of Stuart Maclure.

When I asked Ole Sand why the Planning Committee had picked me to pinch-hit in this job of synthesis, Ole's reply reminded me of a similar riposte before the second conference. At that time the planner called me at the last moment and said, "Wilf, we're in a jam. We've got a conference on childhood education and there are no children in it. Will you talk about the child in education?"

"For heaven's sake, why me?" I asked.

"Because," they said, "you have the most child-like mind we know."

So when I asked Ole, "For heaven's sake why me for synthesis?" Ole said, "Because, Wilf, your mind is about as synthetic as any mind we know."

I should, perhaps, start with an easy synthesis, and, for those who have not attended the previous conferences, detail a short history of Numbers One, Two, and Three.

Number One was born from the discussions of the Ontario Curriculum Institute's Committee on Scope and Organization in Curriculum. After a good deal of frothing and bubbling, the Committee decided that if the members knew more about what was happening in Britain and the United States in curriculum change they might be able to bypass the bubble stage and get to the substance. With the help of Robert Ulich (Professor Emeritus, Harvard University), Ole Sand, whom you have met, and Derek Morell (then Joint Secretary of the Schools Council in Britain), if the bubble stage was not entirely bypassed, certainly the bubbles were smaller and fewer. The conference met in November 1964.

A second conference, February 1966, cosponsored by the Schools Council, the NEA Center for the Study of Instruction, and the Ontario Curriculum Institute, was arranged. Hosted by the Institute, its purpose was not only to learn about and to discuss "Progress Reports on Curriculum Projects" in the three countries but also to foster "International Cooperation in Curriculum Development." To this conference came 20 educators from Britain and the United States and 22 Canadians from provinces other than Ontario.

If numbers are a guide, international cooperation in curriculum development *was* fostered: At Oxford, the following year, approximately fifty from both the United States and Canada, together with 100 from the host, the Schools Council, sat down to think together about the theme "Curriculum Innovation in Practice." The fact that, according to Maclure, the thinking together produced more collisions of minds than cooperation, indicates only a greater need to foster the fostering. My own impression is that the fostering was effected—one would only need to count the increased number of Britishers who visited the United States in the last two years and then went to Canada for a little old-fashioned educational peace and quiet before going home, or count the number of North Americans who have gone to Britain to find out what education really means, or as Maclure suggests, to find out how to talk about education in the English language.

So we come to "Values and the Curriculum," the topic of Conference Number Four.

To mold these four conferences into one, especially since one of them has not happened yet, to create a wholeness which the planners have called a synthesis, is a complete impossibility for one mind to do for another mind, and we might as well admit that fact now. I am not apologizing for my failure before I fail. All I am saying is that the only person who can make a wholeness out of a variety of experiences is the person who has enjoyed them.

I could tell you what I learned from Conference Number One, Number Two, and Number Three and I could tell you from whom I learned each thing I learned. But even yet, I have not put them all together to make a whole. The synthesis is still in process. What I am going to say from here on is, therefore, nothing more than a personal progress report on how I have been getting along with the task that I have commissioned my mind to do.

I have identified for myself two very obvious major problems that confronted our previous conferences, and my Delphic oracle tells me we shall confront them here, too.

The first problem can be summed up in the question: How can education keep abreast of change? At the second conference, Sir Ronald Gould said that education is always a generation, often two, behind what is going on outside of school. Unfortunately, none of the three conferences undertook to talk much about how to help children learn to create change which, of course, is the only way by which education can keep up with change. We all seemed to adopt the myth of the ostrich, which, with head in the sand and high tail flagging, consigns the future to fate.

The second major problem was how to introduce the humaneness of humanity into schools and teaching which, for so many centuries, have seemed to get along so well without it. Robert Ulich, Ole Sand, Derek Morrell, Sir Alec Clegg, Elena Sliepcevich, and many others tried to help us toward solution. Even the Canadians, whose major problem in the third conference was identified by Maclure as administration, were concerned about how to reorganize themselves humanely.

To get those two major problems to coalesce in such a way as to permit solution applicable to both of them is, to me, the purpose of this Conference. In this sense, then, this Fourth International Curriculum Conference must be itself the synthesizing agent for all four of them.

In obedience to my assignment, however, with your permission and for what my report may be worth, I shall tell you how far along my synthesizing has come since Robert Ulich concluded his address at the first conference with the question, "How can the schools help young people, not only to cope with the social demands of our age, but to secure a corner in mind and soul, an *inner sanctum*, where the fugitive impressions of life recede before the quiet majesty of that which we may call 'the abiding?' "

To start off with change after such a profound consideration of "the abiding" seems a bit profane. For synthesis, however, we must start from that which was, and that was change.

In this latter half of the twentieth century, the rapidity of change, the technological changes that man is making in his ways of living, the length and breadth of communication, the breakdown and attempts at reforming social organization—we think of these as the phenomena of change. These are the marvels about which we "Oh!" and "Ah!"; the worries and anxieties about which we "Oh-dear-me!"

As for rapidity of change (applied to the social order) Alfred the Great, as inscribed on the plaque at his birthplace, "found learning dead, and he restored it; the laws powerless and he gave them force; the Church debased, and he raised it; the land ravaged by a fearful enemy, from which he delivered it"—all in 25 years. As for technological change, man has not changed the mechanical principles of the wheel since he invented it 5,000 years ago.

Although we can scorn current change, as we have done, or exclaim or get frenetic about it, there is, in fact, no way to measure the impact of change on any generation; no way, for example, of comparing the impacts of the industrial and the technological revolutions.

And yet, even though we cannot compare the civilizing effects of the domestication of the horse and the cow with the domestication of electricity, radiation, and atomic fission, we can say for sure that we have more potential power today than we know how to handle. Trying to figure out what to do with it is one of the reasons for our scurrying around and falling over one another as we grope for the controls by which to give human significance to the power that our heads have created and our hands do not know how to manipulate.

Today there is an increasingly higher proportion of the world's population aware of change, affected by change (frequently at the moment of change) than ever in man's history. And as for the number of people influenced by change, one has only to quote Lester B. Pearson who recently calculated that 25 percent of all the people who ever lived, live now. The effect of the radiation of change upon one-quarter of the people who have ever lived creates a problem that can be described only as fantastic. Or is it? Can mankind resolve it? Have we the wit to resolve the problem that man's wits made?

All we can say is that we are trying. With so much power at our fingertips and so many people scrambling to get their fingertips on the power, two new directions for man's inquiry have become more and more apparent during the last 25 years: cybernetics and futuristics. Cybernetics, the science of controls, undertakes to sort out the relationships among and between the technological and human

powers. The study of the future (futuristics) undertakes inquiry into the directions that the various powers should go to better the lot of man. These two efforts may sound like pretty weak tries, but they are the best that we have been able to find.

Study of the future and its concomitant, future planning, are so new and represent such recent change, that for the first time, two weeks ago, I learned their name. A report from Goldsmiths' College, University of London, calls the study and planning of the future "futurology." The pervasiveness of future planning on the grand scale may be observed in Russia's successive five-year plans and, ten years ago, in China's abortive Great Leap Forward; in small scale it is everywhere—in industry, even in government. In education, on the other hand, although we have lots of five-year plans for schoolhouses, we come to a full stop before we get to the substance of education. Ole Sand's famous "Thursdays for Thinking" could have been designed only to provide teachers with the time for future planning.

When we described the study of the future and future planning as the most significant change we are now creating, we are not forgetting that man has always been concerned about his future—so concerned, in fact, that he even created utopias of eternal heavens in which his values, unachievable in his lifetime, might be realized.

In the past, however, man's struggles about his future and his divinations and previsions (although based invariably on values) were almost invariably projected values of the past: how to extend the empires, how to get rich quick or quicker, how to polish up the ego. The revolution in future planning lies in its method of not only seeking particular values in the future, but also undertaking planning in such a way that we can create them. Thus instead of imprisoning the future within the walls of the past, we shall create the future, first by formulating our ideals and studying the conditions within which they will have to be achieved, then setting out to achieve them.

This is exactly what the Science Council of Canada has done, for example, in its fourth report. Its thesis is that research and development in science and technology must be for people, and the Council sets out six goals and ways by which realization of the thesis may be achieved. This is future planning.

For those involved in science and technology, future planning should be relatively easy. They have the power, the equipment, and the tools by which to generate more power and to control the power they generate. The means by which to improve the lot of people are

in their hands. All that they have to do, as the Science Council has done for them, is to set their sights on human values that are higher than basic instincts.

For social future planning, on the other hand, with the power of 3 billion minds at our disposal, we lack the instruments either to generate more power or to provide direction for the power we have. Reduce the 3 billion minds to the 20 million that we have in Canada, and we still do not know how to go at the job. As Spenser said, "He that strives to touch the stars oft stumbles on a straw."

We were probably wrong in saying, with respect to Canada at least, that we lack the instruments for social future planning. We do not lack the instruments; we do have social institutions derived from social values. However, they are so completely embedded in their origins that they have difficulty seeing those values of the future for the pursuit of which they were conceived. Their past values are known, certain, and, by at least a few people in a given generation, their achievement has been demonstrated. To switch to any other values is to dare the threats of risk, uncertainty, and loss of faith.

Yet the mood of the day, here and everywhere, is to question the values that we have had. Fortunately or unfortunately, the questioning goes a lot further than merely asking questions. The questioning is a roaring search for betterment—and because of lack of guidelines—betterment of any and whatever kind. Since values are all that men ever fight for, the result is worldwide upheaval, eruption, and disruption in social organization.

In the long run upheaval may be a good thing. McLuhan in one of his aphorisms says that there has to be a breakdown before we can find a breakthrough. But the question is, how long must we suffer breakdown before we find the breakthrough, and what do we do to find it?

According to John Deutsch, former chairman of the Economic Council of Canada, the time to make the breakthrough is now. And for his future planning of economic values the social agency to make the breakthrough is education. Then he identified the value for which education, in its own future planning, ought to strive: initiative, the human power to create a difference. Lacking this power, he said, Canadians would not achieve the economic value goals that he was setting for the nation.

Dr. Solandt's Science Council also puts the finger on education as one of the six major areas for research and development if science and technology are to make significant contributions to the well-being of the Canadian people. And this Council's value goal for education is the development of the inquiring mind.

Deutsch and Solandt and their councilors are not the only people counting on education for the breakthrough. Students, teachers, and parents are relying on education as the major social instrument to see us through and out of the value crisis of our times. This is a crisis that led Walter Lippmann to say that we are now going through a minor return to the Dark Ages, a crisis that led Ulich to exclaim at the correlation between the lengthened period of education and the increased rate of juvenile delinquency.

The responsibility laid on education to extricate man from his value predicament calls for future planning of the highest order, with the deepest thought and the most sincere devotion. The reason for the application of these superlatives to education's future planning is that up to now the only class of values to which education has given more than a side glance has been the class of economic values. But economic values, according to both the philosophers and the hippies, fall to the bottom of the scale of values.

This is the point, then, at which our two main lines of thinking join to try for synthesis. Change and the values of humaneness in humanity must go hand in hand. At the third conference, John Goodlad struck this note in an overview of curriculum change, when he [illegible] values in education.

The failure of education to teach growth in value judgment has its origins (if failure can have an origin) in history. The reasons are mainly two:

1. Only within the last century has either philosophy or psychology turned to the study of value; and it has been much less than 100 years since education started even to study itself. The result is that although philosophy now accepts the study of values as its central study goal, it still debates such issues as the nature of values, the selection of fundamental values, how values should be classified, the standard of value, whether values are merely subjective desires or whether there is some law or norm applicable to desire. Philosophy has left to education the problem: How does man create values that are higher than his instincts?

The consequence of philosophy as a latecomer to the study of values and of education as a latecomer to the study of itself is that teaching for value judgment beyond economics has only recently appeared in any course of studies or curriculum guide in Canada; and even so, such teaching is limited mainly and minimally to esthetics.

2. The second reason for the failure of education to teach for values has been the mode of teaching. In the first place, as Sir Alec

Clegg told us, teaching has been mainly and merely verbal imposition or exposition, whichever you like to call it. Value decisions and their applications, on the other hand, are from and in experience. It is doubtful, for example, if the pages of pious platitudes of the *Murray's English Readers* had the slightest effect on a single child among the thousands of nineteenth-century children who tried to learn to read from them. And as long as teachers continue to talk three-quarters of the time (as they did, according to careful measurement, during the years between 1912 and 1967), there is no hope for value teaching.

In the second place, as long as education is designed for the acquisition of knowledge, the development of value judgment is bound to be a hit-and-miss activity. As Whitehead so often said, inert knowledge, the content of so much teaching, has no value. Fact as fact is inherently cold. If I say, "That is a Scotch pine," I have made only an observation. The value judgment appears when, from experience, I add, "It grows fast in sand to conserve the soil," or "For a Christmas tree it has a conical shape and its needles don't drop quickly." Adam Smith, when he invented the term *value*, said all of this 200 years ago.

For these two reasons—the relative novelty of value as a subject of philosophical study and as a mode, content, and process of education, which excludes practically any experience of value, future planning to achieve the ultimate in education is going to require some hardheaded, perhaps heartbreaking, future thinking.

When I say "ultimate," I should quote Clegg who said, "But there is a third and more complex stage in the learning process and it is the one which is essentially concerned with attitudes and values. Someone once wrote:

> If thou of fortune be bereft
> And of thy earthly store hast left
> Two loaves, sell one and with the dole
> Buy hyacinths to feed the soul."

Sir Alec might have been quoting one of our flower children.

Watching children selling loaves to "buy hyacinths to feed the soul," oddly enough, is one of our major heartbreaks. Another is the loss of our authority over them. We have been fighting children in school all our lives. One teacher in a college of education tells his student teachers, "They are your enemy. You dare not even smile at them until after Christmas."

In Canada, our success in defeating the enemy is told in the recount of casualties. Because of our educational stragegies—that

awful military word, now so frequently and ineptly applied to education—in 1965 we killed 32 percent of the enemy by the end of the first 8 years, 68 percent before the end of 12 years, and later on, when the survivors got to university we had far more teachers (generals, captains, corporals) in education than we had original enemy.

In spite of the heartbreaks (and we could count up a dozen major ones), to get under way in future planning there can be only one point from which to start; there is no other; we have absolutely no alternative. We start with children, the *alpha* though, one hopes, not the *omega* of education.

In proposing children as our starting point in creating synthesis we are, I regret to say, introducing a relatively new idea to the conferences. Except for Derek Morrell who might have signed his address at the first conference "Yours, with love, Morrell," Sir Alec whose thesis was about the minds of children, and Ralph Tyler who asked a lot of excruciating questions about pupil learning, few people beat their breasts in frustration at what happens to the child in school. With the British plying the trade of the teacher, according to Maclure, the Americans politely wrangling curriculum theory on cloud nine, and the Canadians trying to untangle themselves from the coils of administration, the child seemed almost to have disappeared from education; a fact that led Derek Morrell (referring to the third conference in a recent address) to say, "A plague on all their houses!" Teachers and society were all the rage. Teachers, one was glad to see, came first in our concern, before society. But where had our children gone? To those who say, "But the child was always implied," I can only reply that never in my life have I seen an implied child.

Now however, and fortunately for us, we are up to our ears in children. They are all around us clamoring to be heard, and now we start with children.

If we are to start our planning not with us but with our children, then we have to start with those things for which children strive. And the things that children strive for do not seem to fit appropriately the value categories that grown men and women say they strive for.

Studying man's search for what is good, philosophers identify three sets of values. The first set they call the psychological values, which are biological: the life preservers such as nourishment, security, sleep, and sex.

The second set—logical, esthetic, ethical, economic, and religious values—they call the historical values.

The third set are the axioms—the triad of goodness, beauty, and

truth—which from ancient times have been the *axioma*, forms of worthiness that are self-evident.

If for no other reason than that man himself has created them, within these sets of categories, in quality and degree his own, the child must eventually find his values.

At the start, however, (except for the life preserving values) they are not there, or if they are, the adult mind finds it hard to detect them. They must be there incipiently and potentially, but they are so subordinate to the obvious values in children's lives that the children can make them live only as they formulate their own child value systems.

The umbrella value of the child's system is concomitant with the very purpose of childhood. The purpose of childhood is to give the child time to develop, to organize, and to coordinate all the complex organs of his body and the complex functions of his mind. At some point along the way, we say, "He is now a man; she is a woman." Growth and evidence of growth toward adulthood are the child's prize values; but it must be growth toward that point in time and development when he can say to himself in self-assurance, "I am now not just a man; I am my own man." One of the previous seminar groups concluded with just that idea: The purpose of the educational enterprise is "to cultivate the ability to make judgments, exercise self-direction, and achieve self-fulfillment."

The significant aspects of growth toward becoming one's own man are these:

1. Growth in self-respect. Self-respect is rational self-esteem, realization of one's significance as a person, finding gratification in one's competence, especially gratification in one's ability to create his own competencies. As for the values in self-respect, Milton said, "Nothing profits more than self-esteem, grounded on just and right."

2. Growth in competence in companionship. The ability to work and play with others in justice and rightness is not only the foundation of self-respect, as Milton said; it is also the keystone in the conceptual arch of interdependence on which lean the buttresses of social responsibility, social sensitivity, and respect for others.

3. Growth toward independence in choice, in judgment, in the ability to express his thoughts. The ability to think things through on his own, the do-it-yourself bit, is central to our whole set of values, if only for the reason that the nature of man's thought and the expression of it differentiate man and beast.

4. Growth in the ability to evaluate one's development and the products of one's mind. If the child cannot appraise himself he

cannot know that he is growing and the other childhood values disappear.

The reasons that we propose this set of values for our future planning in education are three:

1. These are the values inherent in childhood. In schools in which attainment of these values is already set as the goal of education, for the first time in the history of education (Socrates, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori almost excepted) teacher and child work hand in hand, childhood and education work shoulder to shoulder toward achievement of the same values. The so-called generation gap is no longer there, in school at least. Derek Morell put the matter more conceptually when he said, "In a nutshell, if there is a positive reciprocity of feeling and aspiration between the teachers and the taught, satisfying to both, there is a describable curricular reality."

2. Because attainment of these values is the whole purpose of childhood, the child is going to do his almighty best to build them anyway, with or without the help of school. Without the help of either home or school, what happens? As St. Augustine saw it when he and his gang stripped the pear tree, and as we see it now, what happens is the segmentation of society into groups small enough to permit each individual to find his self-respect, companionship, and independence; these segments, however, are in continuous conflict with one another, creating as Dr. Ulich said, "so much . . . emotional dessication and unhappiness." If the school would it could, with complete assurance of success, guide the child to find his self-values in humanity: not to destroy but to create a social order.

3. Our children are the future. Whatever the future turns out to be, either with or without our help, our children will have made it so. This means that if there is to be a synthesis of our two strands of thought, a compound of humanity, humaneness, and social change, then our children will be, must be the inventors of it.

If our reasoning is valid (and I can see no possible refutation of it) then in our future planning these are the changes that we must make:

1. Instead of demeaning the child because he is small, ignorant, and bad, we respect him both for the person that he is and for the person that he can become. In our respect for him, the child's self-respect blooms.

2. Instead of individualizing education as we have done (locking each child up in a compartment of silence to listen to us), we socialize it. George Barnes said that education is the pursuit of truth in the company of friends. And when I go into one of those new schools in which children work together to achieve common learn-

ing goals, the most heartening thing I see is their competency in companionship. They are creating their social order now.

3. Instead of smothering the child's mind in those haycocks of answers that we call the course of study, we alert it (as our two Canadian Councils require of us) to questioning and finding out. For the verbose artificiality that we call teaching, we substitute a real world of people and things. After all, there are only four sets of relationships that man's mind can perceive: the relationships between people and people, things and things, people and things, and the relationship of the man himself to all three. Out of his perception of these relationships the child must create his own real world. In that real world of his own creation the child finds his independence in thought and judgment.

4. For the continual evaluation by the teacher of right and wrong, good and bad, sin and righteousness, we substitute the child's evaluation of himself and of the products of his mind. And believe me, when we do, we find that in evaluating his own thinking and his own values, nobody can be more severe than the child himself.

Two things remain for future planning. The first is planning how to change not the child, but us. We have been so long inured to righteousness is something that we have not yet gone to work at very hard. For the synthesis that we have talked of, the time has come and now is going.

The second element that we must incorporate into our future planning is faith in childhood. We have been scared of children, just as they have been scared of us. Yet only as we switch from fear of children to faith in children can we ever hope to achieve those values that are the very soul of childhood. Having made the turnaround (if we can manage it), then we shall not worry about the philosophical values that we have listed. Faith in children is the realization of faith in humanity; and humanity itself created the triad of goodness, beauty, and truth. In respect and self-respect, in interdependence and independence, and with their self-fulfilling minds, our children will invent forms of goodness, beauty, and truth that our own past-sodden minds could not even have imagined.

Behaving and Believing: An Exploration into the Role of Values in the Learning/Knowing Process

William F. O'Neill

Since all education is based on some sort of objectives and since all objectives imply a prior commitment to more generalized or abstract principles with respect to what is ultimately worthwhile (values), any discussion of education is in some sense predicated upon certain prior assumptions about the nature and conditions of value.

THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this paper is to discuss certain problems relating to values which underlie educational practices. More specifically, it is to talk about the relationship between value and the learning/knowing process. In effect, this paper addresses itself (somewhat unsystematically) to five basic questions:

1. What is a value?
2. What is the relationship between a value and a fact? (How do values relate to knowing, to the learning process?)
3. What is the origin of values?
4. To what extent can values be modified?
5. What do the answers to these questions imply for the educational process in general and for curriculum theory in particular?

SOME PRELIMINARY QUALIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS

It goes without saying that all of the questions posed above are unanswerable in any absolute sense.

Because of time and space limitations, I have made no attempt to be either exacting or exhaustive. Much of what is said here is necessarily indirect, partial, or merely illustrative. Much—at least in the minds of many—will appear to be patently controversial. Myriads of qualifications could easily be appended to many of the positions taken in this paper, but the basic intent throughout has been to identify problems and to pose suggestive answers, not to resolve the major dilemmas of moral philosophy.

Obviously, I have made no attempt to discuss all of the possible points of view with respect to the connection between values and knowledge. I have restricted myself to ideas which presuppose a "naturalistic" rational-scientific world view and to viewpoints which reserve the term "knowledge" for propositions which are in some sense amenable to objective and public verification. In this sense, I have been primarily concerned with identifying the basic philosophical implications in prevailing scientific opinion with respect to the nature of human behavior and learning. I have done this, not because the traditional prescientific and prepsychological positions no longer make sense but, rather, because their authoritarian and a priori character makes them virtually inapplicable as a basis for secular democratic practices.

Finally, this paper addresses itself primarily to philosophical questions and only secondarily to educational ones. This is intentional and was done for two reasons. First, most professional educators are far more knowledgeable about the practical aspects of education and about specific educational theories than about the more abstract philosophical presuppositions which are fundamental to such matters. Secondly, it is becoming increasingly apparent that recent speculation about the nature of the knowledge process and the relationship between truth and value has a vast—and frequently discomfiting—relevance for contemporary education.

THE NATURE OF VALUE

It is very difficult to make an initial definition of the term "value," because, in a very basic sense, defining the term "value" is precisely

what moral philosophy is all about. When speaking of values, however, it is useful to make two basic sorts of distinctions.

The first is between a *value-experience* (for example, pleasure), a *value-object* (such as chocolate ice cream or blondes in mini-skirts), and a *value-principle* (such as the Golden Rule or a dedication to scientific problem-solving procedures).

The second distinction is between various subareas within so-called moral philosophy itself. Here it is often useful to distinguish between three basic types of value-questions:

1. Questions of *personal (subjective) value:* that is, questions pertaining to the *psychological* nature of value, to value in its relationship to the individual per se—What is *personally* good?
2. *Moral questions:* questions pertaining to the individual in his relationships with other people—What is *interpersonally* good? How should I behave with respect to others?
3. *Ethical questions:* questions pertaining to the relationship between values and free will—Did I *intend* to act as I did? Was my behavior based on conscious choice or was it unreflective and therefore "irresponsible?"

This paper addresses itself primarily to the question of personal value and only secondarily to moral and ethical considerations. The concept of value which is probably most useful for educators is that advanced by the pragmatists. This is true for three reasons: (a) It is based on the scientifically necessary assumption that all values are rooted in behavior. (b) It makes a minimum number of assumptions. (c) It is overwhelmingly verified by the vast bulk of contemporary scientific evidence about human behavior.

In general, this paper is based upon pragmatic presuppositions about the nature of value, and these will become increasingly evident in the course of remarks which follow.

THE CONTEXT OF KNOWING

We can only know our own personal experience. This experience is, in turn, an outgrowth of physical behavior. Behavior, however, is ultimately relative (or relational) to certain conditions which provide the determinative context for activity itself.

The term "relative" is vastly misunderstood. Speaking literally, the statement "Everything is relative" is nonsense. Something can only be "relative" when it is "relational" to something else which is *not* relative and can therefore be used as a standard of reference. If

everything were in the final analysis *relative to belief*, everything would be "subjective," a matter of personal taste. The problem with subjectivity, however, is that it precludes effective communication by making reason arbitrary. If one refuses to accede to the usual conventions for determining knowledge, one must grant others the same right.

"No man," Bertrand Russell has said, "would engage in the pursuit of philosophy if he thought that *all* philosophy is merely an expression of irrational bias." [1] "If," comments anthropologist Dorothy Lee in much the same vein,

> reality itself were not absolute, then true communication . . . would be impossible. My own position is that there is an absolute reality, and that communication is possible. If, then, that which the different codes [i.e., languages] refer to is ultimately the same, a careful study and analysis of a different code and the culture to which it belongs, should lead us to concepts which are ultimately comprehensible, when translated into our own code. It may even, eventually, lead us to aspects of reality from which our own code excludes us.[2]

Properly speaking, knowledge is *subjective* only in a secondary or subordinate sense. Knowledge *is* subjective (psychological), but the "subjective" is ultimately behavioral and therefore grounded in the *objective* circumstances required as a condition for behavior itself. We know subjectively, but our subjectivity is grounded in the objective.

This is not meant to suggest that the notion of continuous change and impermanence is illusory. It is, however, to reject the notion of *radical* change on the grounds that even the notion of change can be understood only in terms of its logical contrary, "permanence." "Truth," as William James once remarked, "presupposes a standard outside of the thinker to which he must conform." [3] As Aristotle observed, we can only perceive differences in terms of what things have in common, in terms of color, length, size, and so on. Thus, in the words of Chesterton, "when [a person states] . . . 'all chairs are different' he utters not only a misstatement, but a contradiction in terms. If all chairs were quite different, you could not call them 'all chairs.' " [4] "The fact of two things being different implies that they are similar. The hare and the tortoise may differ in the quality of their swiftness, but they must agree in the quality of motion. . . . Because the North Pole is unattainable, it does not follow that it is undefinable. And it is only because the North Pole is not indefinable that we can make a satisfactory map of Brighton and Worthing." [5]

To complicate matters even more, and as semanticist Wendell Johnson suggests, even relational "absolutes" are relative to each other. "Words are defined by each other. *Space* is defined in terms of *length* and *length* is defined in terms of *space; beauty* is defined in terms of *good* and *good* in terms of *beauty*, etc." [6] In short, any quality or idea exists only as a function of a set of conditions.

Knowledge is personal, then, but the personal is merely penultimate and presupposes a world of objective and impersonal relationships. The *conditions* of relativity are not themselves relative. "The assumption," to cite an appropriate observation by Dorothy Lee, "is not that reality itself is relative; rather, that it is differently punctuated and categorized, or that different aspects of it are noticed by or presented to, the participants of different cultures." [7]

Relativism, notes German philosopher Karl Mannheim in his epochal work *Ideology and Utopia*,

> signifies merely that all of the elements of meaning in a given situation have reference to one another and derive their significance from this reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame of thought. . . . [It attempts to establish] the relationship of all partial knowledge and its component elements to the larger body of meaning, and ultimately to the structure of reality.[8]

UNCERTAINTY

At basis, truth is rationally *approachable*, but it is not rationally *solvable*.[9] Even our most scientific ideas are not exact copies of reality but essentially representations, or imaginative reconstructions, of reality. As Einstein and Infeld note in *The Evolution of Physics*,

> In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes. But he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one that could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with a real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison. But he certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions.[10]

Or, as Sir Arthur Eddington once remarked with respect to research into the nature and behavior of electrons:

> We see the atoms with their girdles of circulating electrons darting hither and thither, colliding and rebounding. Free electrons torn from the girdles hurry away a hundred times faster, curving sharply around the atoms with sideslips and hairbreadth escapes. . . . The spectacle is so fascinating that we have perhaps forgotten that there was a time when we wanted to be told what an electron is. The question was never answered. . . . *Something unknown is doing we don't know what*—that is what our theory amounts to. It does not sound a particularly illuminating theory. I have read something like it elsewhere:
>
> The slithy toves
> Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.
>
> There is the same suggestion of activity. There is the same indefiniteness as to the nature of the activity and of what it is that is acting.[11]

Absolute knowledge is precluded by the necessarily indeterminate nature of the knowledge process itself. We are forced to recognize, notes Percy Bridgman, "that we cannot have information without acquiring that information by some method, and that the story is not complete until we have told both what we know and how we know it." [12]

ISNESS AND OUGHTNESS

Man is a purposive entity, because he is an active physical structure in a defined field of forces. An active physical entity confronted by defined conditions not only *implies* a certain kind of function, it *is* a certain kind of function. "Everything which has a function," notes Aristotle, "exists for the sake of that function." [13] There is, to use Susan Sontag's memorable phrase, a "natural eschatology of imminence." [14]

Active structure seeks the sort of function compatible with its nature. It *causes* certain types of behavior which, in turn, *cause* certain types of knowledge. Man's biological nature is tacitly intentional, then. The laws of human nature are not ordinances which prescribe behavior but ways of describing the regularities implicit within human behavior itself. There is, Aristotle observed, a natural teleology, but, notes philosopher John Herman Randall,

> it involves for Aristotle no dubious inference to unobservable causes. As [Aristotle] puts it, such a natural end is an outcome

toward which a process is *observed* to go forward unless something stands in its way. Acorns grow into oak trees, not into pine trees; human infants grow into men, not into donkeys.

Natural necessity relates the materials and parts of animals to their functioning; it designates the means that are necessary for the ends of natural processes. It is in this central relation of means to ends that Aristotle finds the necessity exhibited by natural things.[15]

The human organism is an active structure which has an intrinsic urge to survive. In order to survive, it must adapt to natural conditions by behaving, by responding to its environment. It can only respond in terms of its inherent structural capabilities, by automatic structure-function. In the newborn no behavior is consciously adaptive. All behavior is expressive and exploratory. By means of selective reinforcement (pleasure and pain), however, certain types of expressive behavior are strengthened and consolidated. To begin with, this consists of behavior which is directly and repeatedly reinforced (like eating) and behavior which is indirectly reinforced as a means to such basic pleasures (such as crying or cooing). In a sense, then, the infant's structure anticipates and tacitly "wills" his earliest responses. The latent purpose behind the infant's activities is the satisfaction of inherent physical needs through the utilization of available motor-muscular structure.

The child's first behavior is the automatic expression of innate action-potentials. His first experiences with the world are relative to the biological imperatives inherent within his own physical nature. The "reality" of the child is the sort of reality which is necessarily congenial to the powers (structure) which the child possesses.

But even biological structure is not self-determining. The structure of the human species has emerged from a long history of natural selection. It has been shaped and conditioned by the inexorable requirements of survival and of success within survival. The body is a *cause* of function, it is true, but it is also an *effect* of function, the product of human adaptive behavior through the ages. The human body as we know it today is the end product of millenia of behavioral "shaping," the product of a complex interplay of natural forces. If structure implies function, structure has also been shaped by the inexorable effects of its own past functioning, in relationship to the real world.

Phrased somewhat differently, the nature of the contemporary human organism has been determined by the success of the species-

organism in surviving within and coming to grips with the natural world. Behavior has determined the survival of certain types of structure, because the function of this structure has been adaptive and has therefore militated in the direction of success. In outline form, the entire process might be represented as follows:

The total field of forces *(reality)*

↓

shapes *behavior*
(which is selectively reinforced by means of pleasure and pain in terms of its value for the survival and success of the species)

↓

which, in the long run, leads to modifications in the species-organism *(human nature)*

↓

which, in turn, expresses itself as a proclivity toward certain types of *behavior* (which are compatible with the natural needs and potentialities of the organism)

↓

which leads to certain types of *learning*

↓

which eventuates in certain types of *knowledge*

↓

which may or may not be *adaptive* and therefore reinforced

↓

but which thereby leads to subsequent modifications in *behavior* and therefore, in the long run, to evolutionary modifications in the biological structure of the species-organism (and so on in a spiral progression).

The situation can also be summarized in the following manner:

The evolution of the *physical* environment (the possible)

↓

gives rise to the *biological* organism (the imperative)

↓

which is basic to the development of the *normative*
(the desirable)

↓

which is basic in determining the *intellectual*
(the comprehensible)

↓

which leads to modifications in the *physical* environment and so on in a spiral progression.

What makes human nature purposive is the fact that it functions as a predisposition to behave in ways which naturally relate to the objective structure of the real world. Human nature is a product of adaptive behavior in the evolutionary past. Self-actualization in the present is nothing more than the fullest expression of all of those behavioral proclivities which were habitually reinforced in the evolutionary development of the species. The infant's earliest purely expressive behavior is shaped by adaptive requirements until it is knowledge. An important aspect of this knowledge is the child's awareness of his own purposes.

THE RELATIVITY OF SUBJECTIVITY

At basis, reality is not *psychological* but *behavioral*. It is rooted in concrete behavior, which is ultimately grounded in the objective conditions of physical existence—the reality which underlies both subjectivity and objectivity.

In the beginning, there is no "self," and all awareness is a pure relation of identity. Knowledge of self and knowledge of the external world emerge concurrently. We become "selves" by assimilating aspects of those things which we have done and therefore known. Life, notes Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gassett

> is as far as possible from a subjective phenomenon. It is the most objective of all realities. It is man's I finding itself submerged in precisely what is not himself, in the pure *other* which is his environment. To live is to be outside oneself, to realize oneself.[16]

While we experience the world subjectively, our "subjectivity" is itself an outgrowth of objective behavior. Even our subjectivity is ultimately relative to that which is not subjective at all, the behavioral (biological) consequences of relating to the real world in given ways.

The self is ultimately an internalization of experiences growing out of physical behavior. But behavior is, in turn, determined by its own objective context, the nature of the physical body, and the nature of the physical environment. In the final resolve, then, and while behavior may be the *psychological* origin for all knowledge, it is not

the *logical* origin of knowledge. The human organism is an active tension-system. It makes certain demands on its environment. Some of these demands are met, pleasure ensues, and learning occurs. Others are frustrated or denied and eventuate in a rechannelization of behavior and therefore in new and different types of learning.

Man is ultimately a purposive organism who gets pleasure from the expression of his potentialities. Pleasure is not "subjective," however. It is situational and occurs when the organism and its environment come into proper relationship with respect to the action-requirements inherent in given circumstances.

Intelligence is subordinate to pleasure. An intelligent man is not merely a man who can solve problems effectively. He is a man who can solve *relevant* problems effectively. "Relevant problems" are human problems that point toward pleasure and emotional well-being. Intelligence is ultimately a very practical enterprise. The purpose of seeking truth, Kierkegaard once said, is to "exist in it" and "not to think about it." "To exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Denmark with the help of a small map of Europe on which Denmark shows no larger than a pen point."[17]

An intelligent act is an act that works relative to the problem-situation at hand. There is nothing "subjective" or "personal" about intelligence. One cannot be intelligent without acting. It is a situational quality, a gift of relating effectively to one's circumstances. An intelligent man who is unhappy is a stupid man, because the whole point of being intelligent is to be happy. Many "intelligent" people are functionally stupid. They are only capable of being intelligent from the point of view of others.

All truth is ultimately *human* truth—truth that relates to human needs. Truth that does not meet this criterion—if it is possible at all—is pointless and absurd. At basis, all belief is rooted in the psychological. All philosophy, if it starts at the beginning, must start with the study of human behavior and trace the logic of the psychologic. The natural developmental sequence is from the psychological to the ontological and from the empirical (experiential) to the rational.

The categorical imperatives which underlie all behavior are the structural possibilities of the natural world. The human organism is not only put together in a given way. It is also impelled to seek the natural expression of that which it *is*. The body is a network of structure-function imperatives. Active structure not only implies certain types of function, it also seeks those things in the world which relate to and release this functional potential. The body not only has a gastrointestinal tract. In order to survive and remain

adaptive, this gastrointestinal tract must operate in the way in which it is organized. If it fails to do so, the organism will sicken or die. If it functions in terms of its potentialities two things occur: (a) The organism will survive and be effective. It will experience pleasure, which is cued electrochemically by the proper functioning of the organism. (b) It will learn through the automatic hedonic mechanisms of the body what works apropos of the total organism-environment field, and this learning will be verified and internalized as response-tendencies (knowledge) which are capable of directing the organism in its future course of action. At basis, then, experience is determined by behavior, and behavior is determined, in turn, by the total field of forces which exists at any particular time.

THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF BEHAVIOR

Man is not inherently good, and the world is not inherently good. Certain types of behavior *are* inherently good, however, because they are pleasurable. They are pleasurable because they are effective—because they allow the organism to survive and to function in the way in which it is capable of doing. In other words, we are confronted with a sort of contextual behaviorism in which knowledge is primarily determined by a sort of natural dialectic: The body makes certain demands upon the environment—as for food and protection against the elements—and the environment, in turn, offers certain possibilities for the satisfaction of these demands and denies others. By acting upon the environment, the organism discovers through the medium of pleasure and pain which aspects of the environment satisfy or frustrate which natural demands. Through the earliest motor-emotional [18] conditioning, the organism cathects certain objects and events as "good" and proscribes others as "bad." With the emergence of abstract cognition, these goals are broadened to encompass the desirable and undesirable as *categories* of experience (which are represented as *values*). Since all men share a common nature and live in the same sort of world, they also come to share common behavioral experiences which inexorably lead to a high degree of intellectual and moral agreement despite cultural and personal differences. There is, in short, a certain "common sense" inherent within the uniformity of human behavior itself.

None of this, however, is purely mechanistic determinism, for a vast variety of variables may intrude upon and affect the learning process. No two organisms are, for example, alike. It is not merely the *generic* nature of man as man—the fact that a man has a certain

kind of body, only two eyes, two arms, and so on—but also the fact that each individual has an *idiosyncratic* nature (the fact that one man may have a particular sort of temperament or a high or low intellectual capacity) that determines how any particular person will behave. In a similar sense, it is not merely the *overall* structure of the world—the fact that there are three primary colors, that two times two equals four, and so on—which determines what behavior is possible and practical but also the nature of the *specific* situation in which any person finds himself at any particular time.

PRIMARY BEHAVIOR: THE RATIONALITY OF THE PRERATIONAL

What makes the first learning of a child so exceedingly important is perhaps obvious, for it is precisely the primary encounters of early childhood which give rise to the basic attitudes and values that are destined to be the foundation for the child's character-structure. The character is, in turn, the basic factor in determining (a) what situations will be sought and (b) how any situation, once it is encountered, will tend to be perceived and evaluated.

In other words, the most important thing to note about the prerational character-structure of a child is that it is almost invariably self-confirming. It becomes, in effect, not only the *will* which "wills" all subsequent behavior, but also the criterion by which such behavior is assessed and therefore either confirmed or denied as knowledge. Once the character-structure comes into existence, pleasure and pain tend to be increasingly channeled through it, and the "natural wisdom" of direct presymbolic behavior ceases to be a reliable guide to action.

Human knowledge beyond a certain point in psychological development is invariably personal knowledge. Self-orientation is primary: Belief grows out of encounter, but, once a volitional self-system has emerged, we encounter the world primarily through the medium of belief. "People always get what they ask for," notes Aldous Huxley, "the only trouble is that they never know, until they get it, what it actually is that they have asked for." [19]

We can only *learn* what we experience, and we are only capable of *knowing* what we have learned. Our knowledge is therefore restricted by our behavior. This relationship can be outlined as follows:

Behavior

↓ (gives rise to)

experience

↓ (which produces)

learning

↓ (which makes possible)

knowledge

↓ (which, in turn, modifies)

behavior

(which reinitiates the cycle).

The child's first learning, then, is direct and organismic—"non-psychological" in the usual sense of the term. In a peculiar sense, the primary world of hedonic encounter is an impersonal world, "impersonal" in the sense that it precedes any intimation of "personality" or "selfhood." These hedonic encounters with pleasure and pain are "objective" because they come before any sense of "subjectivity," because, in a very basic sense, they provide the foundation for all selfhood and subjectivity—indeed for the entire psychic world of the symbolic inner consciousness. Phrased somewhat differently, the infant only *knows* its own experience as it emerges out of its own behavior.

Psychologically, in the emergence of the self, our first behavior is inordinately important precisely because it occurs first. It therefore provides the basis for all of those first learnings which, once interiorized as meanings, serve to channel and direct our availability for new types of behavior and therefore for new types of experience and knowledge.

We experience a problem when we are frustrated in obtaining what we seek. The nature of the goal sought ultimately determines the nature of the problem encountered, and the nature of the problem encountered is fundamental to the solution obtained.

In the final analysis, pure and practical reason are not separable.

As Sir Francis Bacon said, "What is most useful in practice is most correct in theory."[20] All thought is ultimately instrumental. We think in order to solve our problems and realize our goals. Knowing, William James once noted, is "only one way of getting into fruitful relations with reality."[21]

The infant is neither rational nor capable of symbolic behavior. His first learnings are neither volitional (in the sense of being "willed" by some sort of recognized intent) nor "normative" (in the sense of being based upon assumptions with respect to what is good and bad, desirable and undesirable). At basis, they are even "pre-emotional" in the sense that they cannot be said to emerge out of feelings of anger, hatred, love, and so forth. Rather, the infant's first behavior (and the learnings which are based on this behavior) is perhaps best characterized as *compulsive* and *hedonic*. It is "compulsive" in the sense that it is not psychologically motivated at all but, rather, biologically compelled by the natural requirements of the total organism/environment interaction. The infant's first behavior is "hedonic" in the sense that it actually precedes any familiarity with the higher emotions, which are themselves a product of learning, and is necessarily rooted in the "proto-emotions" of pleasure and pain which lie at the basis of all more sophisticated "emotional" reactions.

The earliest learning is biological, but it is prepsychological and presubjective. Pleasure and pain, the two basic hedonic qualities, are not "emotions." They are rather essential components of all subsequent emotional reactions. An emotion, like anger or fear, necessarily entails pleasure and/or pain, but it involves these hedonic qualities in a specific sort of relationship between the organism and its environment which yields its own singular sort of action-body tonality (meaning). Fear is not merely pain. It is pain vis-à-vis a particular sort of threatening situation which elicits a special sort of motor-muscular response, and it is experienced in and through this response. It is, in other words, a particular *sort* of pain which occurs when the body acts upon itself with respect to a particular kind of anticipated behavior (such as fight or flight).

Emotions are learned. They evolve out of and are controlled by action-tendencies. Since the infant has no knowledge, he has no way of anticipating problems and therefore—with the exception of certain innate biological drives and a limited number of rudimentary reflexes—he has no way of channeling his pleasure and pain reactions through preformulated physical tension-systems which would lend them the distinctive quality of "emotional" responses.

At birth, pleasure and pain are quite objective, because they are rooted in biological necessity. The infant's behavior is geared either to survival or to the satisfaction of innate behavioral proclivities. The infant experiences pleasure when his behavior is effective with respect to his objective physical requirements. He experiences pain when his behavior is not effective in obtaining such natural gratifications.

Man is inherently "purposive." As Darwin first indicated, the mind is essentially an "organ of adaptation." The infant is a natural tension-reducing system instinctively seeking the satisfaction of intrinsic needs in order to satisfy the biological imperative of survival; he is naturally active and naturally learns from his own activity. The child learns, as Montessori once noted, "not with his mind but with his life." [22]

The nature of the first behavior determines the first experience. The nature of the first experience determines the nature of the first learning which, in turn, constitutes the beginning of knowledge. Gradually, the first precarious and indeterminate behavior gives rise to the first determinate inclinations and feelings. By means of motor-emotional conditioning, behavior is gradually channeled into inarticulate habits and tendencies.

In other words, learning is initially determined by pleasure which is a product of (objectively and subjectively) effective behavior. Pleasure is generally a reliable guide to action at this stage in development, because it is totally uncontaminated by psychological (subjective) influences. The organism speaks directly to its environment through its own objective physical requirements. The earliest so-called emotional verification of knowledge is not "emotional" at all but behavioral/biological. In the earliest "prepsychological" era of an individual's development, pleasure is the basic criterion for establishing what is "good" and therefore "true" with respect to behavior.

The child's first learnings do not pertain to the world, and they do not pertain to himself. They precede any awareness of either "world" or "self," and relate purely to his own responses. As philosopher William Heard Kilpatrick notes:

> Each one learns his responses, only his responses; he learns all his responses as he accepts them to act on, some to do, others to ignore; he learns his responses in the degree that they are important to him and in the further degree that they are interrelated with what he already knows.[23]

The first things that a child comes to "know" are aspects of his own behavior, the hedonic significance of his own responses. By pure

hedonic association the child learns (through the medium of his body) that certain acts are painful and to be avoided, that others are pleasurable and to be sought. He learns these things presymbolically and prerationally through direct motor-muscular involvement with his physical surroundings. His first learnings are tacit and inarticulate. He does not *know* that the stove is hot. He experiences being burned, and his behavior is shaped by its own hedonic consequences to avoid another contact with the hot stove. The initial meaning of the stove is "pain"; the pain evokes the behavioral withdrawal. Nonverbally the stove has been "labeled" by this withdrawal-response. It is now a *painful* object with a very real, although inarticulate, significance.

At basis, then, the infant knows only his own behavior in the guise of experience. He learns (assimilates) certain aspects of this behavior directly in the form of motor-muscular habits or stimulus-response arcs in response to his own pleasure-pain reactions. As he grows older he not only acquires new habits by means of instrumental conditioning, he also acquires the habit (again, by means of hedonic reinforcement) of generalizing (abstracting) on the basis of recognized recurrences and similarities between existing behavioral tendencies. In short, he begins to associate and classify similarities and differences among those things he has experienced, to label these associations by means of symbols, and then to use these labels as conceptual tools in confronting new experience. As Bruner notes, the child gradually finds himself "in a position to experience success and failure not as reward and punishment but as information." [24] Gradually, he comes to recognize the rhythms (or ordered changes) implicit within his own experience. He makes these explicit by means of symbols, and he uses these symbols to anticipate and direct his future experiences. The isolated ideas "This is Fido" and "This is Spot" undergo symbolic transformation and emerge as the more global insight "These are dogs." A multiplicity of different experiences with falling—falling off chairs and beds and stairs—gradually becomes generalized into the abstract action-quality we term "falling." The quality of pleasure associated with mother and milk and favorite toys becomes generalized into the overall rubric of "good."

THE AFFECTIVE ORIGIN OF THE COGNITIVE

All knowledge is ultimately affective. This is true for two reasons. To begin with, and in a purely *psychological* sense, we only learn by means of the fundamental hedonic qualities of pleasure and pain. It

is becoming increasingly apparent that memory is electrochemical in nature and that memory-traces are triggered and reinforced by hedonic mechanisms within the central nervous system. We learn through the emotional impact of our behavior. Behavior associated with pleasure is learned. Behavior associated with pain (providing that this pain is not ego-threatening and therefore amenable to being repressed) is probably also learned but it is ordinarily supplanted by more constructive pleasurable behavior as quickly as possible. Non-affecting behavior is not learned or is soon forgotten.

Experience, once assimilated as learning, becomes an integral part of the self-system. It is retained either directly as symbolic knowledge or indirectly as motor-muscular response-tendencies (habits). Effective (pleasurable) responses are retained and subsequently applied to the solution of the same and similar situations in the future.

In addition, and from a purely logical point of view, it stands to reason that the self-system can *be* nothing more than what it *knows*. What a person *knows* (his knowledge and habits), however, is ultimately conditioned by what he has *learned*, which is, in turn, determined by his emotional responses to what he has already *done*. We are, in short, programed "emotionally" to behave in certain ways and to evaluate (and therefore learn) only certain things from our behavior.

BELIEF AS BEHAVIOR

Ultimately, I do what I believe, because no other possibility is available. To say that I *choose to do* what I do *not* choose to do is to violate the natural (logical) laws of behavior. It is to be guilty of self-contradiction and also to deny the empirical law of cause and effect. One cannot *do* what one does not want to do, because to "want" to do something is to *seek* to act and *not* to avoid acting. I may have regrets about what I have *done*. I may wish for different options—for the sort of situation in which some other *best* action was possible. The point is, however, that in any given situation—and regardless of how dismal the alternatives may appear to be—I *want* to do the best thing possible with respect to the circumstances at hand. If I choose not to *act*, this too is a choice. If the opportunity presents itself, I may seek to alter the circumstances and change the options in order to do something else. What I *cannot* do is (a) contradict myself by purporting to do what I do not do or not do what I do or (b) deny that behavior itself is determined (and therefore lawful) by subscribing to a doctrine of uncaused (gratuitious) action.

The basic error which many people make here is to misconstrue the relationship between belief and behavior. In point of fact, behavior is the matrix of belief and not the other way around. Belief (knowledge) is merely a partial residue of behavior, a precipitate of past actions. Belief and behavior are reciprocally interaffecting. Behavior, however, comes first and has both logical and psychological priority.

All behavior is latent thought, because all thought is nothing more than latent behavior. Contrary to belief, communication is direct, behavioral, and nonverbal. We can deceive ourselves very easily by using the verbal fragments of our behavior to subvert and deny the pervasive nonverbal messages of our real actions. Such denials are ultimately unconvincing, however, because words, as merely one aspect of behavior—and however inordinately important they may be—are not magic and are very seldom as eloquent as overt action.

The verbal fallacy is to locate primary reality in words and not in concrete behavior. This can be a grave problem when it comes to determining the real nature of a person's beliefs, because one very important function of words is to disguise or misrepresent the real nature of behavior, and there is frequently a marked disparity between values *professed* and values *reflected* in actual behavior. As philosopher John Hospers writes:

> The majority of Americans profess to be Christians and therefore to accept the Christian way of life; yet very few practice these rules. Few even reflect on the moral directives of Christianity which they have heard many times. They pay lip service to the moral demands found in the Gospels, but they would not dream of putting these precepts into practice; and if any of their neighbors did so, they would consider the neighbors fools. Officially these professed Christians believe it is their duty to turn the other cheek, but in daily life they retaliate even for small injuries. They consider it unmasculine to discuss anything rationally; the way to settle things is to see who wins in a fair fight. Officially, they believe they should forgive, not once but seventy times seven; but in fact they seldom forgive at all, and when they do they usually make a great show of letting people know how forgiving they are. They are told in the Bible to take no thought for the morrow, what they shall eat or wear; but in fact they spend the greater part of their time in this enterprise. Although they are told that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter through the kingdom of heaven, their chief goal is to amass as much money and property as possible, not only for their comfort but to satisfy their exhibitionism and to cause envy among

their neighbors. They believe that all men are brothers, but they associate only with those who are in an income group as high as their own. They prefer not to associate with people of different racial or religious backgrounds and feel uncomfortable in their presence. The Bible tells these so-called Christians that no man can serve both God and Mammon; but during a lifetime spent in trying to outdo their neighbors and in serving Mammon, they assume that their Creator will reward them with eternal bliss for their efforts in his behalf. They are told that the meek shall inherit the earth; but if anyone they know is meek, they consider him a sissy or a sucker. They are told that of faith, hope and charity, the greatest is charity, but they do not particularly mind, that owing to overpopulation and lack of industrialization, the world does not provide enough to feed its people one square meal a day. While millions starve, these Christians spend more money each year on liquor than on all charitable enterprises combined. They are told to beware of false gods, but they believe in "America first" and frown on any attempt to alleviate world tensions because the enemy is wicked, communistic, and atheistic besides. Attempts at conciliation they brand "appeasement," and in some schools all books referring favorably to the concept of "one world" are banned. These Christians are supposed to believe that it is wrong to kill, yet ". . . from the time of Constantine to the time of global radiation and the unInterceptible missile, Christians have killed Christians and been blessed for doing so by other Christians." [25]

"Philosophy," Quintillian once remarked, "may be counterfeited, but eloquence never." [26] Quintillian's famous remark might be rephrased to read "Words may be counterfeited, but behavior never." A person may purport to do what he does not want to do, but he cannot *do* what he does not want to do. As Oscar Wilde once noted, "It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible." [27]

A statement about significant belief is necessarily a statement about behavior. If I state that I am "honest," I mean that I habitually do the honest thing and that my "honesty" takes priority over competing tendencies in virtually all circumstances. If my behavior is not congruous with my description of my behavior, my statement is incorrect, and I am unjustified in labeling myself as characteristically "honest." What makes a person "honest" is not an abstract comprehension of "honesty" in general or of honesty as an abstract course of action but a sincere commitment to honest practices *as a way of life.*

Beliefs are ultimately manifest in behavior. Only their verbal

dimension remains to be inferred. A belief is, in essence, a premise upon which one wagers his existence. Our behavior is the stuff our lives are made of. If I say that something is worthwhile, I mean that I am willing to exchange vital life-energy in the pursuit of it, that I am willing to wager a portion of my existence on it. Life itself is always a prior value. In living, I invest time and energy in what I believe.

"Knowledge" is belief which can be utilized as a means toward value. All knowledge is a means-value in pursuit of ends-values. A "belief," then, is always a value. A *certainty* (absolute knowledge) is invariably a belief that one is willing to stake one's life on.

Ultimately, there are two ways to explain a disparity between professed belief and actual behavior: (a) I do not act as I say or (b) I do not say as I do. Differences of opinion with respect to statements which pertain to general behavior—for example, "I am a good Christian"—can only be resolved by observing relevant behavior, because the statement itself refers to characteristic behavior of a very significant type. If I lie, cheat, and steal, and these contradict my ostensibly "Christian" nature, I am *not* a Christian, because the behavioral phenomena which my statement purports to describe belie my contention. In other words, since *saying* is an aspect of *acting*, a statement is always in principle capable of being confirmed or denied by the nature of real actions. Statements which purport to identify basic value-commitments—for example, "I am a very loving person"—constitute an act which purports to represent the overall nature of my behavior. If my overall behavior (the whole) contradicts the verbal aspect (the part), the part which purports to represent the whole is in error.

Overt physical self-expression is primary, then, because all thought is oriented to action and is merely an aspect of a far more encompassing sequence of behavior. Knowledge is merely internalized behavior. All beliefs are action-systems, and all "facts" are implicit imperatives.

At basis, then, we think and therefore learn as we do, because we perceive certain kinds of problems when we find ourselves confronted with given circumstances. We perceive these kinds of problems, because we are inextricably involved in certain kinds of ongoing behavior, because we seek certain goals and find these blocked by conditions. Faced with any given situation, we have no recourse but to construe it instrumentally, with a view to our dominant concerns at the moment. In a similar sense, we can solve the problem at hand only by calling upon our available repertoire of responses, only

by doing what we know *how* to do on the basis of behavior learned in response to the same and similar situations in the past.

TIME AND MEMORY

Ironically, even the perception of time is determined by our past behavior. What I am capable of experiencing and therefore learning in the present is totally determined by my past behavior. I can only perceive the present situation in terms of who I am—that is, who I *was*, what I have been programed to be in the present as a result of the emotional (hedonic) consequences of my past behavior. I can only respond emotionally to what I do (thereby learning from my own behavior and creating a new "past" which will make me capable of a new type of response in the future) in terms of what I already *am* (that is, in terms of what I already value and am therefore committed to on the basis of my past behavior).[28]

In a similar sense, the "past" no longer exists. What I term the "past" is merely my *contemporary* knowledge of my own prior behavior (for example, what I remember of my childhood or what I recall about the French Revolution from having studied it in high school). We can only know the *personal past*, just as we can only know the *historical past*, by reminiscence, by actively retrieving (recollecting) our own existing knowledge—in short, by perceiving selected aspects of our own interior symbolic environment. Robert Hutchins was quite right when he said that to destroy the Western cultural heritage, it is not necessary to burn the books, we merely need to leave them unread for a generation. If, by some extraordinary circumstance, we were all to suffer collective amnesia and past records were to be totally destroyed, "history" as we know it would disappear. What would remain of the distant past would be merely monuments, fragments, and artifacts, like Stonehenge and Pompeii.[29]

In other words, a *memory* of the past *is* the past for all practical purposes. In order to exist, the past must be activated and directed in the guise of knowledge through present perceptual-processes. Anything which alters basic goals and purposes alters perception and is quite capable of modifying "the past." If a person undergoes a severe shift in personality—as, for example, the ex-Communist who becomes an extreme advocate of free-enterprise capitalism—he will also tend to "remember" his past differently. Not only will he selectively recall different experiences than he previously remembered, he will probably construe the same experiences differently (perhaps viewing a once treasured position of Party responsibility as a shame-

ful episode) and may even avoid remembering (by selective inattention) certain past experiences altogether because they are now incipiently painful. In much the same way, cultures undergo shifts in values, and history therefore tends to be "interpreted" or remembered differently by different societies and at various times. The point is, of course, that *objectively* there is no such thing as "history" per se. There is merely "the past"—i.e., everything that ever transpired. "Recorded history" is not "history," because the act of recording is itself an evaluation, a choice—a sorting and selecting among those things which were potentially available to be recorded.

There is much talk today about Negro history and about African history. The point is, of course, that there has always been a Negro past and an African past, but they have seldom been construed as significant aspects of "history." They were *there*, but they were not *relevant*; they did not relate to basic social needs, problems, and purposes. History has not changed, but values have. Racial conflict has made Black identity and therefore Black history and African studies pertinent. What relates to our purposes we perceive and ultimately come to understand.

In a similar sense, the *future* also comes to us refracted through the distorting lens of self-interest. When we speak of the future, we talk of that which is yet to exist, of that which merely is anticipated or intended. A vision of the future is always a creative vision. It is a projection of the present based upon a comprehension of the past. The future, like the past, exists only in the present. We know the future, as we know anything else, instrumentally. We selectively perceive and subsequently project into the "future" only those aspects of our past experience which relate to our present purposes. The financier who anticipates a business depression perceives a different future than the aerospace engineer who senses an imminent breakthrough in space technology. Insofar as both share common concerns about certain things, like education and politics, and have similar backgrounds or training, they probably also agree in many of their expectancies. In all events, the perceived "future" consists of recollections and recombinations of past experiences relative to existing problems which are subjectively displaced in the guise of reality-hypotheses.

REMEMBERING THE FUTURE

In a sense, then, we *are* our past. We can only relate to the present through the future by intentional (purposive) activity—by seeking

that which we do not have and by coping with the ensuing difficulties. We can only know the world indirectly through our purposes and projects, from within our own commitments. Our values determine what we seek. What we seek determines what we encounter, experience, learn, and—ultimately—believe.

Ironically, however, we can only seek that which we already know. We can only seek to experience that which we have already experienced successfully and found "valuable" (pleasurable). At basis, all values are memories of past satisfactions, attempts to reinstitute and reexperience objects and events (or, more properly, classes of objects and events) which we have already proven successful in obtaining in the past.

In a peculiar sense, then, since all thought is purposive and since all purposes are an attempt to recapitulate past gratifications in the light of present conditions, all thought is an exercise in nostalgia. Cognition is fundamentally characterological, and the tap roots of the character-structure lie deep in prerational behavior. "It's a poor sort of memory that only works backward," Lewis Carroll once said. Precisely, for memory also works forward by means of intentionality. Our basic purposes are rooted in reminiscence. Like eternal emigrants, we attempt, in Freud's memorable phrase, "to recapture our infancy" by rediscovering the emotional consummations of our past in our future, by seeking reprises of primary satisfactions in a sort of repetition-compulsion.

This is not to say that significant change is impossible or that important new knowledge is precluded. It does indicate, however, that significant change in the existing self-system is extremely unlikely for three basic reasons:

1. We seek certain *ends* (values), because we have been successful and have experienced gratification in the past for doing so.
2. We employ certain *means* (problem-solving procedures) to attain these ends because such means have been successful in the past and have yielded effective and pleasurable results.
3. Most people are implicitly committed to maintaining a relatively stable life-situation, not only through apathy, but also because this is a condition (secondary value) required for the fullest expression of their existing value (ends-means) orientations.

Phrased somewhat differently, we tend to seek (value) what we have already experienced and found pleasurable. We tend to solve problems by using methods which have already been successful with the same and similar problems in the past, and, finally, we seek to

sustain the sort of conditions under which we are most likely to gratify our values and find our knowledge applicable. In short, we tend to wear deep ruts into our lives. The older we get, the deeper these ruts ordinarily become. We are, on the whole, successful in what we do, because there is characteristically very little novelty involved in our actions. We go through endless variations on the same ends-means patterns, continuously reinforcing (and therefore strengthening) existing systems of response and expectancy.

THE ONTOLOGY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

Ultimately, we only know our own bodies, our own sensory responses, directly. Everything beyond the senses is indirect and inferential. Our perceptions are merely classifications of sensations. Our conceptions (abstractions) are merely classifications of perceptions. By means of conceptualization, we arrive at three kinds of knowledge: (a) knowledge of the objective world, (b) knowledge of the objective self (the body in its nonsensory aspects as body-object), and (c) the subjective self (memories, intentions, values, goals, and so on).

All of our behavior, and therefore all of our knowledge, is totally determined. We can only perceive what we have sensed; we can only conceive what we have perceived. The general nature of our sensory encounters is predetermined by the generic nature of our bodies and the universal requirements of the natural world. Our specific behavior is not predetermined, however, because what we do and therefore know is also radically contingent upon many fortuitous and unpredictable elements. We are not merely members of the human race. We are also particular individuals with chance combinations of physical characteristics—blue-eyed and brown-eyed, apathetic and energetic, and so on. We live not only in the world but in particular countries, neighborhoods, and houses.

Belief is simultaneously a psychological and a philosophical problem. The psychological—the phenomenological, the experiential—precedes and determines all belief. On the other hand, the lower levels of biological functioning define the conditions which ultimately account for psychological successes and failures.

We question the world in terms of the innate demands of our bodies. The answers we receive are invariably conditioned by what is relevant on a psycho-biological basis.

At basis, then, the physiological nature of the organism is teleological. All behavior is ultimately an expression of psycho-biological drives and serves to reduce their compelling quality. Behavior

achieves meaning from its own effects on the drives or motives from which it emerges, and, as learning occurs, these very drives are increasingly reshaped as a byproduct of their own reinforcement.

Ultimately, the psychological is a concomitant of the behavioral, which is itself largely conditioned by the psycho-biological nature of the organism. On the other hand, the psycho-biological nature of the organism is itself the outgrowth of evolutionary natural selection based on survival. In an odd sense, then, while belief is founded upon the psychological (experiential), the psychological is itself rooted in the biological. The biological is, in turn, a product of the behavioral (the evolution of structure-function in terms of progressive adaptation or fitness) which is itself a part-function of the entire configuration of natural forces over all time. The situation might be outlined as follows:

The *psychological* (experiential)
↓
grows out of the *behavioral*
↓
which is primarily contingent upon the *biological* (the nature of the human organism)
↓
which is a product of the *behavioral* at the species-level (and consists of modifications in physical structure-function brought about by evolutionary natural selection)
↓
which is itself a partial expression of the *ontological* (the total field of forces which constitute Being per se).

Despite the emphasis on the psychological, this point of view is not a type of "psychologism" in which the ontological is explained in psychological terms. The error of psychologism lies in attempting to explain the whole (Being) solely in terms of one of its parts (the mind). What I have attempted to demonstrate here is that, while philosophy (the known) can be *experienced* psychologically (by knowing), it can only be *explained* ontologically, in terms of conditions which are merely implied by the psychological (experiential). In other words, even contemporary scientific psychology (the most rigid operational behaviorists included) holds to certain beliefs—the belief in reason itself or the belief in the "empirical logic" of the

scientific process, for example—which are not, strictly speaking, demonstrable within the context of scientific psychology. There are no "logical" reasons for being logical, and there are no "scientific" reasons for being scientific. To attempt such justification is to become involved in unavoidably circular reasoning which is both unproductive and misleading.

At basis, the psychological is both a product and a function of the ontological. The phenomenological is ultimately grounded in the ontological; the morphology of the mind is ultimately founded upon the morphology of the world. By means of progressive behavior (interaction) the world has given rise to man. By means of his own individual behavior (through the medium of personal experience) each man creates his representation of the world which exists beyond self and his own concept of "self" as well. "Life," Bulwer-Lytton once said, "is like playing a violin solo in public and learning the instrument as one goes on."

There is an undeniable logic in the psychologic. Even "informal" behavior is not truly informal, because all behavior is restricted by the "formal" limits of the possible (the real). Within these limits it is shaped by the inexorable requirements of personal survival and success. In short, all behavior is adaptive, and we only learn our own behavior. All sustained knowledge is in some significant sense reasonable, because behavior itself is tacitly reasonable—that is, adapted to the unavoidable contours of external necessity which is mediated by pleasure and pain.

At basis, then, we can only question the world through the medium of our *subjective* needs. These needs, however, are only *experienced* "subjectively." They are ultimately an *objective* expression of a more encompassing pattern of physical (including biological) forces. The powers man possesses are ultimately natural powers which have been progressively modified through evolution to conform to the requirements of the world itself.

"Whatever is," Thomas Love Peacock once remarked, "is possible." Ironically, the reverse is also true in many respects, for what makes an idea "possible" is precisely the fact that it is comprehensible in terms of those things which are already accepted to be true; it is invariably an imaginative recombination or extension of those things which are already deemed "real." A two-headed horse is possible. A horse 300 miles high is not possible, because it violates certain natural laws which govern the sort of entities which can occur under existing terrestial conditions. Such an animal is incomprehensible because it is unreasonable (irrational) in terms of other and

more basic ideas which are assumed to be true. It is therefore "impossible." The situation might be summarized roughly as follows:

I consider "possible" (potentially real) that which is reasonable in terms of that which I already believe.

What I already believe has been determined (through the medium of personal experience) by the emotional consequences of my own behavior.

What I consider possible is therefore actually *probable* and is likely to be confirmed as true for three reasons:

1. I can only imagine something I have *not* experienced if it is represented directly or indirectly in what I presently *know* on the basis of my past (successful) experience.
2. The fact that I entertain an idea in the first place indicates that it is relevant in terms of my present problems and therefore has a better than chance likelihood of being used as a basis for action.
3. Since I can anticipate possibilities (potential truths) only on the basis of successful past behavior, what I anticipate (hypothesize) tends to be proven true.

In other words, I can only *imagine* meaningful variations of what I already *know*, which is a product of my successful behavior in the past. Therefore what I anticipate is likely to be ratified as true, because it is based upon a recollection and recombination of ideas derived from experiences which have already been successful and which are therefore already accepted to *be* true. The entire process is largely self-confirming.

COMMENTS ON CURRICULUM THEORY

My purpose in this paper has not been to discuss curriculum or curriculum theory as such but rather to talk about certain theoretical preconsiderations that must necessarily be discussed prior to any really probing consideration of curriculum matters. I am not an expert in curriculum, and any attempt on my part to make specific recommendations about curriculum matters would be of marginal value. What I have done is to outline, very briefly, a few of the major implications which the above remarks seem to have for education in general and for curriculum theory in particular. I have kept these remarks very brief and present them as a series of rather summary statements. It goes without saying that these are selected implications and represent a partial and rather idiosyncratic view of what appears to be most relevant. My position is, in effect, that *if* the fore-

going analysis is correct, *then* the following considerations are implied.

1. The traditional dichotomy between "truth" and "value" is fundamentally untenable. All truths *are* ultimately values and emerge out of valuative (purposive) behavior. We know volitionally within the purview of our overall personal commitments.

Cognition is a byproduct of motor-emotional involvement. The intellect as such is not directive; it is a servo-mechanism of the personality. The so-called cognitive domain is actually a subaspect of the "affective domain," and cognition is logically subordinate to and emerges out of affective involvement.

All education is radically moral, because learning itself is predicated upon the nature of personal values. It is nonsense to talk about intellectual training as if it were realistically separable from moral training. All education is ultimately normative, because the knowledge process itself is ultimately normative.

2. All knowing is radically characterological and goal-oriented. We learn instrumentally, as a means of solving our problems and thereby satisfying our needs. Knowledge per se is never originally a value and is capable of functioning as a (secondary) value, relatively independent of its profane origins in narrower goal-seeking behavior, only under certain conditions.

3. The purposes of education are implicit within the "purposes" of reality itself. The world consists of formal (structured) entities in active interrelationship. This relational process is implicitly purposive and therefore teleological. At basis, "isness" *is* "oughtness." Values and goals can be determined objectively by studying what is and therefore what is capable of being and becoming.

Educational objectives are relative, but they are relative to conditions—the nature of the physical world and the nature of the human organism—which are not relative and which can therefore be used as reliable criteria for defining values (that is, principles governing the optimum relationship between a given organism and given conditions). Those who oppose "relativism" in defining educational objectives subscribe tacitly to the contrary position of "subjectivism," which holds that objectives are ultimately based on authoritative personal preference. "Relativism" leads to knowledge which is amenable to change and which is potentially self-correcting in terms of subsequent inquiry. "Subjectivism" leads to a closed concept of truth which is highly resistant to significant modification in the light of new evidence.

4. The ultimate origins of knowledge lie in behavior, and the sole

purpose of knowing is to modify the course of subsequent behavior. All symbolic knowledge represents behavior and can ultimately only be measured in terms of behavior. Most of what we know is nonverbal, and words are always subordinate to deeds as a means of determining actual belief.

There are two basic types of mis-education: "pseudo-education" and "anti-education." "Pseudo-education" is education which is basically irrelevant to the real world. "Anti-education" goes beyond the normal sort of "pseudo-education" (which is basically *non*educative) and becomes actively *mis*-educative by distorting and misrepresenting the true nature of reality.

5. There is a "structure of knowledge," but this is more closely related to the structure of inquiry than to the structure of reality per se. At basis, reality is holistic, and everything is interrelated in an infinitely complex field of cause-and-effect relationships. We do not respond to the physical world, we respond to our responses (perceptions), which have themselves been channeled through our goals and values. The nature of our questions is fully as fundamental in determining the nature of our answers as is the sort of data to which we address ourselves.

6. All education is ultimately *self*-education, motivated and directed by the existing personality structure. Under most circumstances, knowledge (belief) tends to be circular, self-reinforcing, and self-confirming. This is true of both individuals and societies.

Personal knowledge changes constantly, but, in most cases, it changes within an established context of inquiry, and it changes in such a way as to reinforce and confirm these assumptions central to the overriding patterns of belief. In an insane society, the objectives of education are characteristically compatible with the dominant types of defect and are therefore fully functional within a transcendentally dysfunctional frame of reference.

All knowledge is personal knowledge. We know within our commitments, and it is far more difficult to introduce significant new information (and therefore alter basic beliefs) than has previously been thought. Even the *desire to change* is ultimately a personal value which, short of duress, must be present as a condition for change to occur within the existing personality structure.

All learning is based on prerational assumptions and commitments. The most drastic type of education is always ultimately a sort of therapy which provides the person with the self-knowledge necessary to make himself more fully aware of his own beliefs and therefore more totally open to new types of experience.

7. All beliefs are a function of behavior. Since beliefs, once established, become self-reinforcing under normal conditions, it follows that attempts to make significant changes in belief (and therefore to introduce radical new types of knowledge) must center, not on belief as such, but on behavior. In other words, since impersonal conditions are a significant factor in shaping the behavior which subsequently gives rise to belief, a highly controlled learning environment which permits only specified types of behavior and, indirectly, only certain types of learning experiences to occur is probably the best guarantee of significant modifications in belief. Such procedures—which range all the way from Montessori's "prepared environment" to the coerced "milieu therapy" of the Chinese Communist thought reform programs—strike at belief very effectively, because they view it as essentially an epiphenomenon of altered behavior.

8. Human beings are naturally active and therefore naturally educable. Learning is a condition required by the imperatives of survival and adaptation within the natural environment. Education, as Aristotle once noted, is a cooperative art and is improperly conceived as a punitive "discipline."

9. Other things being equal, "negative education" (i.e., uncontrolled learning experience) in early childhood results in productive knowledge. This is true for five basic reasons:

a. Learning is mediated by pleasure; the child learns that which is pleasurable (i.e., tension-reducing).
b. Pleasure is controlled objectively by biological tension-reduction mechanisms within the body which are, in turn, triggered by physical interaction with the real world. The child learns those responses which are objectively effective with respect to his intrinsic needs.
c. The child's earliest needs are essentially physical rather than psychological and do not therefore tend to be mediated by a symbolic self-system (subjectivity).
d. What the child learns through his earliest spontaneous behavior is shaped by the natural "wisdom" inherent within the emergent pattern of effective behavior itself. The infant's body questions the world directly in a mute dialectic of natural give-and-take and learns from the physical (hedonic) consequences of its own responses. Reality gives rise to knowledge (anticipated reality) which shapes behavior which alters knowledge and so on.
e. In most instances, this "uncontrolled" behavior eventuates in productive and trustworthy knowledge which works (and

which is therefore good) when applied to the solution of future problems. This is true for two reasons: (1) because such knowledge represents behavior which *has* worked in past circumstances and which is therefore a distillate of principles derived from past successes confirmed naturally by pleasure; and (2) because in "realistic" situations (by definition) only realistic and therefore effective responses will be learned in the long run and therefore assimilated as "knowledge." (Exceptions, in which otherwise ineffective behavior is reinforced and learned, will occur on certain occasions, but these will be infrequent and therefore easily counterconditioned by the overwhelmingly dominant effects of realistic behavior which result in true knowledge.)

10. Education occurs primarily during the preschool years and is a function of the culture (and the family in particular) and not the school. Most of what passes for "education" today is actually "re-education." The most significant education is that which provides the foundation for the child's future "educability" during early childhood and which ultimately determines the relevance and probable effectiveness of virtually all formal instructional procedures during later years.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Russell, Bertrand. *History of Western Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1946. p. 813.

[2] Lee, Dorothy. *Freedom and Culture*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959. p. 105.

[3] James, William. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy*. New York: Dover Publications, 1956. p. 191.

[4] Chesterton, Gilbert K. *Orthodoxy*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1959. p. 35.

[5] Chesterton, Gilbert K. *Heretics*. New York: J. P. Lane, 1905. pp. 82-83.

[6] Johnson, Wendell. *People in Quandaries.* New York: Harper & Row, 1946. p. 92.

[7] Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[8] Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965. p. 86.

[9] Morris, Van Cleve. *Philosophy and the American School.* Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1961. p. 71.

[10] Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics,* quoted in Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[11] Eddington, Sir Arthur. *The Nature of the Physical World.* London: J. N. Dent, 1935. pp. 280-81; quoted in Watts, Alan W. *The Book.* New York: Collier Books, 1966. p. 120.

[12] Bridgeman, Percy W. "Quo Vadis," in Obler, Paul C. and Estrin, Herman A., editors. *The New Scientist: Essays on the Methods and Values of Modern Science.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1962. p. 307.

[13] Aristotle, quoted by Randall, John Herman, Jr. *Aristotle.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. p. 151.

[14] Sontag, Susan. *Against Interpretation and Other Essays.* New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1966. p. 26.

[15] Randall, *op. cit.*, pp. 232, 235.

[16] Ortega y Gassett, Jose. *The Dehumanization of Art and Other Writings on Art and Culture.* New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956. p. 131.

[17] Kierkegaard, Soren. *Unscientific Postscript,* quoted in Wilson, Colin. *Beyond the Outsider.* Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1965. p. 62.

[18] Strictly speaking, the term "emotional" is misused in connection with the earliest sort of motor conditioning which is based on the hedonic effects of pleasure and pain and which precedes the development of "emotionality" per se. The distinction is clarified in the course of the following pages, but it is useful to bear in mind that the term "motor-emotional," when applied to the earliest learning during the childhood years, is probably less appropriate than the more obscure term "motor-hedonic."

[19] Huxley, Aldous. *The Perennial Philosophy.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. p. 249.

[20] Bacon, Sir Francis. *Novum Organum,* Book II, quoted in Merton, Robert. *Social Theory and Social Structure.* Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961. p. 560.

[21] James, William. *Pragmatism.* New York: World Publishing Co., 1961. p. 244.

[22] Maria Montessori, quoted by E. M. Standing. *Maria Montessori: Her Life and Work*. New York: New American Library, 1962. p. 110.

[23] Kilpatrick, William Heard. "Philosophy of Education from the Experimentalist Outlook." Henry, Nelson B., editor. *Philosophies of Education*. Forty-First Yearbook, Part I, National Society for the Study of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. p. 69.

[24] Bruner, Jerome S. *On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand*. New York: Atheneum, 1965. p. 90.

[25] Hospers, John. *Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Problems of Ethics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961. pp. 11-12. Internal quote from Mills, C. Wright. *The Causes of World War III*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958. p. 152.

[26] Quintillian, quoted by Gross, Ronald, editor. *The Teacher and the Taught*. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1963. p. 10.

[27] Oscar Wilde, quoted in Sontag, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[28] I do not mean to suggest that behavior is predetermined by personality. It would be if behavior were subjective, but the subjective (psychological) is merely one pole of fully developed human behavior. The other pole includes all objective circumstances which are largely fortuitous and always, in some sense, beyond volitional control. Certain of the associative laws of learning—the laws of similarity, intensity, and continuity, for example—address themselves to the ways in which objective conditions normally compel certain types of perceptual behavior (and therefore learning). Personality construes situations, but, in most instances, it does not totally determine their fundamental identification. Since circumstances are not wholly controllable, there are many chance factors that affect and modify what we learn in addition to our personal intentions.

[29] In a similar sense, if a person were to undergo total personal amnesia (in the radical sense of forgetting virtually everything about himself) he would be faced with the necessity of becoming totally resocialized and forging a whole new sense of personal identity. This is not what is ordinarily meant by "amnesia," however. The term ordinarily refers to instances when a person has lost contact with a relatively circumscribed aspect of his past. An amnesia victim typically remains literate, remembers how to drive, and so on, and ordinarily retains certain preferences, attitudes, and such—although he may be in some doubt as to what they *mean*.

Some Curriculum Implications of Dr. O'Neill's Paper

Robert L. Brackenbury

The position Professor O'Neill expounds in his paper and identifies as the "naturalistic" rational-scientific worldview may seem innocuous to the casual reader. It is, however, fraught with implications for the curriculum.

If behavior represents an ongoing relationship between the human organism and an objective world which can never be known as it is but only as it is perceived; if behavior, therefore, is relative or relational to these conditions which provide the context for all activity; if man by nature is a purposive organism who gets pleasure from the expression of his potentials; if knowledge emerges from behavior which is already value-laden; if the "cognitive" has its origin in the "affective" and every belief has a value component; and finally, if "consciousness reigns, but doesn't govern," then man's operative values cannot be understood or effectively changed when they are assigned to a realm of their own, distinct from the cognitive, and cut off from their origins in behavior.

John Ruskin once said that "education is not teaching children that which they do not know, but teaching them to behave as they do not now behave." Doubtless the great majority of educational theorists today would agree that education involves changing behavior and thus Professor O'Neill's position on values raises some significant questions and suggests possible answers to those concerned with curriculum construction.

1. May it be that the work of Bloom and other in compiling a taxonomy of educational objectives needs to be viewed in a different perspective than it often is? This new viewpoint may be necessary because the cognitive domain is not behaviorally distinct from the

affective domain (it is only conceptually distinct), and it does not precede but rather follows the affective in origin and development.*

Teachers need to realize that when they teach subject matter or content, they are not involved with the cognitive or intellectual realm alone but are also immersed in the affective or emotive realm. Knowledge and values, or epistemology and axiology, are separable only conceptually, never behaviorally. Thus, concentrating exclusively on imparting information or focusing solely on moral and spiritual values would be equally questionable. The oft-heard complaint of students that their education is not relevant may at times stem from a curriculum designed by educators who attempt to separate operationally that which can only be separated conceptually. When this mistake is made, it is little wonder that many students fail to perceive the connection between what we struggle to teach them and the behavior in which they are interested.

2. Could it be that various current educational developments—whether they are the results of constructing the curriculum according to what is conceived to be the structure of knowledge (oblivious of the human element in that structure) or they are the results of advocating student-centered teaching (neglecting the persistent demands of the social order)—result in one-sided, unbalanced programs? "Relativism," as opposed to either "objectivism" or "subjectivism," may well provide a more viable basis for obtaining educational objectives since it holds that these objectives are relative both to the requirements of the physical and social world in which man lives and to the nature of the human organism.

3. Might it be well if "de-encapsulation" increasingly came to be regarded as one of the major functions of education? If knowledge and beliefs tend to be circular, self-reinforcing, and self-confirming, one service that formal schooling might well provide for all students is that of exposure to life-styles and frames of reference different from their own. Only by such experiences can self-knowledge and awareness of one's own beliefs be attained, and these are essential to open-mindedness.

4. If we would reduce prejudice and promote more humane human relations, might it not be more profitable to concentrate upon structuring the learning environment than upon making direct, head-on intellectual analyses of beliefs? The self-reinforcing nature of

* In fairness to Bloom and his associates it should be made clear that they have not claimed the domains they explore are discrete categories. It is rather that the manner and order in which their volumes have emerged may have led their readers to so regard them.

beliefs, once they are established, suggests that attention might well be focused more profitably upon the conditions that give birth to them than upon the beliefs themselves.

5. Can a curriculum based on "knowledge for knowledge's sake" be valid? If man learns instrumentally and knowledge emerges from his attempts to solve those problems which confront him, it would seem that, in constructing the curriculum, learning experiences should be selected on the basis of their likely or potential instrumental value to the learner.

There are, to be sure, many implications of Professor O'Neill's paper other than the few outlined above, for if his axiological analysis is correct, a curriculum compatible with it would be very different from the vast majority of educational programs presently extant.

Discussion of Dr. O'Neill's Paper

Denis Lawton

When I first read Dr. O'Neill's paper I felt it was irrelevant; by the time I had read it a third time I felt I had been mistaken—it is not irrelevant but it presents a view of human development that is so partial that in the context of a conference of this kind it is not only misleading but dangerously misleading.

Perhaps I have still—on a fourth reading—misunderstood the paper; if so, I am not alone in this. I say this is an incomplete view for this reason: It seems to regard human beings as organisms interacting with environment and learning as a result of this. But it fails to stress that the distinctive feature of the human environment (as opposed to that of rats and pigeons) is other people. For human beings, very little learning is the result of direct personal experience; it is more often experience mediated through language and culture.

It seems to me that Dr. O'Neill has presented us with a narrow behavioristic view of learning, and it has been pointed out before that this kind of model can explain everything about human beings except anything which involves social interaction and the use of language—in other words, all the most interesting and worthwhile human activities.

I shall limit myself to one specific set of objections. The pleasure/pain view of the development of values does not answer the very old questions about why a man should risk his own life in order to save someone else, suffer torture rather than betray comrades, go hungry to give food to children, and so forth. None of these actions can be explained simply by an organism reacting to pleasure/pain, unless we think of an individual in terms of his group membership and extend the hedonic model beyond all recognition to take account of social norms and expectations. Using O'Neill's simple model, a human being who performed any of the above noble or heroic deeds would be classified as "functionally stupid." The only way to avoid this absurd conclusion would be to introduce the notion of social

values into the system, and this Dr. O'Neill has carefully chosen not to do.

It would also seem to follow from Dr. O'Neill's model that it is impossible to compare and evaluate values. It seems to imply that any set of values is as good as any other set; values are simply the result of individual experience. But surely the answer to this kind of moral relativism was provided long ago by Morris Ginsberg who demonstrated that some values were demonstrably rationally superior to others—for example, the ethics of Roosevelt compared with the ethics of Hitler. Important values are not simply a matter of taste; they can be justified. The important problem in a discussion of curriculums is to show that just because some low-level values do change from time to time and place to place, it does not follow that all values are susceptible to change; some are basic, fundamental, and unchangeable principles which should be distinguished from fairly trivial local rules. One task that I hoped this Conference might have undertaken is to distinguish between high level general value principles that we all agree on and local rules which are comparatively unimportant but which frequently cause controversy in society and in schools (e.g., length of hair or skirts, various aspects of sexual behavior, and so forth).

Just because we in pluralist societies are not completely sure about our attitudes on some of these issues, it does not follow that we are unsure about all value issues. Other speakers have mentioned that no society could function without some of these high level values—respect for persons, truth, honesty. These are not matters of taste; they are the essential requirements for worthwhile social life. They are also too important to be left to individual choice or haphazard individual learning. Every society socializes its young and passes on a system of values; at a time of very rapid social change it would be very dangerous for our educational systems to ignore this necessity. In our case we have a further task: the necessity of providing not only a set of rules but a rational basis for values. I thought Dr. O'Neill was getting very close to this point of view when he said: "Since all men share a common nature and live in the same sort of world, they also come to share common behavioral experiences which inexorably lead to a high degree of intellectual and moral agreement despite cultural and personal differences. There is, in short, a certain 'common sense' inherent within the uniformity of human behavior itself." But once again my quarrel is that the opportunity was missed of bringing the notion of culture into the value learning model. The picture we get from O'Neill is

that of each individual learning simply as one isolated individual. But surely this kind of learning, value learning or moral learning, is essentially social learning. "Reality is not psychological, but behavioral" says O'Neill. I would also want to add: "Reality is cultural." I think we should not conceal a paradox here: Belonging to any group is a constraint on individual freedom, but if a human never belongs to a group he is less than human and is even less free. The conflict between the needs of society and individual development is therefore to some extent an artificial one. One purpose of education must be to encourage children occasionally to defer gratification or even to forego gratification completely. In the past, schools tended to overdo this and sometimes the doctrine emerged that it did not matter what pupils learned as long as they did not like it. Most of us now think this is nonsense, but so is the opposite—the view that anything is educational if it is pleasurable. It is also naive to believe that education will always happen simply as the result of unplanned experiences.

Perhaps I could link this directly with something that Lawrence Stenhouse said. [This paper appears on pages 103-115.] He stressed that his project is not value-free; it is based on the premise that rationality is preferable to irrationality. So, not all value questions are controversial issues; this is one on which all educationists are agreed, and because we agree we do not leave the development of rationality to chance—we do our best to encourage it by means of the curriculum. We also know that the higher levels of rationality do not come about simply by the process of maturation: The work edited by Bruner in "Studies of Cognitive Growth" shows that education or, more correctly, schooling is important for the attainment of the Piagetian level of formal operations. Similarly there are other values on which society is generally agreed—noncontroversial values—which it should therefore be the function of education, the curriculum, to transmit. What we should now be discussing is exactly which values, and then what methods should be involved. I am sure we would all agree on the principle of honesty as a noncontroversial value, but few would be satisfied with the kind of fairy-tale method of transmitting this value—stories about George Washington chopping down cherry trees, for example. But what methods are appropriate and effective in an increasingly rational society? Lawrence Stenhouse is clearly doing very important work in dealing with controversial issues, but these to some extent must presuppose an understanding of noncontroversial values. His age level of 14+ is probably significant. Dealing with controversial issues has been neglected

in the past and it is very important that we cater adequately for this lack in the curriculum but not neglect what happens before this stage. It is too important to be left to chance. Somewhere in the curriculum we need to make clear the values of our societies and the values every society has to have in order to survive. It ought to be possible to achieve this without moralizing or preaching.

One very worthwhile point which Dr. O'Neill made was that if in our examination of curriculum we separate the cognitive and affective domains, we may lose more than we gain. It seems to me that to separate the development of individual values from any question of social values brings about just as great a loss. Furthermore, it would also seem to render teachers unnecessary in the value learning process, and we should not conceal the fact that teachers are now key figures in the transmission of culture and its values. Many schools and many teachers need to refocus attention on essential principles rather than petty rules, but it is a refocusing which is required, not an abdication. There is as much need for teachers to provide opportunities for children to acquire values as to acquire knowledge.

Values and the Curriculum

William B. Jones

The values of our society are, as everyone knows, in a period of great change. Challenges to old assumptions—about church, state, education, customs, and moral standards—are everywhere.

But some values, whatever changes others undergo, remain undiminished: tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for human rights. I suggest that, rather than diminishing, these values are becoming more assertive. They have become basic values of our time, conscious objectives of our society—certainly of the society of the three nations represented here—and of many others. At the highest governmental levels, and in our schools, churches, and other organizations, we are all concerned in lessening intolerance, encouraging mutual understanding, and increasing respect for the rights of persons of another race, nationality, language, religion, or color. Some of us may be more committed than others to the achievement of these goals, but that should not obscure the fact that the objectives are clearly there.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The Department of State is concerned with the broader international implications of tolerance, mutual understanding, and human rights, and the potential of education and educators to encourage them.

I will, if I may, take your subject from the point of view of *international* tolerance, international understanding, and international respect for the rights of others, and the way education can help serve these ends.

The principles of educating for tolerance, whether between peoples of different nations or between peoples of different social and

cultural origins within a single nation, run closely parallel. In both cases, it is a question of dealing with the attitude toward "strangers" —whether they be "strange" by nationality or race or family origin. It is a question of dealing with the attitudes of "we" and "they"— whether "they" come from across the ocean or from another part of town.

It may be an oversimplification to say that if we learn tolerance, understanding, and respect for the Japanese or the Ethiopians or the Brazilians, we will, at the same time, learn to apply these attitudes toward others in our own society. But I am willing to assume that such may well be the case. The essence in both cases, it seems to me, is to learn toleration, understanding, and respect for *difference*, diversity, and strangeness wherever we confront them.

Teaching tolerance is an honored tradition. It has been taught for centuries by great teachers—indeed the world's greatest—as a religious, ethical, and moral principle. The question arises: Can we succeed today if such men have failed? Yet, your suggestion for a discussion on tolerance as one of the important values shows, I think, that they have *not* failed—that living in mutual harmony, understanding, and respect for our fellow man is still a goal, an ideal we still pursue.

TOLERANCE NOW A NECESSITY

Today we are pragmatists. We seek this goal not to win our rewards in another world, but to win them in this—by achieving a harmonious present, a peaceful life, a peaceful world.

Tolerance for people once called strangers or "foreigners" is no longer a question of a "good thing," a "right thing" to do. The twin miracles of modern communication and transportation have brought the world and all its diversity into our immediate neighborhood, onto our doorsteps, indeed into our living rooms. "We" and "they" are one, and each of us holds the other's life in his hands. We are, to use Barbara Ward's graphic image, all crew on a single spaceship, the planet earth, making our common pilgrimage through infinity.

That is one reason why today I can be hopeful—more hopeful than at any previous time—that efforts toward mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect have a greater chance of success than ever before. Tolerance has become a *necessity*—a necessity for our continued existence. And necessity, here as elsewhere, can be the mother of invention.

THE SPREAD OF EDUCATION: A FORCE FOR TOLERANCE

A second reason why I am hopeful is the enormous spread of education in the last decades. The spread of education has enabled those who were once presumed to be "barbarian," "heathen," or of a "lesser breed" or "lower class" to take part in the complex business of the modern world on an equal basis, to participate in national and international scientific and technical affairs, to share in political and cultural activities as active leaders and partners. Education, by developing individual capacities, is helping to make the once "invisible" man visible, making the once "inscrutable" man or country more open to understanding. Education is thus not only a mighty force for his own further progress, but is also one of the greatest instruments for the worldwide spread of respect and understanding of his character and quality. As a result, all the efforts of our several governments, of UNESCO, and of other international agencies to spread and strengthen education both at home and abroad become potent instruments for assuring the increase of tolerance, understanding, and mutual respect. For this reason, in addition to others, these efforts certainly continue to be an important aspect of our foreign and domestic policies.

There is another benefit from the recent spread of education that is of special interest to us here. Countless opinion polls in the United States, and I would assume, in Canada and the United Kingdom as well, show that tolerance, the broader liberal view on matters subject to bias and prejudice, increases with the level of education. Taking the long view, the spread of education to all classes, races, and creeds can help, then, to strike at the very roots of intolerance and prejudice on a scale never before possible in history.

Not all kinds of education, of course, cultivate tolerance. All of us have run into the educated bigot as well as the educated fool.

So you are very properly concerned here today with specific means by which education can encourage tolerance, understanding, and respect for human rights.

THREE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

I would like first to summarize briefly some of the elements of an education—of an "international" education, if you will—that will

help our young people attain attitudes of tolerance and understanding and mutual respect for other peoples of the world.

First, and most obviously, we want to give our young people *knowledge* about other countries and people—about their exports, mountains, rivers, and history—and their problems. Facts are a basic point of departure.

Second, and more importantly, we want to give them *understanding* of other countries and people, for knowledge without understanding is of very limited use. As proven in the past, it can result in some very sad mistakes.

Teaching understanding is far more difficult than teaching knowledge, information, or facts. At the very least, we must give our young people opportunities to study the character of the other countries and peoples which are now next door to us. They must learn about their modes of life or "life-style," their religions, their art and modes of creative expression; they should achieve some insight into why they behave the way they do—why they behave like Mexicans, Russians, Indians, or Chinese. This is admittedly not easy to do, because the thoughtful teacher will, of course, want to avoid the pitfalls of oversimplification and slick generalizations about any people, nationality, or country. But we must attempt to teach knowledge *and* understanding.

The third and to me the most important goal of international education is the cultivation of what I will call a *world awareness*, a sense of common humanity in the infinite diversities of the world.

I believe that these three elements of international education—knowledge, understanding, world awareness—can and should imbue our teaching at every level—from kindergarten to high school. Learning about the world, learning to live in harmony with its many diverse peoples, must begin early. It must become a habit of mind.

I do not feel qualified, particularly with so many serious curriculum specialists present, to discuss precise changes in or additions to actual curriculums. Rather I would prefer to sketch out a few special points that have been of concern to me as I look at U.S. schools from the point of view of cultivating tolerance and understanding of other peoples.

INTERNATIONALIZING CURRICULUMS

One goal, obviously, is the "internationalizing" of curriculums. I would hope this means internationalizing the world perspective of

studies in *all* the regular curriculums, not merely adding some factual material on the non-Western world to social studies.

To me, there is always a danger in "compartmentalizing" studies of foreign countries. It offers the temptation to lay too much stress on substance, on "facts," and not enough on learning attitudes of responsiveness, on developing a habit of empathy toward other cultures. The young son of a neighbor of mine, for instance, recently studying Africa as an "area" in his social studies, spent a great deal of his time memorizing the name of every African country. Further, compartmentalizing "area" studies also offers the temptation to treat them as something "foreign," something added on, rather than as an integral part of our "normal" or standard studies. This defeats our basic purpose.

In teaching many subjects, especially history, in recent years, a beneficial trend has developed toward using original source materials, toward exposing students to some of the papers—contemporary diaries, letters, articles, and creative writing—of each period. Since they are human documents and speak to students on their own immediate terms, they are move vivid and more persuasive than the detached observations of historians or commentators.

UNESCO'S CONTRIBUTION

Fortunately, it is now possible to find such documents from other countries and cultures which could be directly included in established curricular materials in several fields. In the United States, agencies, such as the Asia Society, and some individual state departments of education have collected material of this kind for classroom use and supplementary reading. Internationally, UNESCO has taken the lead in producing translations of the writings and in reproducing the art of China, India, Japan, Persia, Brazil, and other countries.

I believe that young people today are eager, even hungry, for direct contact with other societies, other cultures, past and present. They are engaged in an active search to discover and to grasp those values basic to other societies which might give a new dimension and richness to our own. Let us not disappoint them. We do not study Shakespeare because he was British or the Odyssey because it is of Greek origin. Similarly I do not think we should study the great works of China or Japan or Latin America because they are foreign "area" literature. Certainly, we should not consider them only in the context of "area" studies.

PROBLEMS OF "WORLD HISTORIES"

I have a special comment on the teaching of world history. Until as late as 10 years ago, most "world histories" used in U.S. schools dealt almost exclusively with Western civilization. Other countries have had similar experiences. A French scholar not long ago reported that in many of the so-called world history texts he had reviewed for UNESCO, the Arabs were referred to only as people who invaded Spain in the eighth century and were later expelled. Where these Arabs came from, who they were, what civilization they had developed, what great treasures of learning of the ancient world they had garnered during the West's dark ages were never mentioned. Once defeated in Spain, they disappeared from "world" histories.

Fortunately, this kind of parochialism is disappearing. At least it is under attack. But we cannot congratulate ourselves too much, for, in fact, we are redressing a very real, a very old injustice. In essence what we are at least attempting to do is to provide an education which recognizes that the world is really round, not flat, and that people of enormous importance inhabit all its surface—east, west, north, and south. Columbus proved that the world was round 477 years ago. Our education—in the United States at least—has taken a long time to catch up.

NATIONAL BIAS IN HISTORY TEXTS

A related problem has increasingly received attention in recent years: the question of national bias, often unconscious, found in history books of one country about people and events in other countries. Nearly all of us have been guilty of this kind of biased historical view. Within the last decades all of us, historians and textbook publishers as well as educators, have become considerably more conscious of it, and many have taken some objective concrete steps toward improvement. UNESCO has continued and strengthened earlier efforts to encourage revision of international textbooks. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Cànada have all supported this effort. The Council of Europe, through its Council for Cultural Cooperation, has also been engaged in similar efforts to stimulate bilateral cultural agreements and the cooperation of private historians in revising texts to eliminate bias.

This international effort parallels similar efforts on the domestic scene in the United States. The National Council for the Social

Studies, among others, has been active in this work, and has sponsored a series of reviews of American history books to examine them for racial and religious bias. I was encouraged to read recently that the current crop of American history texts indicates, as a result of these efforts, a marked improvement in the treatment of the Negro and the Indian in classroom texts. Again we are redressing a very real, very old injustice.

"AS OTHERS SEE US"

There is another method of trying to assure that history is taught free of parochialism or bias. This method is to expose students to the views of our national history that are held by persons outside the country. It is rather clear that the exclusively American point of view on American history is not necessarily the whole truth of the matter. I was much interested to see recently a paperback book published this year under the sponsorship of the American Historical Association, the National Council for the Social Studies, and Phi Delta Kappa called "As Others See Us," a collection of international textbook views on American history. The views of Latin America on the Monroe Doctrine, Spain's comments on the Spanish-American war, European views of the Depression of the '30's—these and many others can give American students a provocative perspective on some of the events in our history which had profound international repercusions.

USE OF RESOURCE PEOPLE AND FOREIGN VISITORS

In the same vein, inviting foreign visitors to be "resource" people in our classrooms can provide a beneficial program. In the United States there is a deliberate effort to provide foreign "resource" people for schools. The curriculum development program of the U.S. Office of Education brings about 20 to 30 foreign curriculum specialists a year to work with education officials in different states to develop new courses of study on their home countries, to help assemble library and audiovisual materials, and generally to give curriculum support. The teacher development program for foreign teachers, a Department of State program administered in cooperation with the Office of Education, also provides us with such resource assistance from the grantees during the last six weeks of their program here.

I understand that many of these resource people have been very effective in increasing not only the substantive knowledge of other countries but also in developing an awareness and responsiveness to their character and culture.

I am delighted to learn, in this connection, that our visitors to this Conference from overseas will be going to see U.S. schools and to give them some of this resource assistance.

But aside from such specialized resource people, all three of our countries have a very large reservoir of foreign visitors and students, who can be called upon to bring overseas experience and knowledge to our classrooms. I venture to say we are not making adequate use of them in our schools. For a class in social studies, for example, far more of our schools could seek out a Latin American graduate student to speak about Latin politics, an Iranian or Indian student to discuss his views on his country's development problems, or an African to speak of transition from colonial rule. Their views may be partial or even prejudiced. But under the guidance of the teacher, they can communicate far better than the teacher alone the human dimension of their country's development, culture, and aspirations. Schools situated near universities could adopt a more formal version of this idea, with panels, forums, and seminars to which available advanced foreign scholars and lecturers could be invited.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

Some of the international exchange programs of the U.S. Department of State are programs in which "mutual understanding" has long and rightly figured as the major objective, and which have a special bearing on the subject today.

The exchange of teachers is a major part of our program. There have been about 18,000 teachers exchanged in the last 20 years. Our predominant intent is not the teaching of methodology or pedagogy, or specific development of curriculums. Rather, it is our hope that teachers who go abroad or come here will involve themselves intellectually and personally in their host country, and thus foster an awareness, a responsiveness, an insight into other peoples and their character and culture. On their return home, whether they teach chemistry, English, or world history, teachers who have gained this awareness can give their students a broader view of man's diversity and common problems.

We also support exchange of graduate students. In the last 20 years there has been a total of over 43,000 American and foreign students, many of whom have gone on to be teachers in our own schools. There have also been over 20,000 professors and scholars exchanged.

MILLIONS OF CHILDREN REACHED

At a conservative estimate, during the last 20 years, well over 5 million school children in the United States and well over 8 million abroad have been taught by an exchange teacher from another country, or by one of their own teachers returned from an exchange experience abroad. At least 1 million college students in the United States and abroad have been taught by foreign exchange professors or by professors who have worked or studied abroad under the exchange program.

In addition, since 1949, the Department has supported the visits to the United States of high school students from over 60 countries, under programs carried on by privately sponsored groups.

Moreover, of the approximately one-quarter million American children enrolled in elementary and secondary schools outside the country, some 35,000 are in schools especially established for children of our diplomatic corps and personnel of other governmental as well as private agencies. The Department of State conducts, under its special Office of Overseas Schools, a considerable program to help these schools become "international schools." Additionally, the Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs specifically supports some of these schools as demonstration centers of good schooling and as points of cultural contact between American and foreign young people.

EFFECT ON YOUNGER GENERATION

While there can be no precise measurement, of course, such widespread exchanges and foreign experiences have inevitably had, I think, an immense effect on attitudes of tolerance, understanding, and mutual respect among the younger generation in all our countries, and on their views of other civilizations, other peoples, and points of view. It is impossible to assess or predict the full implications of these new attitudes upon formal relationships between peoples of different races and countries or as a new force in interna-

tional relations, but I believe that they may very well be profound. They are, indeed, already sharply in evidence.

DANGERS OF REVERSION TO INTOLERANCE

Tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for human rights are fragile, perishable. Men revert all too easily to old prejudices, to old parochialisms. Historically, periods of marked tolerance have not necessarily lasted. Under the evil genius of a single fanatic, under the stress of a conflict of interests, individuals or governments have superseded periods of harmony with periods of sharp intolerance, division, and, unhappily, sometimes open conflict.

A crucial question is how we can encourage a tolerance that will be *enduring*, strong enough to ride out and overcome clashes of interests. It seems very clear that the price of tolerance is eternal vigilance.

We who are engaged in international educational activities of whatever kind in whatever country are particularly charged to maintain such vigilance. In our exercise of this responsibility lies our great hope, perhaps our only hope, for a peaceful and united world. As you deliberate these next few days, I could wish you no greater good fortune than to do so with this immense goal in view.

Values and the Curriculum

William G. Davis

There is a school of thought that defines curriculum as the vehicle by which culture and standards are transmitted from one generation to another. Others say curriculum is the body of knowledge that prepares a child for a remunerative career. I would like to make it clear that these are not my definitions, nor those of the officials in the Department of Education of Ontario, concerned with the elementary and secondary schools of the province. Certainly the child must be prepared for the future, but the curriculum should be aimed, not at imparting a set body of knowledge, or in training for a specific job, but *in developing the unique potentialities of each student.*

To achieve such a goal, of course, the student must acquire both knowledge and a respect for knowledge, both the will to learn and the knowledge of how to learn. If at any time we were ever to achieve the ideal, unlikely as that may be, no two students would be treated alike, but each would, through his own curriculum, achieve the fulfillment of his own unique abilities and strengths.

In these definitions I have already implied a basic value—*respect for the individual.* It is in terms of the individual and his involvement with curriculum that I am speaking today; however, we must consider the individual student in terms of the world in which he will live.

Historically, in that part of Canada from which I come, the values implicit in the curriculum were those of a pioneer culture—thrift, cooperation, industry, diligence. In addition, there were the qualities advocated by a church-influenced society—respect, honesty, sobriety, and the like. There is an extract from the Public Schools Act well known to Ontario teachers that appeared on the front page of the daily registers from before the turn of the century until 1968. It read:

> It shall be the duty of every teacher to inculcate by precept and example respect for religion and the principles of Christian moral-

ity and the highest regard for truth, justice, loyalty, love of country, humanity, benevolence, sobriety, industry, frugality, purity, temperance and all other virtues.

These were the virtues that were to be translated into values for the students.

But the topic of this Conference indicates very clearly that a questioning of old values is now taking place. The relevance of long-held values to modern living and to modern philosophies is seriously doubted by many people, especially the young.

It has become a cliché to say that the world is changing; it is being transformed from one minute to the next. In this context, a student's bewilderment is understandable. Yet it is largely through our schools that we are expected to offer some firm basis for decisions about values.

When we think about the world in which students live, the word *technology* immediately comes to the fore. Modern technology is forcing us to restructure our views and to reestablish our priorities. Technology is affecting our values in nearly every sphere of life. What were your feelings as you saw the earth from a spacecraft on its way to the moon? There was our world shrunken to a round blob on a television screen. Surely this has shaken our thinking for the next century.

And there is more: We now cure many diseases formerly incurable; we have prolonged man's life span; we have computerized the routine tasks of mankind; we have revolutionized communication, transforming the world into what my compatriot Marshall McLuhan describes as a "global village."

There are a number of reactions to these technical revolutions. Some people revel in the change, the speed, the excitement; others react violently against them. But there are less dramatic and obvious ways in which technology is affecting our values. There is an unspoken theory that Canadians are still pioneers at heart. When the weather is favorable, we head for the north woods. We take along with us our automobiles and televisions, our outboard motors, our insecticides, and every instrument of pollution we can think of. Then having brought the city to the country, we proceed to complain about the absence of fish in our lakes.

An important aspect of work in this technological age involves the sense of productivity and accomplishment. Food companies have made surveys which indicate that the average housewife feels guilty if she uses a cake mix. However, her guilt is alleviated if she adds an egg from her own refrigerator, for then the wife and mother feels that

she is doing what she should for her family. This particular survey might form the text for volumes on the status of women in a technological world—the housewife needs to feel useful and needed by her family. I hope that our schools can help the modern generation find more constructive ways of being useful than adding an egg to a cake mix.

But there are those who would retreat from technology entirely, except for air conditioning, automobiles, and possibly an occasional jet plane to reach a conference on the evils of technocracy. These people, whose opinion is often just, declare that technology is eroding our whole moral fiber and our intellectual standards. Certainly this could become true, and it will if we cling blindly to the mores of the past without analyzing their relevance. But I believe that it is still perfectly possible to keep fundamental values and standards intact if we adjust intelligently to the modern world. It will, however, take a great deal of thought and reexamination.

There have been other periods of dramatic change: the transition from flint to bronze weapons, for example; the ferment of technological change in the sixteenth century when men were suddenly free, both on the sea and in the realm of their own minds; and in more recent times, some Victorian writers declared that their age would be known as the time of the most rapid change in the history of man. When the Crystal Palace arose in the mid-nineteenth centory, people thought that human achievement had reached its apex.

But the nineteenth century was the era when factories burgeoned and prospered and sent their output around the world; it was the era when industry gave birth to smoke-blackened cities all too often breeding grounds for misery and disease. The Victorians did not solve all their problems, but they did make a start. Faced with the spreading blight of disease, for instance, technology and science produced spectacular advances in preventive medicine. Then legislation imposed these changes on a population that appeared at times to want the freedom to be unhealthy. For example, one strong-minded individualist is said to have objected to garbage disposal because it threatened his personal freedom. I am sure you can find his twentieth-century counterpart. The individualist was trying to retain a right which symbolized an important value for him, even if the symbol he chose was somewhat eccentric.

Faced with so much change in our lives, we are examining our values and we must reestablish our priorities. We are giving up some manifestations of individual freedom; we are told that we are gaining others. I hope that we are examining the returns to make sure that the

exchange is worthwhile. Perhaps historians of the twenty-first century will consider some of our reactions rather quaint. Our contemporary problems of pollution, pest control, or international law arise in large measure because of conflicting values. A century from now some of these conflicts may have been resolved. In the meantime, we must carefully examine all encroachments on individual freedom.

Perhaps the most significant factor about technological advance is that it forces us to redetermine our priorities in the light of many new possibilities; the more goals placed within our grasp, the greater the difficulty of choosing among them. As one recent writer put it, Socrates may have had no obligation to search for a cure for cancer, but we have, simply because the technology appropriate for the search is now available. With the rapid growth of knowledge comes a change in the pattern of values. The biological revolution, with its vast array of discoveries and accomplishments, has disturbed many of our established patterns of thought. Whether we think of organ transplants or rearranging DNA molecules, our priority of values can be altered.

The Victorians, who experienced the beginnings of the same kinds of problems, at least had the solace of poets who distilled the inarticulate emotions of the time into crystalline verse:

Strength without hands to smite,
Love that endures for a breath,
Night the shadow of life,
And life, the shadow of death.

"Strength without hands to smite." That, I am sure, is how many of our young people feel today. The technology which we regard with awe is normal for them, and in many ways today's students are more sensitive to value questions than are adults. Our students in North America have lived their entire lives in a television-dominated culture. In this society where the television set has been called "the third parent," entertainment and information are mingled and not separated into discrete elements. The enormous outpouring of televised information makes the young person of today vividly aware of the contrasts of the world—between plenty and want, rich and poor, black and white, advanced and developing nations, east and west. Faced with these problems, young people have difficulty in understanding how the organizations and attitudes they see operating in most sectors of our society will solve them.

In addition to these dramatic and, in many cases, tragic contrasts, television also portrays the normality of an affluent world, the suburban ideal, the world in which the model of car or refrigerator plays an important part.

Perhaps the source of these disparities is the immense human capacity to compromise. This kind of flexibility is central to the human experience, but I suspect that today's student sees it not so much as an achievement, but as an example of dishonesty. We have been stating our values for centuries, but the young look at the realities and contrasts of life and, as has been said before, they are calling our hand and accusing us of hypocrisy. Probably we can best help students in school not by urging them to compromise, for they reject the value that this implies, but rather we can lead them to realize the complexity of moral decisions.

Ii is too easy to dismiss the moral dilemmas of others, especially of the young, with oversimplified solutions or rules of thumb. "Always obey your parents" is advice that was comforting to parents, but a youngster wants to know, "Should I obey my parents when they are wrong?" And what criteria should one apply in such a question? The conflicting demands of fundamental values is one of the basic dilemmas of human life and no simple hierarchy of values will make such decisions easy.

Today's student lives in a world that offers no definite blueprint, yet all too frequently we say that education is a preparation for the future. At the same time we tell him, somewhat paradoxically, that education is not something that he will complete, but is a process that will be part of his entire life. Constant retraining and updating are a normal part of life today. Career changes become an example not only of meeting an adventurous challenge, but also of coping with the constant obsolescence of training. It is not very comforting to the student to hear that jobs which do not yet exist will be obsolete 10 years from now.

In this situation it makes little sense to a student to be told that school prepares him for the real world. School is as much a part of reality as any other experience in life. Students reject the idea of constantly following routines of preparation now for the purpose of doing something else in the future. They are concerned with now and if they show little concern for remote goals, this is partially a result of conflicting values embodied in conflicting predictions of the future. Incidentally, little angers young people more than the feeling that they are being processed to take part in a competitive society. The idea of such processing offers a real threat to the idea of individuality—another set of conflicting values.

If individualism is really threatened, and many of our students feel that it is, where is the menace?

On one hand, we have, I suppose, overorganization. As a responsible Minister in a government, I rather hesitate to include govern-

ment as one of the big impersonal factors that affect the cause of individualism. It is true that, in the minds of many students, this may be the case. The same applies undoubtedly to half a dozen other big social institutions, all of them symbolized in the minds of the student by the computer. As a matter of fact, many adults are reacting strongly against computerized living and the students are affected even more, for their status as individuals has not yet been accorded the legal rights of adults. They feel particularly vulnerable to the cold winds of conformity and computerized efficiency. They sense that compromises are encroaching on individualism, but they are not aware that individualism is curbed, in general, only when the adult world considers it worthwhile. I hope we are exercising sufficient judgment and care as we alter the manifestations of this basic value in our society.

And what is the role of the school here? Assuming that the school should exemplify the social values that society favors, the question arises: Does society *really* want individualism? For a society that pays lip service to the cause of the independent thinker, there seems to be much talk about being well adjusted in a sense that simply means conforming to the norms of the society in which we live. I suspect, of course, that most of us want just enough individualists to blaze out a few new trails, but not too many.

If society in general has not resolved this particular conflict, how can the school? Do we teach the student that it is good to admire the individualist but bad to be one?

The school years are a time when young people should begin consciously to formulate the philosophical foundations of their lives. In the shelter of the school, they should have time to ponder and reflect, important to the development of values. Since the world of the future is so unpredictable, students cannot draw up any organized blueprint for action. They can, however, arrive at basic principles and learn how to apply them.

In previous curriculums with discrete subjects and time divided into regular units, the study of values was all too often inserted into the social studies pigeonhole and terminated at 3:45 every afternoon. The modern trend (and if we are going to pay more than lip service to individualism, we must support it) is toward students doing research on topics that blur and cross the lines between disciplines. The matter of moral values certainly crosses subject lines. So, I think, do other values which I hope we will offer our students the opportunity to develop, esthetic values for example. Developing esthetic values does not preclude an individualized program. Esthetic values, like

moral ones, can arise in every area of study. While verbal communication is the basic necessity, an individual's understanding and capabilities are sharpened and deepened if he knows the joys of communication through the other arts as well, whether as a receiver or as a sender. If about 90 percent of all scientists who ever lived are now alive, it is very likely also that 90 percent of all artists who ever lived are now dead.

Another question that must be asked is to what extent does the traditional academic content of many of the subject disciplines contribute to the development of values by students. There may well be no such thing as a value-free subject. It is also the opinion of many in Ontario that the practice of organizing the curriculum of elementary and secondary schools on the basis of discrete subjects actually inhibits the development of coherent values by students. Countless times questions remain unanswered, trains of logic are interrupted, and developing patterns of understanding are shattered by bells at the ends of periods, by the confines of textbooks, or by the limiting topics of courses.

The use of disciplines or subjects as repositories of knowledge or as indexed guides to content cannot be questioned, but to continue to use such structures of knowledge as organizers for students' work may well be unwise and inhibiting, at the very least, to the development of values in the curriculum.

So far I have touched on some of the values which should permeate our school system: respect for the individual expressed in terms of an individualized learning system, time for reflection, a love of the arts as an extension of the human spirit. There is another worthwhile value I want to mention specifically—respect for evidence. It is so easy, so fatally easy, to reason on the basis of incomplete information, to reach faulty but emotionally charged conclusions. I sincerely hope our school system is giving the students an honest respect for what is fact and what is surmise, what is true and what is glib and half-true. In one of our schools last week, a dialogue occurred between a 14-year-old student and his ninth-grade teacher in which the student questioned a statement that the teacher had made. The teacher rephrased his statement, but added nothing new, except an exhortation to the student to have faith in the teacher's own wider experience in such matters. The student's reply was, "Conviction is a fine thing, sir, but it's no substitute for the facts."

Another basic curriculum problem for the school is how much of the past and its values do we offer the student. A stock answer is that we give him the tools to reason and seek knowledge, and then we let

him go ahead. But in teaching reasoning processes, for example, we are surely transmitting attitudes. The commitment we have to the *way* in which we teach young people may well be the most important value which we are transmitting to them. When Marshall McLuhan speaks of the "Medium as the Message," he is making the point that what we communicate is as much a product of how we say it, as what we say. If we are really concerned about individual humanity, the human spirit, tolerance, the use of evidence, and the like, then we shall transmit these values to the younger generation not in terms of the content of the curriculum nor in terms of obvious and overt moral lessons, but in terms of our behavior as adults and of how we allow young people to behave as students in school.

The search for new forms of institutions—new patterns of organization, better ways of grouping students, less autocratic governing bodies, devices for participation and debate—deserves the highest priorities. Education shares with most of the rest of the institutions of society the need to adapt to the new realities of our time. Those structures that embody old values must become open enough to allow new values to develop with a minimum of confrontation and harmful conflict, while at the same time ensuring that useful comparisons and careful analysis take place.

All my comments so far have, of course, begged what is perhaps the crucial question in any discussion of education and values. There is a basic dilemma facing any *public* school system, especially in pluralistic societies such as those represented at this Conference. On the one hand, it is fundamental to the purposes of education that schools concern themselves with values. This I have assumed in all my remarks so far, and it is, of course, assumed in the theme of this Conference. On the other hand, a public system must not represent sectional interests. It is part of the community as a whole and should avoid presenting a partisan view.

A subordinate dilemma of this kind is also apparent these days: the question of community values as opposed to academic freedom. Either one carried to excess can be detrimental to the education of the child. We are currently concerned in Ontario with devising additional mechanisms for discussion and participation where students, teachers, and parents may engage in dialogue on a continuing basis.

Another dilemma in this area is even more difficult: the problem minority groups face when they see their children educated in a manner that is alien to their own view. It is easy enough to say that a minority set of viewpoints that conflicts with the teaching of reason and logic of the kind that we uphold in our schools must be disre-

garded. However, in Canada, for example, it is very difficult to know how public education can serve members of groups like our native Indians, Mennonites, and others who regard the inculcation of very specific values as part of education, and who regard many of the values of the community in general as alien.

It has been suggested that the school stay clear of value questions. As I have implied, I consider this to be completely impossible, not only in practice, but also in theory. Not only will a teacher be unable to keep his own views from a class with whom he is associated for a whole year, but a position of value-neutrality is itself a value position.

If the school is to fulfill its responsibilities in the realm of values, it is also essential that it avoid the dangers of indoctrination. A knowledge of these dangers is fundamental to the best work in education. I do not propose to examine the philosophical and psychological aspects of this question; these I leave to the experts. But I would like to stress a point or two. In the first place, indoctrination is much easier to observe in others than in our own society. If we consider indoctrination undesirable, we must remember that no person says that he intends to indoctrinate. Furthermore, indoctrination usually takes place in a context of general community approval.

Perhaps the most important negative aspect of indoctrination is that it has not a built-in system of self-examination or analysis of the view under discussion. *Self-examination is perhaps the basis of our whole curriculum as it is of our society.* We are committed to a curriculum in which the student is encouraged to question, to evaluate, and to reach his own conclusions.

Given the demands of a rapidly changing environment and the needs of the student for a stable foundation and a sense of his own worth as an individual, *I believe that we must support a child-centered curriculum.* It does, as I have said, raise certain dilemmas: the demands of the present community, the desire to pass on the culture of the past to the new generation, and the question of where a free expression of views becomes indoctrination.

But of paramount importance is the need of the individual student. We must arrange matters so that he can gain the knowledge and stability to advance successfully into the twenty-first century, the respect for reason and evidence which he needs to deal with the issues that continually arise in a technological world, and above all, the self-esteem to release the human spirit so that he becomes all that he is capable of being.

Controversial Value Issues in the Classroom

Lawrence Stenhouse

If education were not centrally and inextricably bound up with questions of value, we should not all be here at this Conference today. But in setting ourselves the theme, "Values and the Curriculum," we address ourselves to no easy task. The relationship between the curriculum and problems of valuation is complex and involved. Even as distinguished a gathering as this, working intensively in small groups, is scarcely likely in a week to tease out all the relationships and implications. It would be folly, then, for someone in my own position, blinkered by the immediate concerns of directing a major curriculum project, with the concentration of effort which that implies, to attempt in this talk to take a broad canvas. Mine must be a microscopic, not a macroscopic, view. I propose to address myself to a narrowly defined and strictly limited problem, though, I hope you will agree, an important one. Certainly, it is a problem which is bound to be of central concern to any democracy which emphasizes and values the responsibility of its citizens. This is the problem of handling, within the curriculum, areas of study which involve highly controversial social, ethical, or political values. In short, how is a democracy to handle controversial issues in its schools?

First, we must be clear as to what we mean by a controversial issue, and I take as my definition that proposed by Dorothy Fraser:

> A controversial issue involves a problem about which different individuals and groups urge conflicting courses of action. It is an issue for which society has not found a solution that can be universally or almost universally accepted. It is an issue of sufficient significance that each of the proposed ways of dealing with it is objectionable to some section of the citizenry and arouses protest. The protest may result from a feeling that a cherished belief, an economic interest, or a basic principle is threatened. It may come because the welfare of organizations or groups seems at stake.

> When a course of action is formulated that virtually all sectors of society accept, the issue is no longer controversial.[1]

In short, a controversial issue is one which divides teachers, pupils, and parents. Such issues tend to come into the classroom when pupils become old enough to want to interpret particular cases which present themselves as dilemmas in the adult world. It is specific cases which make for controversy; there can be no interpretation of practical values in the adult world which does not deal with specific cases. Thus, that war is an undesirable thing is scarcely controversial, but whether the war in Vietnam is justified is highly controversial. That sexual control of some kind is necessary is scarcely controversial, but whether this necessarily excludes active sexual relationships between those who love one another under any given and specific circumstances is highly controversial. Value issues, I am saying, cannot be taught effectively at high levels of generality. Values inevitably express themselves in practical judgments.

The sector of the curriculum in which the problems of handling value issues is most acute is variously called civics or personal relationships or social studies or, in England, the humanities. The Schools Council Working Paper Number 2 on the Raising of the School Leaving Age speaks of the humanities in these terms:

> The problem is to give every man some access to a complex cultural inheritance, some hold on his personal life and on his relationships with the various communities to which he belongs, some extension of his understanding of, and sensitivity towards, other human beings. The aim is to forward understanding, discrimination, and judgment in the human field—it will involve reliable factual knowledge, where this is appropriate, direct experience, imaginative experience, some appreciation of the dilemmas of the human condition, of the rough hewn nature of many of our institutions, and some rational thought about them.[2]

Thus, the term humanities indicates a program concerned with the exploration of human issues.

As we interpret this, it is not identical with social studies or civics as these are taught in England. We assume that the approach to any human issue calls for a synthesis of the social sciences, the arts, and religion and ethics. The informed and sensitive appreciation of the situations in which judgments are to be made implies that we sometimes work for the criteria of objectivity which are typical of the social or behavioral sciences but that we also take into account the imaginative projection into experience which is typical of the arts. It is necessary to relate and synthesize objectivity and subjectivity,

rationality and imagination. Given an understanding of the human situation, it is then important to see the role of religion or metaphysics and ethics in enabling us to attain a world view or a rational scheme within which we can criticize our decisions and actions. We are faced with a complex synthesis as we focus all our powers and knowledge on an issue under consideration.

The Humanities Curriculum Project decided to explore the problems of teaching in controversial areas by adopting nine themes or topics for experimental development. These are war, education, the family, relations between the sexes, people and work, poverty, living in cities, law and order, and race relations. Schools Council Working Paper Number 2 suggested that the aim was to forward understanding, discrimination, and judgment. We assumed that in fact full understanding implied the capacity for discrimination and judgment and we adopted as our aim: "to develop understanding of the nature and structure of certain complex value issues of universal human concern." We were careful in formulating this aim not to make assumptions about the transfer of understanding from one topic or situation to another.

There is a great deal in common between our position and that outlined in a recommendation of the National Education Association Project on Instruction.

> Rational discussion of controversial issues should be an important part of the school program. The teacher should help the students identify relevant information, learn techniques of critical analysis, make independent judgments, and be prepared to present and support them. The teacher should also help students become sensitive to the continuing need for objective re-examination of issues in the light of new information and changing conditions of society.[3]

The main points of contrast are that we have laid more emphasis on the emotional and imaginative, and that we have stressed the idea of understanding rather than component skills. For us, understanding means more than a sum of information, affective responses, and skills. It implies a structuring of these appropriate to the situation of the person who is studying it. Understanding is the achievement of an interpretative map answering both the needs of the situation and the needs of the person who is attempting to understand it.

Given that we are working in the area of controversial issues and attempting to achieve understanding, there appear to be three possible strategies which can be employed in the school.

One might argue that the school should attempt to transmit an agreed position adopted as a matter of policy. This fails in practical political terms because it is impossible to obtain the agreement of parents or policy makers on the huge range of issues involved. Moreover, even if it were possible to lay down an agreed line, the teachers would still disagree among themselves and the schools would find themselves involved in an organized and systematic hypocrisy which would make them extremely vulnerable to the criticism of pupils. This approach is also unacceptable in terms of our aim, since it cannot possibly further the understanding of a controversial issue to pretend that it is not in fact controversial.

A second possibility is that each teacher should be free to give his own sincerely held point of view. But the inescapable authority position of the teacher must in this case leave him open to the charge of using the classroom as a platform for his views. In the face of such criticism, the profession would have committed itself to defending the teacher who advocated pacifism to the children of regular army soldiers or who advocated premarital sexual intercourse in the face of parental disapproval. This position seems scarcely tenable in practice, though attractive at first view. In theory it might be possible to get around the difficulty by ensuring that only teachers whose opinions were relatively conformist were given appointments. Questions about a teacher's political, religious, and moral beliefs and practices would then become appropriate at interviews. This is unacceptable to the teaching profession, certainly in Britain. Our experience in classrooms suggests that the authority position of the teacher is much stronger than most teachers realize, and that it is almost insuperably difficult for him to put forward his own points of view without implying that controversial issues can be settled on the basis of the authority of others.

The third strategy, and the one adopted by the project, is to attempt to devise a method of teaching which should within itself guarantee that the teacher is doing all he can to protect pupils from his own bias, while advancing their understanding. This involves the teacher in a procedural neutrality in handling controversial issues which could be the basis of a professional ethic for dealing with controversy in the classroom.

It was on this basis that we designed our curriculum experiment. Of course, I have not been able to outline the position fully here, nor have I time to describe at length and defend our strategy and its premises. There are, however, two points I should like to expand more fully, one concerning the philosophical position of the project, the other concerning methodology.

It must be made clear that the project is not value-free.

In the first place, the decision to include controversial issues in the school curriculum for adolescents implies a value judgment, and the choice of issues to be tackled is based on the value judgment that they are issues of importance. We have made decisions of value at the most fundamental level at which values impinge on the curriculum, namely, in answering the question, what is worthwhile and therefore worth teaching?

We have also made value decisions at another level. We have asserted that teaching procedures and curriculum materials must be justifiable in terms of certain values which are fundamental to education. Education must always involve a preference for rational rather than irrational procedures, for sensitivity rather than insensitivity, for example. It will always be concerned to examine and establish criteria and standards. The appropriate attitude of teachers to pupils will always involve respect for persons and consideration of their welfare.

Finally, even in the area of controversial substantive issues in which we ask the teacher to accept the criterion of neutrality, we are asserting the democratic values which call for an open debate and dialogue on those issues "for which society has not found a solution that can be universally or almost universally accepted."

We have, then, adopted value positions at three points by trying to answer the questions: What should be taught? What educational values should be realized in the way it is taught? What are the implications of democratic values for the degree of doubt and openness with which it should be taught?

So much for the values implicit in our experimental design. Now I want to say something about the methodology we have employed, particularly because I think it has a special relevance to curriculum design in any area which is exploratory or which implies that openness which we see as appropriate to value judgments in practical life and in the arts.

The main interest of our design is the absence of behavioral objectives from the conceptualization and planning of our curriculum. Any sophisticated curriculum worker is bound to be aware of the limitations of a design directed towards specified terminal student behavior. Objectives are merely a simplifying device to help us choose from the range of hypotheses we could put forward about the effects of a curriculum innovation in a school or system. Philip Jackson and Elliott Eisner, for example, have noted some of the limitations of the objectives model, and there are still others which I cannot explore here.

The important point is simply that we are adopting an alternative strategy. Instead of taking our general statement of aim and analyzing it into specifications of terminal student behavior, we analyzed it logically in order to derive from it a specification of a use of materials and a teaching strategy which should be consistent with the pursuit of the aim. One might draw a distinction between two ways of disciplining and structuring behavior, including classroom behavior. In one case, behavior is disciplined by the pursuit of goals. In the other, behavior is disciplined by the acceptance of a form or of principles of procedure.

This type of behavior which is disciplined by form can be seen in various settings. It is common in the arts. Often a poet has only a general impression of what he wants to say, which is given precision as he works it out in tension with an appropriate form such as a sonnet. The rules of procedure at meetings are a similar form specification. The goal is not specified in detail but the form or principle of procedure is defended as logically deducible from a general aim. The sonnet is a proven form for the capture of a single unitary thought or mood with a twist in its tail. Committee procedure is a proven means of achieving consensus towards action.

We adopted a research plan based upon the specification of a procedure of teaching which should embody the values implied in the aim in a form which could be realized in the classroom. This means that the changes which we specify are not changes in terminal student behavior but in the criteria to which teachers work in the classroom. These changes are defined by enunciating certain principles of procedure or criteria of criticism which are expressions of the aim. They are, if you like, specifications of a form of process. Some might be tempted to call them "process objectives," though that phrase does not seem to me a helpful one.

The difficulty in designing an effective curriculum experiment which does not use behavioral objectives might be expected to be most acute in the field of evaluation. Our evaluation officer, Barry MacDonald, who is present at this Conference, has devised an evaluation strategy based on the premise that the main function of curriculum evaluation is to inform decision makers. This enables him to bring in the questions which decision makers do in fact ask of us in order to assist him in selecting what effects to measure. Questions can be gathered from our funding agencies, from educational administrators, from parents, and from teachers.

I believe that this experimental approach to curriculum design and evaluation has considerable potential and, in certain situations,

marked advantages over the approach through objectives as a way of translating a value position which has been stated as a general aim into a practical teaching strategy. For the moment, however, it is enough to say that the value position which asks the teacher to accept criteria of neutrality and impartiality in handling controversial issues demands that we face the technical problem of devising and specifying a teaching strategy which is pedagogically effective and ethically justifiable.

Hence, the project team felt that it must attempt to develop experimentally and evaluate a pattern of teaching with the following characteristics:

1. The fundamental educational values of rationality, imagination, sensitivity, readiness to listen to the views of others, and so forth must be built into the principles of procedure in the classroom.

2. The pattern of teaching must renounce the authority of the teacher as an "expert" capable of solving value issues since this authority cannot be justified either epistemologically or politically. In short, the teacher must aspire to be neutral.

3. The teaching strategy [illegible] of the teacher in the classroom, but contain it within rules which can be justified in terms of the need for discipline and rigor in attaining understanding.

4. The strategy must be such as to satisfy parents and pupils that every possible effort is being made to avoid the use of the teacher's authority position to indoctrinate his own views.

5. The procedure must enable pupils to understand divergence of views and hence must depend upon a group working together through discussion and shared activities. In such a group opinions should be respected, and minority opinions should be protected from ridicule or from social pressure.

6. In sensitive issues, thought must be given to preserving privacy and protecting students; e.g., illegitimate children, children from broken homes, children of prostitutes should be borne in mind when discussing the family or relations between the sexes.

7. Above all, the aim should be understanding. This implies that one should not force pupils towards opinions or premature commitments which harden into prejudice. Nor should one see particular virtue in a change of view. The object is that the pupil should come to understand the nature and implications of his

point of view, and grow to adult responsibility by adopting it in his own person and assuming accountability for it. Whether or not the pupil changes his point of view is not significant for the attainment of understanding.

It seemed that the basic classroom pattern should be one of discussion. Instruction inevitably implies that the teacher cannot maintain a neutral position. In the discussion the teacher should be neutral on issues but he should be able to accept responsibility for the rigor and quality of the work, by being a recessive chairman and using shrewd questioning.

A discussion which aims at understanding cannot be a mere exchange of views. It must be a reflective inquiry fed by information. But it is virtually impossible for the teacher to be the source of information in a discussion group without breaching his neutrality and taking a dominant role. Therefore, the group will best feed information into its discussion by considering evidence.

It is important to see what is meant by "evidence" in this context. The group needs sources of information which place before it facts, insights into other people's points of view and perspectives on life, opportunities to project oneself imaginatively into other people's experiences, and some general impression of the cultural resources available in our civilization. No evidence is in the last analysis objective, and it is important for people to interpret and evaluate each piece of evidence. It is a false strategy to look for authority in evidence, both because of this lack of objectivity, and because the kind of value problems which are at stake in the discussion of controversial issues can never be solved without going beyond the evidence. When Truman, as President of the United States, made the decision to drop an atomic bomb, the evidence on which he acted was necessarily incomplete, and however complete it might be, it could never allow him to escape the responsibility of judgment. This is what is meant by "the buck stops here." Evidence can never take responsibility from our shoulders.

Thus, the use of the word evidence must not be taken to imply authoritative documentation. What is meant by evidence is simply any kind of material or experience used, not simply for its own sake, but in relevance to an issue. The word implies a way of using information and not the status of that information. Anything can be evidence if it is used effectively to explore a problem. We are not trying to assign our pupils to a life of committee meetings. That would be intolerable.

Discussion work in a group should generate research on the part

of both pupils and teachers as they find evidence to feed the discussion and illuminate the issues that confront them. In theory, a group with the assistance of a teacher can build up its own collection of evidence, but in practice it is scarcely feasible for teachers with the limited time and facilities at their disposal to collect enough materials to support adequately a discussion-based inquiry of this sort. The project therefore decided that it should attempt to produce rich, diverse, and, as far as possible, balanced collections of evidence as foundation collections for school documentation centers. These collections could stand in relation to the teacher's and pupil's collections of evidence as the school library stands in relation to the personal books of teacher and pupil.

The materials provided by the project include songs, poems, extracts from novels and plays, letters, extracts from biography, memoirs and historical works, readings in social science, journalism, advertisements, questionnaires, statistical tables, graphs, maps and plans, cartoons, still photographs, slides of paintings, and audiotapes.

It has been assumed as essential that materials cannot be written by the project team, if they are to be regarded as evidence. Experimental materials used in schools are selected from a much larger collection assembled by the team.

The collections have a structure which is intended to ensure that the teacher is likely to have at his disposal at least one piece of material to cover any issue likely to arise within a given topic area. In other words, the structure is there to help achieve coverage. The materials are not intended to be used in a predetermined sequence, but rather to be brought into the discussion in response to points arising from the group. A teacher prepares for this kind of teaching by knowing his way around the collection and not by making up his mind in advance what pieces he will use in any given discussion meeting.

The collections are at this stage being tried in a diverse sample of between thirty and forty schools.

Although it is an important part of the task of the project to produce materials which have been adequately tested in use, far more interesting is the study of the teaching situation. Our teachers have been regularly sending to the central team 20-minute tapes of discussion sessions. The study of these tapes is enabling us to work out the implications of our basic premises and aims for discussion-based work and we have been able to move toward a first draft of a self-training program for teachers.

At this stage we have only completed the second year of a five-year experiment, and what I have to say about our findings must be treated as personal reflections on the work in hand and not as secure results.

One of the interesting things is that one encounters a tradition which seems to go back to a misinterpretation of Dewey. I believe that Dewey was deeply concerned with intellectual and educational values, and that the nearest attempt to explore systematically the implications of his conception of reflective teaching is Griffin's Ph.D. thesis from Ohio State University, which is reported at some length in Gage's *Handbook of Research on Teaching*. But Dewey has notoriously been misinterpreted, and one encounters this misinterpretation in teachers who feel that the function of discussion is social rather than educational. For many, a discussion group is a kind of performance, and the values by which they judge it are a desire for fluency, animation, balance of contribution, and social adjustment within the group. Of course, it would be wrong to underestimate the importance of an understanding of group dynamics for any kind of work in discussion, but in proposing an aim of understanding, we find that we have called into question the values which are often taken for granted in such work. For example, it is clear that learning to listen is quite as important as learning to speak, and that we cannot be satisfied with a pace of activity which gives no time for reflection. There are all sorts of patterns of discussion and activity which need to be looked at afresh in the light of the aim. For example, is it a good thing that in a discussion group only two people speak in a 20-minute sequence? If we refer this to our aim, the question can only be answered by discovering whether the understanding of the group as a whole was enhanced. Although these points seem simple and obvious, in practice the effect on a group of the realization that it is trying to achieve understanding rather than serving as a means for individual members to convert one another to deeply held opinions is quite radical in its implications for discussion work.

Another point which has emerged is the extreme subtlety and strength of the teacher's authority position in his classroom. It is often transmitted by barely perceptible cues. For example, the chairman of a discussion group who persistently asks questions to which he thinks he knows the answer rather than questions to which he does not know the answer implicitly asserts his position of superiority and authority and indeed often makes the group feel that the discussion is merely an oblique teaching method which cloaks the teacher's instructional position. Again, because of his general au-

thority position in the school the teacher is a potential source of rewards; however, if one is, as we are, attempting to get the group of students to accept full responsibility for their own learning, then they must find rewards in the task itself and in their own progress. A teacher as chairman cannot afford to say "yes" or "an interesting point." This sort of reward clearly tends to set up a guessing game in which the students are more concerned with interpreting the teacher's behavior in order to understand what he has in his mind than with interpreting the issues before them in the light of the evidence. The teacher needs to see that students are rewarded by being carefully listened to and fed with questions which help them to articulate and express their own point of view.

One very interesting point is that there are indications that the assumption of a neutral and nonauthoritarian role on the part of the teacher reduces his capacity to transmit to his pupils his low expectation of their performance. Recent researchers have suggested quite strongly that teacher expectation is a major element in holding down the achievement of pupils of average ability, and there are some indications of a strengthening of the capacity of pupil groups to face difficult reading materials as a result of the work of the project. One might formulate this by suggesting the hypothesis that when a group responsibility for achieving understanding, then the reading level of that group is higher than that of any individual member within it.

Another area in which our understanding has been enhanced by the study of tapes of teaching in action is the nature and interpretation of evidence. Almost all evidence is ambiguous, and we are led to a consideration of the significance of ambiguity and its interpretation. The natural impulse of a group confronted with evidence is to attempt to establish a solid consensus, but it may well be that understanding depends upon the acceptance of divergence and the exploration of its nature. It is quite clear that the majority of teachers approach the problem of helping pupils to understand a poem or a picture merely by transmitting their own personal interpretations, yet it is also clear from discussion groups held with teachers that highly qualified teachers of English diverge in their own interpretations of a poem. The teaching approaches which we are exploring may have a relevance far beyond controversial issues. Within the whole range of the arts, we are dealing with value judgments which are in part the expression of personal responses. Disagreement about the arts is not controversial in the sense proposed by Dorothy Fraser

only because the arts do not arouse the citizenry. Yet it may still be appropriate if we are to achieve understanding to treat the disagreements as important.

As I said, I cannot offer at this stage any full report on our work. But I have no doubt that we are encountering fundamental problems in the nature of understanding, the nature of authority in teaching, and the nature of evidence which are potentially of considerable significance beyond our field. The problem we are dealing with—discussion in the presence of value divergence—is clearly significant at all levels of adult and higher education as well as in the secondary school.

Such a style of discussion, which asks the participants to commit themselves to the aim of attaining understanding, may have a particular significance where value divisions tend to produce alienation between different groups in society. One would like to investigate the problems and possibilities of bringing together into a discussion group of this sort members with sharply divided value systems, divided for example by race or social class or generation. Of course, by no means all such people will commit themselves from the outset to accepting responsibility for achieving deeper understanding of the issues at stake. I am not claiming that we have any easy technique for overcoming intractable problems of mutual understanding. We cannot create goodwill; we can only help it to work.

It may well be that the occasion has offered us something worthy of the occasion has tempted me to anticipate results and to overemphasize both the significance and relevance of our work.

However, there are basic assumptions in our work which represent a value position, which would not be affected by our results.

First, we assume that an educator has a responsibility to choose curriculum content—the broad agenda of education—on the value judgment that certain activities, experiences, or forms of knowledge are worthwhile in themselves, and he has to make clear the grounds on which he believes them worthwhile.

Second, we assume that the educational process must embody certain basic values such as rationality, respect for persons, acceptance of consistent criteria, and so forth. To call a process "education" is to assert that it embodies certain values as principles of procedure.

Third, that certainly in the face of controversial issues, and probably in a much wider field than that, a democracy has a value commitment which should be represented in its educational procedures.

This commitment has been well expressed by Griffin.

> Societies are democratic in the degree to which they refrain from setting limits upon matters that may be thought about. It is a corollary that such societies place their faith in knowledge and actively promote occasions for doubt on the ground that doubt is the beginning of all knowledge.[4]

In a democracy, ethical, political, and social values must always be held open to question and discussion. To say this is not to express indifference to the values people hold. On the contrary. If you want to know what value problems most concern a dictatorship, you look for the area where it is most intent on indoctrination. If you want to know what values most concern a democracy, you look for the areas where it most concerned to stimulate discussion. And it is the strength of education in a democracy that discussion rests upon firmer and more defensible educational values than does indoctrination.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Fraser, Dorothy M. *Deciding What To Teach.* Project on the Instructional Program of the Public Schools. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1963. p. 153. Quoted in Neagley, Ross L. and Evans, N. Dean. *Handbook for Effective Curriculum Development.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. p. 19.

[2] Schools Council Working Paper Number 2, *Raising the School Leaving Age.* London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965. para. 60.

[3] National Education Association, Center for the Study of Instruction. *From Bookshelves to Action.* Washington, D.C.: the Association, 1964. pp. 12-13. Quoted by Neagley and Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

[4] Summary of Griffin's position in Metcalf, Lawrence E. "Research on Teaching the Social Studies." pp. 934-35 in Gage, N. L., editor. *Handbook of Research on Teaching.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

The Choices Before Us: Tri-National Panel

Neil Paterson

A small seed has grown into a familiar plant in the English school curriculum during the last decade. A number of schools have developed regular programs of community service; that is, programs to involve young people in situations where they can make an active contribution in their local communities as part of school work. At first, these programs were confined to the 16- to 18-year-olds in the Sixth Form. But gradually teachers recognized that they offered something to younger students as well. In particular, schools began to include community service as an integral part of the new courses they were developing for the 14- and 15-year-old, early-school-leavers—the nonacademic group.

It might be useful to include at this point a description of such a program which I received recently from a head teacher. She began by describing how in the early sixties a certain amount of voluntary work was done by the girls and boys as part of the Duke of Edinburg Ward School.

> Then in 1962 the need for the girls in the childcare course to gain experience with children led to our approaching local infant schools. Thanks to very cooperative head teachers, we were soon able to let all the girls following this course spend some time each week with five-year-olds. Introduction to nursery schools, clinics and hospitals quickly followed, both for the girls interested in childcare work and for those who were hoping to train eventually as nurses. At first, all practical experience took place outside the school building, but the girls soon felt a need to have a more direct responsibility for children than was possible on their visits, valuable though these were. They felt too that conditions in the infant schools and nurseries, with their furniture and equipment especially planned for small children, were not such as they themselves would meet in their own homes. The next step therefore

was to invite into our building groups of children of pre-school age. This served two purposes: to give the girls the experience they required and to give harrassed mothers an occasional, much needed rest. All this work was part of the girl's childcare studies and all practical work was discussed and related to theory. The work at this time was carried out by just a small group of girls, most of whom were leaving at age 15.

I am going to omit part of the account that follows and come to the part that relates particularly to community service.

The new programs included one day for a study of people at work which took the girls into shops and offices and brought workers of all kinds into the school, so that the world of work took on a more familiar look and the girls began to appreciate many different types of employment. It included also one day for social studies based on some aspects of human needs such as health, education, welfare, all under the general heading of the community's responsibility to the individual which became the individual's responsibility to the community. Once interest was aroused, there grew a need to go out of the school to see what was being done in neighboring towns. A study of health, for example, involved cooperation with Local Authorities for whom the problem of old age is becoming increasingly pressing. Welfare and health visitors were invited into school to discuss their work and its demands. As a result of this link, the girls were taken by officials to old people's homes, the homes of old people who needed visiting, luncheon clubs, rehabilitation workshops, day centers, clubs, council flatlets specially designed for old and handicapped, and homes run by other organizations. They also visited hospitals and clinics of many types. To learn about housing there were visits to housing estates of various types, visits by builders and introduction to building costs and standards. Local Authority policies were discussed and rent collectors and estate agents came to talk to the girls about such matters as eviction, mortgages and planning in general.

As they learned to observe and criticize and question so they found in themselves a need to give help where they had discovered it was necessary and so from the curriculum began the school community work on the initiative of the girls themselves. Their visits came to include help at luncheon clubs, old people's homes, hospitals, centers and schools for the mentally and physically handicapped, nurseries and nursery schools. The manner in which our community work was organized has let to the adoption of a local old people's home and this in turn has led to an extension of curricular involvement. The attitude of the old folk has changed considerably. From a rather tentative acceptance of help has grown a conviction that they have only to ask to receive. They wanted

pictures for their sitting room so they came to an art exhibition arranged for their benefit and chose cushions which were then made in the home economics department. Furniture needed renovating. This was done as part of our homemaking course. Posters were required to advertize their Bring and Buy Sale. Again work for the art department. Special refreshments and an entertainment for visitors from another old people's home again provided by the school.

An important effect in our work with old people is that they in their turn are most anxious that they can give some help to the school. And they have, for example, provided items for our Christmas bazaar.

A month ago the childcare group invited a group of seven-year-olds from one of our local infants schools to a party. The group was responsible for the organization, entertainment, decorations and menu. They asked for help from the art department with the result that when the day of the party came the area in which it was to be held was decorated with banners and very large stuffed animals and a trapeze artist, life-size, was swinging on her trapeze from the ceiling. Enough party hats had been made for every child and the tea table had been decorated. One group of girls had been responsible for the sandwiches, scones and small cakes and for the large cake which had been made in the shape of a clown which occupied the center of the table. A circus performance had been arranged in some of the classes and there was the ringmaster, a magician with his card tricks, a ventriloquist and dog, a performing baby, an elephant, and a giant who sang nursery rhymes with the audience. The entertainment finished with the reading of a story.

As the work has grown, so has the image of the school locally. We're now regarded as a community center and requests of various kinds are frequently received.

Now this is fairly typical of the work which is going on with the 14- to 15-year age group. But obviously the programs in schools vary much according to the area, the support from outside agencies, and the age and abilities of the children taking part.

However, all these programs have certain features in common:

1. They take it for granted that learning experiences can be organized for young people outside the classroom, outside the school, and beyond the immediate control of the teacher.

2. They draw heavily for their success on the active involvement of adults who do not normally consider that they have a share in the education of young people—matrons and nurses of hospitals, for example.

3. They assume that young people can be trusted to take and carry out these responsibilities without the constant supervision of the teacher.

4. They demand personal commitment and involvement.

Community service is only one of the possible programs which provide such opportunities. However, it is not enough to expect that all the desirable objectives will follow simply because you put this program in operation.

One danger of introducing community service into the curriculum, especially that of the early-school-leaver, is that it seems to slip in without need for educational justification. It has "good" written all over it. It is one way of solving disciplinary problems for it moves the likely troublemakers out of the school. Yet the same teachers who favor it for the early-school-leavers are just as likely to advance reasons why their students taking public examinations have no time to enjoy such experiences. If community service has anything to offer one group of young people, it ought to have something to offer to all.

Another difficulty is that planning a program can involve the teacher in an extraordinary amount of preparatory exploration not only in the school but in the community. The busy teacher often does not have time to evaluate. We assume that all desirable objectives—consideration for others, awareness of one's ability to give something to others, an operational knowledge of the welfare services—will be reached simply because we have organized. Yet the operation can fail to achieve any of these objectives.

I heard of one school which had a national reputation for the work its young people were doing. The school is on a huge housing estate on the outskirts of one of our industrial cities, a wilderness where the city deposited families displaced by slum clearance. On paper the community service scheme looked excellent, but the reaction of the boys and girls who took part was completely negative. They thought that the whole exercise was a waste of time, engineered by teachers who wanted to regiment them. They were right. The school was authoritarian. The work was organized by the staff. The boys and girls were not consulted. Many things were wrong with the social environment of which the school was part, but what the young people felt was wrong was not necessarily where the teachers wanted to involve them. If in fact we are asking young people to take responsibility, we need to study the logic of our own behavior to make certain we are not giving freedom with one hand and holding it back with another.

Practical work in the community must be an integral part of education, with its roots either in the school or in the young person's own experience. We often are so busy providing children with information and materials that we are not always alert to what young people themselves can offer. Besides, to make a useful contribution in the community, young people need preparation. By this I do not mean a course in government or childcare. They need help from their teachers in observing different kinds of institutions to help them see how these institutions work, where power lies, and how to bring about change. They could, for example, begin by looking at their own schools where they might find enough to keep them occupied.

The Schools Council is at present running a project to see how far children in the secondary school can be helped to develop these skills. Preparation is only part of the total picture. It is also necessary to follow up this experience by discussing it with their peers, their teachers, and other adults; and to relate it to work in the classroom, in the English lessons, in social studies, or perhaps in areas of the curriculum which at first seem less related.

In one school the community service was closely linked with craft work. A local hostel for physically handicapped children needed specially built aids and toys, many of which were too costly to buy. The craft teacher saw this as an opportunity to involve his students in the design and planning of this apparatus. This involved the boys and girls in visiting the children, getting to know them and their disabilities, and designing aids to suit the needs of each child. It is perhaps significant that the school did not call this community service and that the most detailed public report of this appeared in the School's Council *Technology Bulletin*.

To follow the logic of our own argument, we should give young people more responsibility in situations where practical demands are going to be made on them. It is a pity to achieve educational opportunities at the expense of keeping young people in tutelage. We are asking for trouble if we do this. To involve young people in the community, we should ask them not simply to accept our decision, as teachers, on what needs to be done but rather to take responsibility for this themselves. Our job in relation to community service will then cease to be that of organizers and become that of consultants. While this may relieve us of some of the preparatory work, it certainly will not lessen our emotional and physical involvement. It is difficult to be an observer, especially when dealing with situations that demand action. In community work the division between

social and political action can be a fine one. How do teachers react when young people can no longer accept the situation where, for example, they are working in a hospital with mentally handicapped children who are given a raw deal? Do teachers know how to handle this situation? In accepting a responsibility for community work as part of the curriculum, English schools have taken on something that is potentially radical. I am not sure that this is fully realized by teachers. Perhaps extremes can be avoided, but it will not take our students long to discover what is happening.

If the school should expose itself and its students to situations in the community which demand action, we must accept that the relationship between teachers and pupils and the relationship between the school and the community will change. What is relevant to this Conference is not only community service, interesting though this may be, but also the implications of where it may lead and how teachers, administrators, and parents are going to define priorities.

In England, community service is often referred to as having something to contribute to the moral, social, or even the religious education of young people. No doubt it has. But if it does, I do not think that involving young people in a situation where they are asked to respond to the needs of an old person for companionship, for example, or a handicapped child to be treated as a human being, necessarily will make them better citizens or more religious. All that one can say for certain is that they have had a new experience. How they use that experience in the future will depend on many other aspects of their personality.

The Choices Before Us: Tri-National Panel

Mario Fantini

In this setting, I feel like the worried clergyman addressing the congregation for the first time. He begins to read his sermon, and toward the bottom of page one he reads, "And Adam said unto Eve . . ." He looks at his congregation. "And Adam said unto Eve . . ." He looks at his notes. "And Adam said unto Eve . . ." And he says, "A leaf seems to be missing."

I have a strange leaf here. I do not know how logical I can be. I have several points to make. The only way I can relate this to an international context is to say that the forces shaping advanced technological societies—urbanization, technology, democracy—tie us together. I have had experiences about certain things in urban settings that I think represent waste of energy. I hope others can benefit from these experiences.

In the informal part of the Conference some people say, "Well the urban problem is there, but we don't have that kind of problem." While this may be true now, leadership should anticipate an environment that does not yet exist. In the United States by the end of 1970, three-fourths of the population will be urban. The technological forces are proceeding at a geometric rate, while the ability of institutions to adapt proceeds at an arithmetic rate at best. Thus the institutions are becoming more irrelevant to the purposes for which they exist. We are concerned with one of those institutions and we seek to update it, to reform it.

The problems in this country concern also the process by which reform is achieved. And the process is probably more important than the product. After some thirty years of conferences where the themes, diagnoses, and prescriptions have varied little, we have been unable to implement changes designed some time ago. In this country we are beginning the second progressive movement in edu-

cation. We are suddenly revisiting Dewey and the other giants who forecast what might happen if the forces that they could foresee took shape, as indeed they have. However, the symptoms of institutional obsolescence fill the road to rehabilitation with hazards. We are going through a period of profound transition.

The student movement, the urban crisis, and parental discontent are symptoms of a more pervasive problem. That problem is the gradual realization that the institution is not serving us and that students and parents have no way at present to make the school more responsive, because of the way it is structured. So we have people who feel impotent to change the institutions that are supposed to serve them, and we face growing alienation. Meanwhile, energies which could have been harnessed to a common problem are lost. And I hope that those who have lead time can prevent a collision.

The problem is one of institutional obsolescence. Society is beginning to make demands to which the school cannot respond. Or it responds in the only way it can, by adding new structures as each new need emerges. When the first industrial revolution called attention to manpower needs we developed a vocational wing. When we discovered poverty we made more demands on the school. Other wings are developing—early childhood education, adult education, and compensatory education. This add-on strategy for reform is followed because we have to keep certain things going as we attempt to respond to our client. But this add-on strategy has taken us to a point where the road ahead has to be different. The model of education which we now try to update was forged in another century and is a conception of education that grew out of fixed notions of man and his environment. I think that we have yet to translate the Einsteinian notion into a more dynamic concept, whether it has to do with IQ or capacity, or whether one looks at the school as an egg crate, a flexible device, or as the basic element of learning. All these are ingredients that have to go into a different conception of education.

But now although I say that, I think that about 75 percent of Americans are happy and satisfied with the institution. I think that most of the clients like things the way they are and that they have a right to keep them the way they are. So while we try to update that model —and most of the discussion has to do with making the existing model more functional—the problem remains one of introducing into the system of public education new conceptions aimed at common sets of objectives. As far as I can see, having tried to impose on the client a wall-to-wall solution, having said to conferences that I

had a model of education to replace the one that I consider outdated, I did not take into account the rights of others. This is a natural thing for the professional to do, but it is completely dysfunctional.

To me, the values we have been talking about have to do with maximizing choice for people—for the professional, for the students, for the parents, and for the other citizens—for the kind of education that makes sense. Right no we are trying to make one system serve needs of masses of diverse populations. The result is, at best, developing values of assimilation, getting everybody to adjust to one mainstream culture, rather than developing the diversity which is the vitality of the society itself. We have developed an adjustment disposition. We adjust the school to negative environments, such as pollution or slums. We have not yet developed the notion that individuals have the responsibility to reconstruct environments that have a negative consequence on growth and development. When students in school face an adjustment to an environment that they feel is negative, they have very limited choices.

In the generation to come, the ingredients of new institutions will redefine the basic unit called the classroom. More and more the community will be the classroom. I think the whole notion of the credentialed teacher will change, with different notions of who the teacher might be. We are moving from a single set of legitimate objectives in an institution to sets of objectives, moving from a cognitive to an affective, more humanistic institution. We are reminded by the client that the bureaucratic institution is in many ways inhuman and autocratic and yet we expect it to produce democratic behavior. We are going to look at education as something not only for children but also for people. We are moving rapidly—and this Conference is an indication—from education as talking and covering of subject matter to education as doing and experiencing and reconstructing and changing. We are looking at the ends of education more carefully and at the roles of parents, citizens, the worker, and the individual. I think that the processes leading to these roles will be more sharply defined. In the politics of education we are beginning to see a reversal of the top-down flow of decision making to a bottom-up process where the agents closest to the action—the teacher, the parent, and the student—become increasingly the agents of decision. This will lead, I think, to more democratization of the institution with consequences for the value structure.

There are common sets of objectives that most of us would accept; however, the varied paths to these common sets of objectives are not clear, nor is it clear that these options can be encompassed with-

in the system of public education. We are trying in vain to make one model respond to diversity. There is an alternative which is congruent with the ideals of the society, based on free choice, and containing the seeds of renewal. If we have common objectives and realize that there are optional ways of getting there, by what process can we develop these options? Is it possible to have a free choice system of public education at the local level? Is it possible to permit the 75 percent in the community who like the schools as they are to maintain them? Can we work with the other 25 percent to open up new conceptions of education—a school-without-walls conception or a multicultural approach or simply the ungraded team teaching approach? Is it possible in a community where there are four schools that each school begin to develop a different conception of education? Or if not each school, a school within a school?

Let me be a little personal. When I worked in Harlem (some of you visited School 201) parents rebelling against the school said to me, "It's alright for you to say I should adjust to the school, because if you don't like the school in your community, you could move, you could send your child to a private school. In other words, you have options. I have very few options. I've got to take the school as it is and it's not responsive to me and my culture. It's not conducive to growth and development. Now to whom do I appeal?" This question struck home. I found that the school which my children attend was not maximizing the potential. I had few options, even if all I wanted was an ungraded school, which is to me just a change in organization. I made phone call after phone call to see how I could change my children's school environment. As I began to press the administration, I became a thorn in their side. I felt impotent, yet still faced with the responsibility for the growth and development of my children. Finally I realized that a school down the street was trying to do something ungraded and I appealed to have my child sent there. School officials refused on the basis of the way district lines are established.

In other words, I had to accept the one option. I think we have to open up more options. There are parents, maybe 10, 15, or 20 percent, who want a Montessori program. Yet they have no way of getting this unless they go to England or move elsewhere at tremendous cost. I think that the system of public education has to open up these choices, create a type of supply and demand. If 75 percent of the people are happy with the existing system even though I personally disagree, the 75 percent have a right to their opinion. The point is, what are my rights? I am not talking about imposing my criteria on

others, but simply expanding my options and those of other parents, teachers, and students.

Gradually, if there is increased demand for variant kinds of education, the processes of supply and demand should produce a self-selection process. Gradually other parents will become aware that options exist to achieve common sets of objectives.

This must affect teacher training, because right now we prepare most teachers for only one model and even if we offer different models teachers actually have to work in an environment which produces behavior appropriate to only one model. We can envision the time when the whole notion of parochial education may fit this more open model. We are at a stage now where we have to consider the role of the school with regard to a philosophy of man. Where other objectives are the same, I think many would prefer parochial education. It is possible, that under a system of options, parochial education could fit into a public school system. I think the seeds of renewal are inherent in this. Without superimposing something because we think it is best, we can develop the main value of an open society, a wider choice for people.

We must make these choices visible. Right now they are only conceptually visible to people who have not had the opportunities to think things through. We need some specimens, and I would hope that these specimens could be under the framework of education. That may seem farfetched for many whose realities militate against the availability of options. Just think for a moment of your community, or of any community characterized by diversity. Is that diversity reflected in the institutions? Could it be possible, if 10 percent of the parents, teachers, or students want an option, to make it available? I went through a stage in which I put a new monolithic structure on the table and said, "If you don't like this, you don't know anything about growth and development." I am now saying that if people want an educational system which in my opinion is restrictive they ought to have that. We have to develop alternatives without compromising the basic rights of people.

The Choices Before Us: Tri-National Panel

George Flower

Henry Bessemer, who developed the great Bessemer process for making steel, was a relative novice in the business. He stumbled upon this breakthrough for a problem that had perplexed the steel business for years. When asked how he did it, Bessemer modestly said, "I was lucky; but another factor was that I had not been so close to the business for so long that I had come to believe that whatever is is therefore right." It is easy to agree that whatever is is not necessarily right. I suppose most of us have made speeches to this effect. That position supplies much of the driving force behind our research and behind the work of the Schools Council, the NEA-CSI, and the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. But in our insistence that whatever *is* is therefore not right we may sometimes fall into the other trap, by acting as if whatever is is therefore wrong.

It seems to me, and admittedly this is gross oversimplification, that many students and staff in Canadian and American universities and school systems seem to be saying that whatever is established, is for that very reason wrong. The basic value position of increasing numbers of people, and not just a lunatic fringe, seems to run something like this: "The world is in a mess, we're fed up with it, so let's change, for change is bound to be for the better. Don't ask us what to substitute for our present circumstances. Don't ask us to work out the likely effects of alternatives. Don't clutter up the issue with logic." As a member of our discussion group said, "Don't cloud our feelings by asking us to verbalize and rationalize. We don't like what is, so out it must go."

I find this approach, according to my own personal value system, rather disturbing. Wilfred Wees may say, "Flower, you just don't want to rock the boat. You want to maintain the *status quo*." But I do not think it is that simple. One of the students in our group was

concerned about the possible out-of-the-frying-pan-into-the-fire effect, or at least out of one frying-pan into another where the temperature might be even higher. So among the various thoughts that have been chasing themselves around in my mind today (Ole Sand says Thursdays are for thinking!) is this gloomy one: Does our value crisis today boil down to a rejection of what is without adequate exploration of alternatives and their possible advantages and disadvantages? If this proposition is worth entertaining for a while, what are some of its implications for curriculum? I doubt, like Mario Fantini, that we shall find any wall-to-wall solutions. But I think there are a number of directions for seeking answers regarding values in the curriculum. I would like to mention a few which have appealed to me.

First, I want to remember, more actively and continuously than before, that the academic is attracted by ideas, by concepts. When we grapple with matters of value, we must guard against overemphasis on the cognitive, on concepts and ideas, and against a possibly serious underemphasis on the affective, on emotion and feelings. I do not think this is an anti-intellectual position, although some of my friends tell me it is. It is simply a recognition that not all are as attracted by ideas, by intellectualization, as we ourselves may tend to be. Professor O'Neill said that values are circumstantial. Certainly reason is by no means the only component in the circumstances of the environment.

Second, in seeking answers about values in the curriculum, we should recognize not only that values are circumstantial but also that it is not possible to change or to control all circumstances overnight.

Henrick Ibsen liked to gather a few friends for dinner and engage in conversation on the manifest evils of the world and how to overcome them. Frequently the discussion would become more sweeping and the plans proposed by Ibsen more grandiose. On such occasions Ibsen's wife would bring him back to earth with a quiet, "Please pass the potatoes, Henrik." I think we can pass the potatoes on values and the curriculum. We do not have to wait until we have some wall-to-wall solution, some plan for all the complex problems involved before we approach some of them. Mr. Stenhouse's initial project plans, for example, seem to me to be most promising. However, we do not have to wait until his final reports are in before moving in some of the directions his study suggests.

Third, we need not approach values and the curriculum in an all-or-nothing-at-all spirit. We tend to intellectualize; we pose sharp alternatives. Yet the real choice is never or rarely the one or the other.

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There is an infinite range of in-between choices to the question, Are professional school people to abandon their long-term objectives and take over the objectives of the pupils? Dame Muriel Stewart replies that the divergence between our objectives for the school and the objectives of young people for themselves turns out to be less than it would first appear. Wilfred Wees asks us to aim at helping a boy to develop to the point where he can say to himself with assurance, "I am not just a man. I am my own man." We value that. Yet no man is an island and every man, no matter how much he is his own man, is also a man in society and so the value is not only independence but also interdependence. The choice is not one or the other but as much as possible of each.

Now what kind of action does this suggest for us? I think Howard Hausman of the National Science Foundation phrased it well when he suggested that we can look closely at the way we organize our schools and the learning environment at any given time with reference to any given purpose or activity. There must be some organization, however temporary, when two or more persons interact. In the very nature of organization there are bound to be some constraints. But, suggests Hausman, to facilitate the development of values requires a review of all the environmental constraints that have grown up and that we have imposed, with a view to eliminating all of them that may not be absolutely necessary. It is only a step. It is not all or nothing, but it is also not nothing at all.

Finally, I have been much impressed with an approach to values and the curriculum developed by Mrs. Charity James and her associates in Goldsmith's College and the schools they work with. Again it is not all or nothing, but it is a beginning. As I understand it, Mrs. James and her colleagues begin working with a group of teachers in a course of in-service training. To oversimplify, this is initially rather unstructured so that among other things the teachers can have an experience from which they will hopefully learn to be a little more comfortable and effective in the face of uncertainty as to what precisely should be done, how, when, where, and why. Then these teachers, back in their schools, are involved in, among other things, a partial blurring of firm subject matter lines in the curriculum and a greater involvement of as many students as possible with those constraints removed. As a result, students, too, may learn to seek whatever may be required to solve a problem which interests them, and students, too, may deal comfortably and effectively with uncertainty.

Two points here seem to be vital. First, the development of capacity to deal comfortably and effectively with uncertainty is a major value aim. The one thing that is certain about the future is that it is uncertain. Second, the need is recognized to give teachers experience and confidence. To give us practitioners experience and confidence in dealing with uncertainty will, it is hoped, develop something of the same capacity in the students.

It strikes me as rather impressive that our basic posture as professionals, as teachers looking at our own work, is to question what we are doing; we find many soft spots and we try to do something about them. Such a value orientation strikes me as not only highly desirable but also highly necessary. Mario Fantini speaks of institutional obsolescence and he is right. We must look at the soft spots. However, in castigating ourselves for our shortcomings, in concentrating on our weaknesses, it would be unfortunate if teachers were to be so overcome by the enormity of their shortcomings and the complexity of their problems that they concluded that little can be done and as a .esult, did nothing. The rather extensive successes in education should serve as reassurances as we spend most of our time on the soft spots and worry about all our failures.

I will stop with the story of the man who took a friend out to show off his new hunting dog. They were hunting over water and every time a bird fell the dog stepped over the side of the boat, walked across the water, retrieved the bird, walked back, and stepped into the boat. The friend made no comment at all. Finally, the owner of the dog said, "Don't you see anything unusual about my dog?" "Yes," said the friend, "the poor beast can't swim."

Appendix A.
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Appendix B.
Participating Students
from Onteora High School, Boiceville, New York

	Grade
Patricia Adels	10
Mark Bailey	12
John Buoymaster	12
Jenny Buton	11
Bill Eichhorn	12
Suzanne Goddard	10
Howard Gordon	12
Barbara Graff	12
Mark Grazier	12
George Haug	12
Judy Hevesi	11
Nancy Hollyday	11
Lorraine Holzman	12
Sonja Klaessig	10
Kathy Lee	12
Christine McCarthy	12
Thomas Peekema	12
Mary Rickard	12
John Runge	12
Britt St. John	10
Helen Schaeffer	12
Karla Sieger	12
David Snyder	12
Bill Weidman	11
Christopher Weidman	12
David Wilber	12
Beatrice Wilkenson	12
Jessie Wolf	12
David Zimet	11

Appendix C.
Officers
of Discussion Groups

BY LEVELS

Teacher Education

I. Chairman: Kirkpatrick, J. B. (Canada)
Rapporteur: Chenney, Betty (U.S.A.)
II. Chairman: Kirkpatrick, David (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Walton, John (U.K.)

Nursery Schools – Kindergarten

III. Chairman: James, Charity (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Nations, Jimmy E. (U.S.A.)

Elementary

IV. Chairman: Jones, George W. (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Martineau, Jacques (Canada)
V. Chairman: Stewart, Dame Muriel (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Hefner, Norman E. (U.S.A.)
VI. Chairman: Prueter, K. F. (Canada)
Rapporteur: Price, R. D. (U.K.)
VII. Chairman: Caston, Geoffrey (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Magers, Sally (U.S.A.)
VIII. Chairman: Gilliss, K. E. (Canada)
Rapporteur: Raphael, Barbara (Canada)

Secondary

IX. Chairman: Overly, Norman (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Richert, George E. (Canada)
X. Chairman: D'Angelo, John (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Clayton, Dorothy (U.K.)
XI. Chairman: Powell-Davies, M. G. (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Giles, W. H. (Canada)
XII. Chairman: Drew, L. J. (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Harrison, G. B. (U.K.)
XIII. Chairman: Deshaies, Cyrille (Canada)
Rapporteur: Halsey, P. (U.K.)
XIV. Chairman: Breckmann, G. K. (Canada)
Rapporteur: Coyle, R. B. (U.K.)

BY SUBJECT AREAS

Social Studies (including History)

A. Chairman: Miel, Alice (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: MacDonald, Barry (U.K.)
B. Chairman: Young, Brian (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Fraser, Dorothy (U.S.A.)
C. Chairman: O'Kane, Robert (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Morrison, Allan B. (Canada)
D. Chairman: Edinger, Lois (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Deakin, John (U.K.)

Language (including English)

E. Chairman: Hoon, Nancy M. (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Cunningham, H. F. (U.K.)
F. Chairman: Rogers, G. A. (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Woods, Thomas (U.S.A.)

Mathematics and Science

G. Chairman: Herbert, John (Canada)
Rapporteur: Thier, Herbert D. (U.S.A.)
H. Chairman: McIlhone, John (Canada)
Rapporteur: Naylor, F. T. (U.K.)
I. Chairman: Langford, Walter J. (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Anderson, Norman D. (U.S.A.)

Philosophy (including Ethics)

J. Chairman: Elliott, John (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Haug, George (U.S.A.)

Arts

K. Chairman: Cox, Peter (U.K.)
Rapporteur: Jewett, Ann E. (U.S.A.)

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L. Chairman: Beauchamp, George A. (U.S.A.)
Rapporteur: Payne, Arlene (U.S.A.)
M. Chairman: Scarfe, N. V. (Canada)
Rapporteur: Wilson, Elizabeth (U.S.A.)

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N. Chairman: Coutts, H. T. (Canada)
Rapporteur: Gabbard, Hazel (U.S.A.)

Appendix D. School Visits and Films

SCHOOLS

Fox Lane Middle School, Bedford, New York—team teaching, technological aids, computer-assisted instruction, revised curriculum

Reginald R. Bennett Elementary School, Boiceville, New York—centralized education in a rural setting, variety of programs

Horace Greeley High School, Chappaqua, New York—a school where there is much enthusiasm for learning

Ralph R. Smith Elementary School, Hyde Park, New York—an "almost rural" school emphasizing freedom and responsibility of the individual, teacher, and student

Newburgh Free Academy, Newburgh, New York—a comprehensive high school with a wide variety of programs

State University Campus School, New Paltz, New York—an experimental school with latest educational innovations including CAI and individualized instruction

Ridgewood High School, Ridgewood, New Jersey—outstanding humanities courses, team taught; extensive use of outside personnel

White Plains High School, White Plains, New York—involvement of students in planning and working with teachers on curriculum; large city school

Yorktown Heights High School, Yorktown Heights, New York—well-balanced high school programs; suburban area

Children's Community Workshop School, New York City—a private, innovative school working on fundamental educational principles

Downtown Community School, New York City—a private school which attempts, through its scholarship program, to enroll learners from lower economic groups; intercultural curriculum

Bank Street School for Children, New York City—a tuition demonstration school with a teacher preparation college; curriculum highly individualized

Intermediate School 201, New York City—a school in the New York City School System with emphasis on black history and culture; community involvement

Early Childhood Center, Bank Street College of Education, New York City—an experimental and demonstration project funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity and the New York City Council Against Poverty; for preschool children and also a community action program

FILMS

Children Without (United States)
Who Cares? (United Kingdom)
Very Nice, Very Nice (Canada)
21-87 (Canada)
And So Tomorrow (Canada)
The Way It Is (United States)
The Last Bus (United Kingdom)
E.F.F.E. Walt Whitman High School (United States)

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